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ABSTRACT

THREE ESSAYS ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA: SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS
SEPTEMBER 2016
YING CHEN, B.A., SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL STUDIES UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor David Kotz and Professor Robert Pollin

The first essay focuses on the role of the hukou (i.e. Household Registration
System) with full awareness of the economic system it operates under, and the
development model it assists. I find that hukou’s main role in the planned economy was
to assist socialist industrialization while averting the Lewis development model, a
development strategy based on unlimited supply of labors from the rural sector, largely
adopted in developing countries. In the market reform period, hukou performed exactly
the opposite function, which is to assist the Lewis model based on the unlimited supply of
rural surplus labor “released” from the rural de-collectivization. Based on these results, I
argue that the interacting effects of the hukou and the economic system, rather than hukou
alone, should be the analytical focus to address important development topics such as
industrialization, urbanization, spatial and social inequality.
The second essay compares the different agricultural investment patterns when
agricultural credit is borrowed on a collective basis versus on an individual basis. I find
that on the same income level, a one percent increase in the IC ratio (i.e. the ratio of loan
made on individual base relative to on a collective base) leads to of a two percentage
point decline on irrigation investment. On the other hand, a one percent increase in the IC
ratio leads to about 10 percentage point increase in fertilizer use. Based on these results, I
argue that the form of agricultural lending matters significantly in decisions regarding
vi

agricultural investments. Collective-based agricultural lending tends to be channeled to
investment that contributes to more sustainable agricultural development yet with returns
only in the intermediate or long run (such as irrigation).
The third essay addresses the employment issue through estimating the relative
employment impacts of renewable energy investments versus spending within the
traditional fossil fuel sectors. I find that spending within three segments of the renewable
energy sectors—solar, wind and bioenergy, will produce in combination about twice as
many jobs per dollar of expenditure than an equal amount of spending on fossil fuels. I
also find that, more than 70% of jobs from renewable energy sectors are created in the
informal economy. Overall, the results of my estimates demonstrate that, for the case of
China, the project of building a clean energy economy does not face the prospect of a
massive obstacle in terms of negative employment effects.
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CHAPTER 1
THE HUKOU SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT

1.1 Introduction
In this paper, I examine the role of the Household Registration System (i.e. hukou),
in both the planned economy period (1950s to late 1970s) and the market economy (early
1980s to now) period in China. I show that the commonly held view that hukou is the
reason for urban and rural inequality is not well-grounded in evidence. This view does not
differentiate hukou’s effects that result within the context of alternative policy settings, i.e.
the planned economy versus the market economy. Not differentiating hukou’s impacts
under different interactions with other policies risks a misjudgment about the effect of the
still ongoing hukou reform. For example, the official discourse is that the repeal of the
hukou system will help alleviate urban and rural inequality. My study suggests that the
reality is more nuanced when understanding hukou’s roles within the context of different
economic systems.
The Hukou system refers to the household registration system that records the
information of Chinese citizens with regard to their names, dates of birth, birth places,
addresses, family members, and occupations. It was officially implemented nationwide in
1958. The distinct feature of China’s hukou system is that different social policies are often
associated with regard to the birthplaces and occupations registered in hukou. Despite
several reforms, the hukou system has still been effective in controlling residents’
accessibility to resources, and therefore influences the labor mobility across provinces.
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For example, compared to residents with local hukou (i.e. meaning they were born
in a given province), policies are stricter to residents who want to purchase real estate
properties in the places they are residing in but without local hukou (i.e. meaning that they
were not born in this province). There will be limitations on the total number of apartments
or houses that can be purchased by the residents without local hukou, or the number of
years they have resided and paid taxes to the local government before they are qualified to
make the purchase, although specific policies vary across different places. Constraints are
also imposed on the children of the residents without local hukou, with regard to their
access to primary education and high-school education services. These policies generate
controversies especially when the more economically developed areas have promising real
estate values as well as better educational resources. Occupation-wise, residents with
agricultural hukou (i.e. nongye hukou) are entitled to the right to use land for agricultural
purposes while those with non-agricultural hukou (i.e. fei nongye hukou) are not. In 2014,
the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou was repealed. Now, like
urban residents, rural residents can buy and sell the village land that was once entitled to
their original agricultural hukou as they wish. This reform facilitates land concentration
and the transfer of village land to outside developers and agribusiness companies (Andreas
and Zhan 2015).
The hukou system is usually considered as an institutional basis for the broader
rural-urban chasm (Cheng 1991; Chan, 1994; Knight and Song, 1999; Solinger, 1999; Yu
2002; Alexander & A. Chan 2004; Wang 2005; Whyte, 2010; Qin 2013). This
generalization of hukou’s function fails to take into account the economic system hukou
operates under. In this essay, I examine the interacting effects of the hukou and different
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economic systems based on a review of historical policy documents, data on migration
from rural to urban sectors, agricultural output and industrial output growth. I argue that
hukou has different economic and social effects when operating under different economic
systems. Under the planned economy, hukou’s main role was to assist socialist
industrialization while averting the Lewis development model widely adopted in other
developing countries. Under the market economy, hukou performed exactly the opposite
function: to assist the Lewis development model based on the unlimited supply of rural
surplus labor “released” from the rural decollectivization. The Lewis model is a
development model that builds on the idea of unlimited supply of surplus labor from the
rural sector (or non-capitalist, subsistence sector) to the urban sector (capitalist sector). The
unlimited labor supply leads to the low wage and thus (assumed) high investment
development path, until the exhaustion of the rural sector surplus labor, or “Lewis turning
point”. At this point of exhaustion, wages of the urban sector will be forced to increase and
the economy is then considered developed.
The essay will be organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the existing studies
and show that they have largely missed the discussion about how hukou actually functions
with the assistance of other policies implemented in different time periods. In Section 3, I
examine some historical policy documents to study the origins of the modern hukou
system. I show that hukou’s function of migration control was only made possible after the
implementation of the Unified Procurement and Marketing of Grain grain policy. Section
4 uses evidence to show how hukou assisted the planned economy to achieve a balanced
growth of both industrial and agricultural sectors. Section 5 examines how hukou assists a
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Lewis development model in the market economy, with the assistance of a series of policies
preceding the hukou reform. Section 6 concludes the essay.

1.2 Literature Review
The existing studies on hukou have not addressed sufficiently the different
functions that hukou played under the planned economy and market economy. Most
scholars focus on the restrictions the system has imposed on rural-urban labor mobility, or
the privileges that came with the urban hukou. Yet they tend to overlook the discussion
about how these restrictions and privileges have implications on the overall economic
development models. As a result, they are not able to recognize that some of the social
impacts are not the results of hukou alone, but result from other policies that are specifically
associated with the broader economic system.
A number of studies attribute the hukou system as the institutional base for the
rural/urban chasm over the past 60 years (Cheng 1991; Chan, 1994; Knight and Song, 1999;
Solinger, 1999; Yu 2002; Alexander & A. Chan 2004; Wang 2005; Whyte, 2010; Qin
2013). Some compare it to the South African Apartheid system (Alexander & A. Chan
2004; Qin 2013), because the hukou system has divided the population into two “castes.”
They are the non-agricultural population that is economically and socially superior to the
other “caste”—the agricultural population. These two distinct groups have vastly different
opportunities, obligations and socio-economic status (Yu 2002; Chan& Zhang 1999).
According to these studies, hukou-based discrimination is a kind of “birth-ascribed
stratification” (Potter 1983).

4

This is why studies focus on hukou’s role in restricting labor mobility from rural to
urban sectors in the planned economy as it reinforces such birth-ascribed differences (Yu
2002; Wang 2004). There are some exceptions though. For example, urban residents
maintained ties with the countryside by hosting visiting relatives, and through visits home
for the Chinese New Year (Brown 2012). Also, urban sector jobs are occasionally available
to rural residents, with opportunities for rural residents to permanently settle down in the
urban sector (Wu 1994).
When the restrictions on labor mobility were lifted in the market economy in the
early 1980s, scholars shifted their focus to the urban privileges associated with the hukou
system. Rural migrants now indeed had higher chances to take up jobs in the cities
compared with in the planned economy experience, but a full conversion from rural
residents to urban citizens remained difficult for ordinary peasants (Cai & Chan 2000).
Usually, these chances were only open to the very wealthy who could afford to “purchase”
urban hukou status, or, “the powerful, educated and talented, and needed manual laborers”
(Wang 2004).
Going beyond hukou’s impact on ordinary residents, some studies view hukou as
part of a larger economic and political system set up to serve multiple state interests
(Chan& Zhang 1999; Wu and Treiman, 2004; Wang, 2005; Naughton 2007; Fan, 2008).
For example, much of the existing literature recognized hukou’s important role in
contributing to China’s development of heavy industry in the socialist era (Cheng 1991;
Chan 1992; Lin et.al 1994; Mallee 1996; Cai& Chan 2000; Chan 2009). At the same time,
many considered this strategy detrimental to the development of both the urban and rural
sectors (Ka& Seldon 1986; Yu 2002). Specifically, Ka & Selden (1986) argued that hukou
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assisted China’s socialist industrialization through restricting rural-urban labor mobility,
and therefore depressing income and consumption levels so as to help transfer agricultural
surplus to strategic industries. They further argued that this development strategy is no
more pro-rural than the urban-biased capitalist industrialization in Taiwan because of the
intentional repression on income and consumption in the rural sector (p1296). Yu (2002)
argued that both sectors were worse off during the socialist era because the productivity of
the urban sector workers was hampered due to the lack of competition from the rural
surplus labor.
The early studies rarely engage the discussion of hukou policy with urbanization
issues. However, this topic was picked up recently by Chinese scholars in the context of
debates regarding rural land privatization. Chan (1992) highlighted the deliberate underurbanization rate relative to the high industrialization speed in the planned economy period
and suggested that the reverse, over-urbanization, is happening in the market economy
period.1 This over-urbanization issue is especially severe when the public infrastructure
(i.e. transportation) proved to be insufficient to meet the demand by surging migrant
workers who need to travel back to the rural sector for the Chinese New Year. Regarding
these migration issues, Chan (2001, 2009) argued that the root cause was hukou’s
restrictions on the permanent stay of rural residents in the urban sector. He thus proposed
that the permanent settle-down of rural-urban migrants will be possible as long as the hukou
restriction is lifted, and these migrants are also guaranteed access to education facilities
and housings in the urban sector. Others disagree with the argument, suggesting that the

1

According to Chan (1992), This unique “anti-urban” policies including “a tight control of rural-urban
labor and population mobility, fuller utilization of the existing urban working-age population, suppression
of the expansion of urban service employment and personal consumption in general, promotion of rural
industrialization and increased use of urban ‘temporary’ workers”.
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ownership of land is the key reason why there is no massive permanent migration from
rural to urban area (Wen 2007, Qin 2013).
The problems with these analyses are that these economic and social impacts that
were attributed to hukou were actually the results of the interaction between hukou and
other policies. To incorrectly identify hukou as the only cause for these impacts is running
the risk of false evaluation of the effect of repealing the hukou system as is discussed in
the context of urbanization debate. This confusion of hukou’s function is partly why the
existing literature has been ambivalent towards the future of the hukou system. Some argue
that hukou is playing a critical role in China’s current export-oriented development model.
The repeal of the system will deteriorate the welfare services accessible to urban citizens
and cause social tensions (Huang 2001; Yu 2002; Li 2012); Others think an urgent reform
of hukou is needed, if China wants to push for further economic reform and to become “a
modern, first-world nation and global leader” (Chan 2009; Qin 2013; Zhang 2013).
Overall, despite many insights on hukou’s role in both the planned economy and
market economy periods in China, the existing studies fail to separate hukou’s social
impacts from those caused by the changes in the economic systems. For the few studies
that paid attention to such structural change, the evidence on which they relied is not
updated. This essay focuses on the function of the hukou with full awareness of the
economic system it operates under and the development model it assists.

1.3 Origin of the Hukou System
Hukou is associated with three levels of functions. They are the functions of 1)
civilian registration; 2) migration control; and 3) employment regulation. Each function
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needs the other two function(s) as its basis. By reviewing several policies preceding the
official implementation of hukou system in 1958, I argue that hukou’s function goes
beyond civilian registration and migration control as the existing studies often claim. Its
main function was to assist with the urban full employment goal through regulating internal
migration according to economic planning. Moreover, the alleged migration control
function of hukou was actually achieved through the overlooked Unified Procurement and
Marketing of Grain (UPMG) policy adopted in 1953. Hukou only played a secondary role
to the UPMG policy regarding regulating migration.
The existing studies trace Hukou system back to the baojia system in the Song
dynasty of the 11th century (Cheng& Selden 1994). The baojia system was a military
management structure imposed on civilians for security reasons. The basic structure is as
follows: Ten households made up one pai (row), ten pai constituted one jia (tithing), and
every ten jia formed a bao (watch). If there is crime committed by one family in a pai, it
would result in punishment for all ten families in that pai. This management structure had
been revised over time, and was continuously revived under the Chiang Kaisheck
government in 1912 and under the Japanese occupation in 1933, in order to to monitor and
control Chinese civilians.
Such association of the hukou system with the baojia system suggests a focus on
the civilian registration function of hukou as its basic function. Indeed, policies for civilian
registration, migration and employment were initially separate in the history of the People’s
Republic of China. But then as early as in year 1953, these policies for different purposes
started to become interacted. The result, though, was not very satisfactory.
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The policy for civilian registration was implemented first. In 1951, the Ministry of
Public Security, with State Council Approval, issued a Temporary Regulation Governing
the Urban Population.2 The main idea of the regulation was to launch a registration system
for the urban population only. Urban households were divided into six categories including
residential households, industrial and commercial households, public residents (i.e. those
living in hotels, inns etc.), floating household (i.e. those living in boats and ships), temple
households, and aliens (i.e. residents of foreign countries of origin). Those who intended
to move out of the cities had to report to the local public security and apply for a changeof-residence permit. Then they are required to submit this permit to the new residence
within three days of arrival. 3 Meanwhile, their census record regarding the former
residence would be canceled. Under this household registration system, urban residents
enjoyed free mobility to a great extent, according to Cheng & Selden (1994, 649). As a
matter of fact, anyone who intended to apply for a permit to move out of the original
residence could obtain it and then register anywhere, including in Beijing and Shanghai.
Then came the employment policies. In 1952, three years after the establishment of
People’s Republic of China, the State Council announced a “Decision on Labor
Employment Problems” to address urban unemployment and the “blind” influx from the
rural sector into the cities.4

2

Temporary Regulation Governing the Urban Population, or Chengshi hukou guanli zanxing tiaoli, issued
on 16 July, 1951; published online at http://www.rmlt.com.cn/2014/0731/300526.shtml, and retrieved on
Jan 16th, 2016.
3
See Article 5 of the Temporary Regulation Governing the Urban Population.
4
On 6 August 1952, the State Council issued “Decision on Labor Employment Problems”, or Guanyu jiuye
wenti de jueding. See Chinese version of the Decision, online at
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/1200/23051/23052/23055/2006/3/zh97916371113600240-0.htm,
retrieved on Jan 16th, 2016
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For the urban sector, the goal was to achieve full employment. Urban
unemployment has always been a challenge to the Chinese Communist government since
it took power in 1949 from the Kuomingtang government. The Chinese government
recognized that, in the war recovery period, unemployment is inevitable but only
temporary.5 Such inevitability is due to the fact that a significant number of people whose
expertise and skills acquired in the previous economic system (i.e. capitalist system) cannot
find appropriate positions in the current socialist system. These people include, for example,
those who previously work for unproductive industries (i.e., luxury consumption and
entertainment industries for landlords and former elite class); some intellectuals and former
Kuomingtang cadres without special skills to join work; and women who previously were
not allowed to work outside home but now wanted to work. All these situations contributed
to a massive unemployed population with the urban unemployment rate as high as 23.6%
in 1949.6
The Chinese government’s strategy to full employment was to provide training to
unskilled workers so that they can adjust to structural changes in the industries. The
government also required that enterprises could not lay off workers at will. For example,
Article 1 of the document stated that during the industrial restructuring period, those who
were temporarily unemployed should not only be paid as employed but also receive
training so that they will be prepared for new positions in the upgraded industries. Article
1 suggested that, in principle, labor should follow capital when capital needs to transfer to
other industries. However, any lay-offs would require going through various legal

5

Ibid.
Report on the 60 Years of People’s Republic of China: the Development of multi-way Employment
Structure (Xinzhongguo 60 zhounian xilie baogao: duofangshi jiuye geju xingcheng), at
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-09/14/content_1416987.htm, retrieved on July 12, 2016.
6
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processes including application to unions and the Labor Department before the enterprise
can legally lay off the worker. As was highlighted in the document itself, the nature of
unemployment is different in the socialist system versus in the capitalist system. This
strategy to reduce unemployment and the ultimate goal for full employment are indeed
distinguished from the political necessity of maintaining a pool of reserve army under the
capitalist economy.7
This strategy worked successfully. In the beginning of the 1952 document, the
Chinese government proudly announced the achievement it had made in dealing with
massive unemployment as a left-over problem from China’s colonialism period and the
Kuomingtang period. Specifically, 1.2 million unemployed workers went back to work by
December 1951, including 0.6 million in the state mining industry. Another 1 million
previously unemployed intellectuals began new employment opportunities after some
training offered by the state.
A different strategy was used to solve rural unemployment because of its different
nature compared with urban unemployment. For the rural sector, the solution for surplus
labor was to cultivate wasteland so that more arable land is made available for rural
residents to cultivate. The 1952 document provided the reasoning behind the different
strategies in both sectors. The crucial difference between urban and rural surplus labor was
that urban surplus labor depended on the rural sector to provide food, while the rural surplus
labors “have land to cultivate and have food to eat.”8 The key contradiction between the
surging demand for food production and the existence of rural surplus labor lies in the

7

Michael Kalecki 1942, Political Aspects of Full Employment, retrieved online at
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/kalecki220510.html, on Jan 16th, 2016.
8
Article 4 of the 1952 Decision on Labor Employment Problems.
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problem of “insufficient amount of arable land”, and therefore the surplus labor force in
the rural sector should be directed for more food production in the previously uncultivated
land. Based on this analysis, the state encouraged that the rural surplus labor pool cultivate
the previously wasteland through irrigation building and other cultivation technologies.
They were also encouraged to migrate to North-East, North-West and South-West to
reclaim the wasteland while not “damaging the water and land condition, and without
disturbing the development of animal husbandry”.9
Clearly, this grand plan for mobilizing rural surplus labor requires a strong control
of labor mobility both within sectors and across rural and urban sectors, as well as a
carefully-designed long-run plan. Yet, its enforcement was completely based on persuasion.
So is the other Directive issued in 1953.10 The outcome is quite satisfactory (see Table 1.1).
In 1953, the net rural-urban migration rate is 2.7%, dropping almost half from the previous
year’s migration rate of 4.6%.
Yet a 2.7% migration rate still leads to a sizable migration population. To strengthen
the previous policies that relied on persuasion only, Shanghai and other major cities started
to issue a more detailed Household Registration Book (huji bu) for civilian registration.
The Household Registration Books required the recording of birth, death, residence,
education and occupation of every household member, very much like the categories of
information required by the later hukou system.

9

Ibid.
On 17 April 1953, the State Council promulgated a “Directive on Dissuading Peasants from Blind Influx
into Cities”, or Quanzhi nongmin mangmu liuru chengshi de zhishi. The directive, using persuasive
language, urged the hundreds of thousands of peasants who had entered the cities in search of work to
return to their villages, exempting those who had already obtained employment and had government or
factory papers to prove it.
10
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But it was really after the implementation of the “Unified Procurement and
Marketing of Grain” policy (UPMG) that migration control finally became effective.11 In
1953, the UPMG policy, or Tonggou Tongxiao policy was initiated to prevent grain
speculation and to stabilize the grain price. According to this policy, the state purchased
specified amounts of grain from the rural sector and rationed the food to urban residents
based on their recorded information on the household registration books. By diminishing
the possibility for speculative activities on grains, the goal of grain price stabilization was
effectively achieved very soon (Cheng and Selden 1994). At the same time, the UPMG
policy also made rural-urban mobility more difficult. This is because as food is strictly
rationed to every citizen according to their registration record, rural people can no longer
purchase food in urban areas as much as they want. Rural people could still stay in the
urban sector temporarily either with food which they had brought to the cities, provided by
urban relatives, or they could exchange some grain for grain tickets usable in the city. Yet
the stay would not last long.12
Although migration control was often associated with hukou, the UMPG policy was
the de facto policy that made migration control possible through food rationing. When
migration control became effective, policies for employment regulation started to be
effectively implemented as well. As a matter of fact, policies for civilian control and
employment regulation started to be explicitly combined.
In 1954, a “recruitment quota” mechanism was introduced so that the urban labor
department could use it to hire rural workers based on economic planning (Cheng & Selden,
11

On 19 November 1953, State Council passed “Regulation on Planned Procurement and Planned Supply
of Grain”. See Chinese version at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/22/content_2367996.htm
12
Peasants may use grain to exchange for traveling-place local grain tickets or Grain ticket for nation-wide
use according to Article 13 in Tonggou Tongxiao Policy, but it would only be a temporary solution for
those who are not recorded as residing in urban areas in the household registration books.
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1994). These transitions of jobs required a transfer from an agricultural to non-agricultural
hukou. According to the state plan, the urban labor department made the recruitment
decision. Yet instead of directly recruiting rural workers, the urban units need to notify the
relevant county and township governments, who would then allocate recruitment quotas to
villages for local cadres to make the selection of rural workers. This policy was
implemented during the process of massive nationalization and collectivization of
agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce. Some studies use the analogy of the
conversion process with permanent residence in the US immigration system to show how
difficult it was for a Chinese rural resident to convert from an agricultural hukou to a nonagricultural hukou in the planned economy, when immigrants should both fill the
requirement and do not exceed the quota of a particular year (Chan 2004). The use of the
term “recruitment quota” suggests an embrace of rural-urban migration control as part of
the employment regulation under the planned economy.
In 1955, the registration requirement was extended to the rural sector as well. The
State Council passed “The Directive Concerning Establishment of a Permanent System of
Household Registration”. This required the recording of birth, death, internal migration and
immigration information for cities, towns and villages. This Directive could be considered
as the antecedent of the 1958 Hukou system.13
Two months later, the State Council passed “Provisional Measures Governing
Grain-rationing in Cities and Towns,” which formally established the food rationing
system in detail. For example, Article 4 differentiated seven categories of grain cards
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On 22 June 1955, State Council passed “The Directive Concerning Establishment of a Permanent System
of Household Registration”, or Guanyu Jianli Jingchang Hukou Dengji Zhidu de Zhishi. This document
can be accessed at http://knews.shaanxi.gov.cn/zxfw/www1.shaanxi.gov.cn/bszn/xxxx_p.asp-no1=737.htm,
retrieved on Jan 17th, 2016.

14

regarding residence, occupation and grade, as well as three grain tickets based on the range
of its applicability.14 All citizens needed to bring their Household Registration Book to the
local government to receive grain tickets and cards. By this point, the migration control of
UPMG policy had been strengthened, and the association of migration control with
household registration had become clearer. At the same time, the state managed to largely
eliminate private home ownership from 1953 to 1956. Migrants could not obtain housing
in the urban sector without obtaining official approval. Even hotels or inns required travel
documents issued by work units or local governments (Cheng and Selden 1994, 657).
Therefore, another barrier was imposed for any unsolicited migration in terms of housing
by 1956.
In 1958, the hukou system was officially launched.15 Every household in cities and
towns was required to have a Household Registration Book issued by a local public security
organ. In rural areas, Household Registration Book was issued at the unit of collectives.
Compared with all of its previous versions that had been advanced for almost a decade, the
1958 Regulations was more specific and stricter, and set up instructions for the registration
process. For example, for rural to urban migration, one has to obtain a “move-in permit”
first issued by an urban department (i.e. either the urban labor department or urban school
enrollment certificate, etc), in order to apply for a “move-out permit” from one’s original
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On 5 August 1955, State Council passed “Provisional Measures Governing Grain-rationing in Cities and
Towns”, or Shizheng Liangshi Dingliang Gongying Zanxing Banfa. The seven kinds of grain cards include
city and town resident grain-supply card; Industrial and commercial trade grain-supply card; City and town
animal feed-supply card and City and town resident grain-transfer card. The three tickets include Grain
ticket for nation-wide use; Local area grain ticket and Local area animal-feed ticket.The document can be
accessed at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/28/content_2388644.htm, retrieved on Jan 17th,
2016.
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1958 Jan 9, the Standing Committee of the NPC promulgated “Regulations on Household Registration in
the PRC”, or Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hukou Dengji Tiaoli. The Chinese version of this document
can be accessed at: http://www.jincao.com/fa/04/law04.55.htm, retrieved on Jan 17th, 2016.
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residential place.16 This policy suggests that only those who were admitted either to work
or study in the urban sector were allowed to migrate.
By now, hukou’s three levels of functions including civilian control, migration
control, and employment regulation were realized one by one through a series of policies
starting as early as 1955. The civilian control function of hukou was not new and could be
traced back to as early as the 11th century. Yet the effective migration control and
employment regulations were the key distinction of the hukou system since its official
implementation in 1958. This distinctive feature of the hukou system was established
within the broader economic planning system under which it was operating. These latter
two functions cannot be achieved without the assistance of other policies that are also
contributing to organizing production and distribution in the planned economy, especially
the food rationing policy UMPG.

1.4 Hukou’s role in the planned economy
Once the hukou system was established in 1958, its three functions (i.e. civilian
registration, migration control and employment regulation) started to take effect.
Contrary to a common misunderstanding, hukou's priority during the planned economy
period was not migration control but to assist the socialist industrialization process. In
fact, rural-urban migration reached its peak several months after the official
implementation of the hukou system in 1958. This is to say that whenever the urban
industrial sector needed more workers, hukou policy adjusted accordingly to meet
industrial needs. In this section I present both the theoretical argument and empirical
16

See Article 10 of the “Regulations on Household Registration in the PRC”.
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evidence to show how hukou assists socialist industrialization through maintaining
balanced growth in both the industrial and agricultural sectors.

1.4.1 Rural-Urban Migration Rate
Hukou’s migration regulation function played only a secondary role relative to its
purpose in supporting industrialization. Figure 1.1 shows the net rural-urban migration rate
from 1949 to 1990 based on the “residual method” developed in Wu (1994). The net ruralurban migration rate was calculated as a “residual” by subtracting the annual natural
increase (n) from the annual total increase (g) in urban population. The assumption here is
that the rate of increase in the urban population beyond the natural rate of increase birth
population in the urban population is due to migration rural to urban areas.17
As we can see, the greatest rise in migration during the planned economy period
occurred in 1958 and 1962 respectively. The year 1958 witnessed the largest rural to urban
migration with the net rural-urban migration rate as high as 22.1%. The year 1962
experienced the largest urban to rural migration with the net migration rate as -10.1%. The
massive rural to urban migration in 1958 corresponded with the Great Leap Forward, while
the massive urban to rural migration in 1962 corresponded with the youth rustication
campaign, in which young people were sent to the countryside to learn from the peasants.
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Note that this methodology uses the Urban Non-Agricultural Population instead of the Official Total
Urban Population in the Statistical Yearbook due to the several revisions that the official statistical
definition of urban population has gone through. These revisions have rendered the concept of “urban
citizens” more and more loosely defined. For example, a 1982 revision defined urban population as
including “all persons who had lived for one year or more, and those who had resided less than one year but
had been absent from their place of hukou registration for one year or more, within the official boundary of
a city/town” (Wu 1994, 678). This revision led to a sudden increase of 60 million of urban population in
1982 from 1981, while a consistent measure suggests only 4 million increase in urban population. See more
detailed methodological discussion in Wu (1994), pp 682-84.
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The peak of rural to urban migration (22.1%) occurred in 1958, which was exactly
the year when the Chinese government officially launched the hukou system nationwide.
The regulation was announced in January of 1958 together with the full implementation of
the Tongue Tongxiao policy that imposes food rationing on the urban sector. Therefore,
theoretically speaking, we should expect to see rural-urban migration as being moderate
starting with 1958. However, in autumn 1958, 38 million people were reported to be
mobilized to leave their villages to join iron and steel production projects in the cities, in
response to the explosion of urban industrial and construction jobs (Cheng and Selden
1994). Just within three years (1958-1960), the urban population as a share of the national
population rose from 15 to 20 percent (Ibid, 664). Obviously, the hukou system that was
established in that year was not being strictly enforced. As the General Manager of the
Huhhot Iron and Steel Mill said, this was a year of “jobs scrambling for people. As long as
you could read and write and had good health, you qualified for employment in any factory.
Mangliu (Blind Influx) were also welcome. No migration certificate was required” (Cheng
and Seldon 1995).
Clearly, the top priority of state at this time was not to control migration from the
rural sector to the urban sector, but socialist industrialization in the urban sector. When
things get in the way, even the newly established hukou system could become just a
formality. Hukou, as a tool under the planned economy was adjusted and loosened so as to
encourage, rather than restrict, migration based on the needs of production. However, this
wave of uncontrolled migration left an insufficient supply of workers to cultivate the land.
This is one of the key factors that contribute to the notorious Great Famine. The detrimental
effect from uncontrolled migration further proved the importance of migration control
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especially under the specific context in China. That context was the economy with
agriculture still being labor-intensive and with urban sector solely dependent on the
agricultural sector for food provision.

1.4.2 Two types of development models
The key feature of the development model in the planned economy is its aim to
achieve a balanced growth between the industrial and agricultural sectors. The growth is
balanced in the sense that the industrial sector development does not come at the cost of
squeezing agricultural development. Socialist industrialization was the goal of New China.
To achieve that goal, the industrial sector needed food subsistence produced by the
agricultural sector. It also needed rural workers to join the urban working class but not too
many to threaten sufficient production of food to feed the entire population. The industrial
sector also needed the rural population to consume their industrial production. In order for
the rural sector to play these three roles (i.e., food provision, labor supply and industrial
goods consumption), a population balance must be maintained between the urban and rural
sectors for a long-run sustainable development trajectory.
From a static point of view, hukou under the planned economy did prevent peasants
from entering the urban areas at will. But in a dynamic view, a planned and control
migration for now would be necessary for a massive migration in the future. How can more
peasants join the urban labor forces without affecting agricultural output levels? A
prerequisite is a massive mechanization of the agricultural sector so that rural laborers can
be “freed” to support industrial production in the urban sector. At the same time, the

19

mechanization of the rural sector needs the assistance from the industrial sector. Therefore,
again, a balanced population between the two sectors is necessary to guarantee good
performances of both sectors.
A typical development model is one that concentrates on industrialization by
attracting labor from the rural sector. The natural outcome of such a development strategy
is that the stronger, and the more educated people chose to move to the urban sector, leaving
the agricultural sector diminished. This development strategy is strongly unbalanced
between the urban and the rural sectors. It has been used in many other developing
countries, and is succinctly summarized in the Lewis model.
According to Lewis, due to an overpopulated rural sector relative to the available
natural resources (i.e. arable land), the marginal productivity of rural labor is zero or even
negative. Meanwhile, the urban sector exhibits relatively higher productivity, thus offering
relatively higher wages, and that would attract an “unlimited supply” of rural surplus labor
at this subsistence wage. As more and more rural laborers leave the village to the urban
sector, those who are staying in village will have a larger share of food supply at a given
output level. This is supposed to be a positive outcome for the rural residents. Meanwhile,
capitalists (i.e. employers in the urban sector) started to accumulate profits by paying
workers only the subsistence wage at the initial stage of capitalist development. The profit
they earned translates into investment which drives the economy. This accumulation period
ends when the unlimited supply of labor (from the rural sector and foreign immigration) is
exhausted and capitalists have to start paying wages higher than the subsistence level.
When the overall wage level in the urban sector is lifted up, the country is considered
developed.
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However, the Lewis model overlooked an alternative solution to rural surplus labor
in the rural sector. That is to cultivate more arable land. Studies show that during the
collective years, labor mobilization was high for building productive infrastructure (i.e.
irrigation works, land reclamation, afforestation) and thus rural surplus workers are rare
(Patnaik and Natrajan 2000). With the assumption that the only way to solve rural surplus
labor problem was to move to the urban sector to look for jobs, the outcome with the Lewis
development strategy is a squeezed and diminished rural sector.
A diminishing agricultural sector has problems in the Chinese context. First,
population density in China is very high. On average, for every square kilometer of land
area in China, there are 145 inhabitants as of today. For the urban sector, this number could
go even higher, such as 1525 for Beijing and 3826 for Shanghai.18 This number is very
high compared with only 35 for the United States for example and 49 for the world average.
An unattractive agricultural sector will lead to an even higher population density in the
urban sector, posing problems for accessing resources such as health care, housing, and
education (Zhang and Kanbur 2005). Second, without advanced technology, the agriculture
sector is completely dependent on physical labor. This way a shortage of rural labors will
lead to a drop in agricultural production and pose severe food security issues such as the
Great Famine.
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Average population density data for China and United States is from World Bank. Urban sector data is
extracted from the Statistics Portal for year 2014, at http://www.statista.com/statistics/279040/populationdensity-in-urban-areas-of-china-by-region/. World average population density is from United States Census
Bureau at http://www.census.gov/popclock/.
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1.4.3 Empirical evidence regarding balanced growth model
The key feature of a socialist industrialization in China is that the agricultural sector
is not being sacrificed in order for the development in the urban sector. The mechanism to
achieve a relatively balanced growth of both the industrial and agricultural sector is as
follows: To generate surplus labor from the rural sector without actually harming the
agricultural production, there must be a massive rural mechanization and infrastructure
building that significantly raise agricultural productivity. This rise in agricultural
productivity allows labors to be freed from agricultural-related work while guaranteeing
sufficient agricultural production to feed both urban and rural population. When these
surplus rural laborers transition to the industrial sector to work, we expect a high growth
rate occurring in the industrial sector, which would in turn assist further mechanization of
the rural sector.
Table 1.1 shows the growth rates of total industrial output, total agricultural output,
and total power of rural machinery extracted from China Statistics Yearbook 2012, with
references to the net rural-migration rate calculated by Wu (1994).19 The data cover the
years 1950 to 1980. The second column shows the growth rate of total industrial output.
The third column shows the growth rate of total agricultural output. Both growth rates are
calculated based on information on industrial output and agricultural output measured in
value (RMB). The fourth and fifth columns present data on the growth rate of rural
mechanization, where the rural mechanization was measured by the total power of
agricultural machinery (kilowatt). Note that the fourth column presents the growth rates
based on the original data available. For example, the growth rate of 559.8% for year 1957
19

The methodology is explained in details in Section 4.1.
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suggests that the rural mechanization in 1957 is a roughly 6-fold increase compared to year
1952, the previous year in which data on the total power of agricultural machinery was
available. The fifth column presents the compound annual growth rate based on
information in the left sub-column. The last column shows the net rural-urban migration
rate as discussed in Section 4.1.
As we can see, the first major rural-urban migration occurred in 1958 (with 22.1%
rural-urban migration rate), after more than 5-fold increases in total power of agricultural
machinery in 1957 relative to year 1952. As one of the achievements of the First Five Year
Plan (1953-1957), the significant improvement in agricultural machinery provides the basis
for rural mechanization which contributed to the release of rural laborers from the
agricultural sector. Such release of rural laborers sets a foundation for the historically
massive migration out of the rural and into urban sector in the following year. In this sense,
the Great Leap Forward is by no means some random thoughts of some particular policy
makers according to the social discourse as of today, but has its objective and material
base.20
The year 1959 and 1960 witnessed a significant decline in agricultural growth (13.9% and -11.2%), corresponding to a lower level (but still positive) net migration rate
(1.9% and 4.1%). From these data, we see that the massive influx of rural labor for the sake
of Great Leap Forward mainly occurred in the year of 1958 on the basis of significant
improvement in agricultural machinery. However, the goal of industry growth was set
higher and higher and eventually went beyond what the real agricultural basis could support
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The same year also witnessed the highest industrial growth rate of 52.95%. Although this statistic could
be overstated, we could infer that the industrialization process went smooth and shows very optimistic
prospect.
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in terms of both labor availability and crop production. Then the natural disaster came as
the last straw to the agricultural sector. The first significant decline in agricultural sector in
1959 corresponds with 30% industrial growth. This positive but relatively moderate growth
rate can be interpreted as the interaction between both a lagged but positive effect from
1958’s fast growth (53%), and a negative impact on industrial sector due to the shock in
the agricultural sector (-13.9%). The sudden drop in net migration (from 22.1% in 1958 to
1.86% in 1959), suggests that rural workers stopped migrating to the urban sector, and that
many temporary migrant urban workers went back to their previous residence in 1958. The
same pattern is also shown by the 1960 data, with industrial growth becoming even slower
but still positive (5.5%) and a continuing decline in agriculture (-11.2%). This pattern
suggests that under the planned economy, industrial growth depends on agricultural
growth, in terms of both subsistence and labor provision.
From 1961 to 1964, the migration rate was persistently negative (with the highest
level of -10.1% in 1962), corresponding to the strict implementation of the hukou policy in
1960-1962 and a rural exile of 20 million workers discussed above (Cheng and Selden
1995). With more rural labor force returning to work on the farm, the agricultural sector
started to recover in 1961 (29.5%) and continued the steady growth until the 1975. The
industrial sector took two more years (1963) to recover (12.4%) from the previous two
years of negative growth. The two years lag in the industrial sector again justified the
importance of agricultural accumulation in the socialist industrialization.
The relatively stable and high level of agricultural growth from 9.8% in 1963 to
16.5% in 1965 corresponds with the industrial growth rate averaging around 20% from
1963 to 1966. The corresponding migration rate is relatively stable but very moderate from
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1963 to 1967 (within a positive and negative 3% range). This is partly due to the strict
control of migration implemented through the hukou system, and also partly because the
increasing productivity in the urban sector. As such, the labor requirement for the same
level of output is lower compared with previous years.
The start of Cultural Revolution in 1967 corresponded with a relatively lower but
still positive agricultural growth (with an average agricultural output growth rate of 3.7%)
rate until 1975. Echoing Mao’s call for “Reeducation of the Intellectual Youth”,
institutionalized the youth rustication is reflected by the negative net migration in the years
of 1968-1970. The migration rate then turned positive and remained so after, suggesting
that the youth rustication program was not sustained at a rapid rate. The industrial sector
was affected in the year 1967 (-15.99%) and 1968 (-10.02%), but as the youth were
rusticated and the urban unemployment pressure was relieved, industrial sector’s growth
rate remained positive (with highest level 32.26% in 1970) until 1975.
The rural-urban net migration rate started to surge after the Cultural Revolution,
rising to 6.1% in 1979, corresponding to the return of the rusticated youth. The second peak
of migration rate occurred in 1984, corresponding with the repeal of Unified Procurement
and Marketing of Grain policy in 1985 and its pilot program of “temporary residence
certificate” in large cities (i.e. Hubei) in 1984.
Overall, most data conform to a pattern that suggests that agricultural growth
usually predicts an industrial growth in the following 1-2 years during the planned
economy period, and net migration rate adjusts according to both agricultural and
industrial growth.21 When the agricultural sector shows steady growth, positive net
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Exceptions also exist. So a definitive conclusion of the logic loop stated in this essay needs a formal
model and econometric analysis which I aim to examine in further research.
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migration occurred (i.e. year 1958) and contributed to fast industrial growth. But when
agricultural growth started to decline, net migration rate soon turned negative to adjust to
the rural need (i.e. year 1962). The institutional migration from rural to urban sector (or
with reverse direction) was used to adjust to the balanced growth for both the rural and
urban sectors.

1.5 Hukou reform within the market economy
Contrary to the view that was commonly held, it is not hukou’s reform per se that
lifted the restriction on rural to urban migration. Hukou’s reform was preceded by a series
of policy changes that made available a massive pool of rural surplus laborers on the one
hand, and that created a much more flexible labor market in the urban sector compared
with that in the planned economy. Hukou was only adjusted so that it can work with other
reform policies that allow flexible migration for a new market-economy-based
development model.

1.5.1 Preconditions for the hukou reform
In a chronicle view, the series of policies that have been implemented presented the
inner logic of how the state managed to push massive rural labor force to migrate to urban
areas. It was achieved through rural decollectivization first (through the 1982 rural
Responsibility System and the 1984 Household Responsibility System in 1984). The
decollectivization disciplined these rural migrants to be prepared as the de facto urban labor
force (through 1982 Custody and Repatriation policy). Then the state reduced the
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bargaining power of urban workers with the prepared reserve army of rural migrants
through the 1984 Decision on Economic reform and the 1986 Labor Contract System).

1.5.1.1 1982 Agricultural Production System and 1984 Household Responsibility
System
In 1982, the state issued the Meeting Minutes of National Agricultural
Development, in which it praised the achievements after implementing the Agricultural
Production Responsibility System in the rural sector since the 1978 Third Plenum of the
Eleventh National Party Congress.22 The Agricultural Production Responsibility System
(APRS) has a wider meaning than the later and better known Household Responsibility
System (HRS). Under APRS, all types of agricultural work are contracted to individual
commune members or individual households. These include work on different types of
land, work under different seasons, or detailed work such as fertilizing, spraying pesticides,
dry grains, etc. The compensation is either predetermined by the type of work or associated
with output when output is measurable.23
These various contracting formats were experimented within the production
brigades as supplementary production to collective agricultural production since the start
of the reform. The 1982 document emphasized that more than 90% of the brigades adopted

On Jan 1st 1982, the state issued Meeting Minutes of National Agricultural Development, or Quanguo
Nongcun Gongzuo Huiyi Jiyao. See Chinese version at:
http://www.ce.cn/cysc/agriculture/gdxw/201001/15/t20100115_20043473.shtml, retrieved on Mar 2nd,
2016.
23
See more details at 1980 Document on Issues with Reinforcing Agricultural Production System
(http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-02/04/content_2547020.htm), and the section on Labor
Compensation in Chronical of Shao Wu City, Fujian Province
(http://www.fjsq.gov.cn/ShowText.asp?ToBook=3180&index=406&), both retrieved on Mar 2nd, 2016.
22
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various forms of APRS. This contributed to overcoming the free rider issues in the
collective production as well as raising incentives and productivity of agricultural
production. In addition, restrictions on rural markets and fairs were eased, and peasants
were encouraged to engage in the production of cash crops as well as other market-oriented
activities. Also, the legal limit on private family plots was raised from 5% to a maximum
of 15% of the cultivated land (Meisner 1999, 221). Despite all these market-oriented reform,
the 1982 document still spent great efforts explaining why APRS did not contradict the
socialist system. The main reasoning was that planning was still the overall guide in the
economy while market adjustments were only ancillary. Also, ownership of land and other
means of production were still collective. Selling, renting and transferring of contracted
land remained strictly prohibited.
In 1984, the state adopted the term Household Responsibility System (HRS) to
recognize the nation-wide reform that has already taken place.24 HRS involves a series of
policies. First, land was divided so that each individual peasant household enters into
contracts with the production team for the use of a given portion of land. Second, farm
tools and draft animals were divided among households. Third, households pay the
production team a stipulated portion of its output to meet state tax and grain quota
obligations (Meisner 1999, 473).
In order to spare the peasants from worrying about frequent policy changes, the
time limit for land contracts was extended to 15 years based on HRS, and even longer for
the projects that involve longer production cycles such as fruit trees, forestry, and
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wastelands.25 The previous prohibition against transfer of contracted land was released.
Instead, the document explicitly “encourage[s] the gradual concentration of land to those
who are more able to cultivate farms.”26. The same document also defended the practice of
hiring workers by rural enterprises. According to the document, hiring workers does not
imply capitalism, as long as a “certain portion of after-tax profit goes to communal property;
and goes to workers as compensational payment in additional to wage payment.” 27
Moreover, brigade enterprise managers who are responsible for hiring workers in such
situations are allowed to receive higher pay than ordinary workers.28 Despite being clearly
open to land transfer, land concentration as well as hiring workers, the document was vague
on many critical concepts. These included the boundary between the rights owned by the
communes and by the individual specializing household (i.e. Zhuanye hu), or the limit of
wage difference between managers and ordinary workers.
There are three things worth noting here. First of all, individual households now
became the de facto owners of land although the ownership of the land remains collective
in theory. Second, HRS was originally presented as being voluntarily implemented only in
the places where collectives failed to operate well in the 1982 document. Yet in fact, it
soon became mandatory and was rapidly universalized in the early 1980s. According to
Meisner (1999, 473), 98% of peasant households had converted to one form or another of
the HRS by the end of 1983. Third, the 1984 document recognized the growing
phenomenon that more and more peasants were unable to cultivate their land and had to
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work for others. But the way it was discussed suggests that this phenomenon was being
treated as a given fact rather than a problem to solve.
The rural sector reform did not face strong resistance. One of the key reasons was
that new policies for government subsidies were also implemented simultaneously with the
APRS. These subsidies included a lowered amount of compulsory quota required from the
agricultural sector, a 20% increase in the state price for compulsory grain and a 50%
premium for above-quota state purchases, together with a significant price increase for a
wide range of other agricultural products (Meisner 1999, 221). Peasants gained huge
material compensation through these subsidies. In particular, it was easy for them to
produce above-quota amounts of crops largely based on the irrigation system built in Mao’s
era and cheap fertilizers already accessible in the pre-reform era.29
However, the stimulus effects on the agricultural sector did not last long. Starting
from the mid-1980s, agricultural production began to decline. Other problems also
occurred such as high inflation, reduced rural social welfare and declining amount of arable
land. 30 The most important change in the agricultural sector was the rapid growth of
socioeconomic inequality. As Meisner observed (1999, 474), the agricultural sector started
to show “a class distinction of those who were hiring labors and those who are hired labors
gradually appeared.” Meisner further described in detail that this is a class distinction
between “an elite group of successful entrepreneurs who own machinery or operate
commercial and service enterprise, hire wage laborers, and accumulate capital in a diverse
variety of private business endeavors” and “the great mass of peasants increasingly
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differentiated by income and function, and ranging from the relatively prosperous to the
relatively impoverished.”

1.5.1.2 1982 Custody and Repatriation policy
As a result of the HRS, rural surplus laborers flourish. At the peak of the collective
communes, 100 million people were mobilized annually for the “winter works” programs
of capital formation and maintenance (i.e. irrigation works). Now these number of people
became the surplus laborers “freed” from their rural collectives (Patnaik and Natrajan 2000,
Rawski 1979). More and more peasants became unable to afford basic subsistence by
cultivating small pieces of land that were distributed to their individual households. Those
households with fewer laborers, draft animals or agricultural tools were the ones who were
hit first. They appeared less competitive in agricultural production than others so they had
to accept side-line work to support their families. Moving to urban areas to find jobs or
begging were among the choices (Meisner 1999; Solinger 1999).
Also, rural mechanization could be more fully utilized on collective farms than on
small pieces of lands that are distributed to each household under HRS. The fast
development of rural mechanization could guarantee either agricultural production
increase or the collective benefit increase (i.e. health, education, etc.). Yet for individual
households, the only effective way to increase production on the limited land is fertilizer.
This could explain the much slower growth in mechanization development after HRS
compared to the collective era as is shown in Figure 1.2.31
31

The agricultural mechanization level also falls for average person. According to the Comprehensive
Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (Xinzhongguo Wushinian Tongji Ziliao Huibian),
the employed population in the primary industry shows an overall increasing trend (with mild fluctuations)
until the peak in 1991. This measure includes people who are employed in farming as well as forestry,
herding and fishery. This is the best available measure to calculate machinery power per person.
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Comparing the rate of agricultural mechanization growth before and after the
economic reform, we could see that since 1980, the annual growth rate of total power of
agricultural machinery has never exceeded 10%. From 1965-1977 (adding one more year
before and after the Cultural Revolution), the total growth rate of agricultural machinery
power achieved 834%; while the growth rate from 1978-1990, which also spans 12 years,
was only 144%. An important implication from this comparison is that the rural migration
after the economic reform was not based on a massive improvement of rural mechanization.
Lack of rapid rural mechanization makes it difficult to free physical labor without affecting
agricultural output level. Yet the land distributed to each household was insufficient to
assign work to every laborer. As a result, those who are not needed for the farm work
became the surplus labor. They were then forced to migrate to the urban sector to earn
subsistence.
As a result of the limited land that households could work on and the bad
maintenance of collective work (i.e. building of irrigation, etc.), surplus labor emerged as
a severe issue. Data show that 100 to 220 million peasants rapidly became “surplus” rural
laborers, among whom some 50 million peasants migrated to urban areas from 1978 to
1988 (Solinger 1999, 18). Figure 1.1 presents the urban migration rate before and after
economic reform. We can observe that since 1978, the migration rate remains positive,
with the peak (10.7%) occurring in 1984.
The 1982 Custody and Repatriation policy (i.e. Shourong Qiansong Banfa) aimed
to address the issue of surging migrants who became vagrants due to the lack of urban
employment opportunities. Cities established Custody and Repatriation stations to offer
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reliefs, education and repatriation for vagrants. 32 These stations recorded the names,
identities and addresses of these vagrants and their reasons and time for being homeless.33
The vagrants were then repatriated to their original hukou places. The new policy also
required that their local government or brigades shall help them solve their living problems
so that they do not need to migrate to cities.34 Those having ability to work will be sent to
the Placement Farms, or Anzhi Nongchang. These are the places to settle those homeless,
income-less, long-term vagrants by offering minimum subsistence. 35 Those who have
problems to be repatriated back and have no ability to work will be sent to social welfare
homes or nursing homes and be provided with five protections (i.e. wu bao), namely the
protections for food, clothes, shelter, medical aid and burial after death.36
The Custody and Repatriation policy is more than just aiming to offer humanitarian
aid to the homeless and jobless in the urban sector. These people migrate to cities because
they cannot survive by working in the rural sector. Instead of addressing the issue of surplus
labor in the rural sector, the state sets the priority of maintaining the fiction that everyone
shall have a job in order to live legally in cities by repatriating those people back to the
places that they fled from. Usually they are the “incompetent farmers” who had transferred
their land to other “competent farmers.” It was also increasingly difficult for them to get
hired by rural enterprises with surging unemployment in the rural sector in the 1980s
(Solinger 1985, 102). Compared with the repatriation of rural migrants from the urban
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sector in the planning period, the difference lies in that the peasants repatriated to farm now
cannot survive under de-collectivization.

1.5.1.3 1984 Decision on Economic reform and 1986 Labor Contract System
After ensuring that one needs to have a job to live legally in cities, the state started
to work to make sure that these urban workers must be “good,” or disciplined workers.
In 1984, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued the
Decision on Economic Reform (i.e. Guanyu Jingji Tizhi Gaige de Jueding), which begins
with the statement that “Socialism shall eliminate poverty. We shall not take poverty as
Socialism”.37 It then emphasized the importance of providing enterprises with autonomous
decision-making power and called for government organs to restrain from intervention.38
On the theoretical side, the document defended the economic reform as not contradicting
socialism given the public ownership of the means of production. However, the document
made explicit that commodity production and commodity exchange is necessary given
China’s unique context with “massive population, inconvenient transportation, information
difficulties, imbalanced economic and cultural development among different regions which
are all problems hard to solve in the short run”.39
According to the document, the Production Responsibility System implemented in
the rural sector shall be applied to the urban sector as well. 40 This reform has two
implications. First, workers’ power over the production process will be shifted
37

See Article 2 of the Decision on Economic Reform, at
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disproportionally to the management level. The document explicitly stated that only the
“Manager-Responsibility System” can meet the requirement of detailed division of labor,
management for highly productive production in modern enterprises.41 Second, significant
wage differences are allowed based on the different types of work, such as intellectual
versus physical labor, complicated versus simple labor, skilled versus unskilled labor, or
heavy-load versus light-load labor. The document stated that it is “urgent” to change the
current situation of relatively low payment for intellectual labor.” This perspective stands
in sharp contrast to the goal of elimination the three differences (i.e. intellectual labor and
physical labor, urban and rural area, workers and peasants) under the planned economy.
In 1986, two more documents were issued that were more bold in their wording
with respect to the urgency of disciplining workers.42 The Temporary Regulation on Labor
Contract System in State-Owned Enterprises required a universal implementation of the
Labor Contract System. This included various forms such as 5 years long-term workers, 1
to 5 years short-term workers and temporary workers. 43 Based on this document,
enterprises can terminate the labor contract when 1) workers are found unqualified during
the probation period (3-6 months); 2) workers are sick or damaged not because of work
and cannot be involved in the original work after health medication; 3) workers disrupt
production order or do not conform to reasonable personnel change); 4) enterprises go
bankrupt.44 If we compare this regulation with the 1952 Decision on Labor Employment
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Problems, we will find that workers now can be laid off with the reasons that were strictly
forbidden to be used to fire workers in the planned economy.

1.5.2 Hukou’s Reform
With all these preset conditions in 1984, large cities such as Wuhan started to loosen
the hukou regulation by openly issuing Temporary Residence Certificates for rural workers
coming to urban cities to work. One year later, this “Temporary Residence Certificate”
became applicable in the whole country. Yet grain access was still an issue under the food
rationing system for rural migrant workers to maintain even “temporary residence” (6-12
months) in cities and towns. In 1985, the Unified Procurement and Marketing of Grain
(UPMG) policy was repealed. This meant that the most effective control over migration
through food rationing was lifted. With food becoming accessible in the market, a nationwide implementation of “Temporary Residence Certificate” was announced in 1985.

1.5.2.1 Temporary Residence Certificate and the Repeal of UPMG policy
This newly emerging hostility toward urban workers from 1984 to 1986 is in the
context of the adjustment of hukou policy and the repeal of UPMG policy. This is because,
only when the food rationing constraint was lifted, rural migrants could stay in the urban
sectors for as long as they were needed. This created a massive reserve army of workers to
compete against the urban sector workers.
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The change in the hukou system started in some major cities such as Wuhan. As
early as May 1983, Wuhan started to adopt the use of “Temporary Residence Certificates”
in order to “institute, verify and issue certificates declaring temporary residence for nonnative personnel coming to our city [Wuhan] to engage in various kinds of economic
activity” (Solinger 1985, 98). In that year, Wuhan’s “temporary and floating population”
numbered 222,000 (Solinger 1985, 103). This round of rural-urban migration differed
significantly from the floating population in the 1950s in that the migration now was no
longer for the sake of central planning of production and distribution operating through
“recruitment quota” set by the Labor Department. It was exactly the “blind influx” that the
government had fought to prevent from occurring in the 1950s. As a result of this change
in the nature of the migration pattern, the Labor Department was no longer responsible for
rural-urban migration issues. Rather, it became the responsibility of the Public Security
Department (Solinger 1985).
Yet grain access was still an issue under the food rationing system for rural migrant
workers to maintain even “temporary residence” (6-12 months) in cities and towns. In 1985,
UPMG policy was finally repealed. 45 In the opening statement of Ten Policies on
Stimulating the Rural Economy, the state claimed that UPMG policy was no longer
applicable as it now “largely hampers the development of agricultural commodities
production and the improvement of economic efficiency.” Instead, a system of contractual
order and market sales of agricultural products needs was implemented immediately.46
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With food becoming accessible in the market, a nation-wide implementation of
“Temporary Residence Certificate” program was announced in 1985.47 According to the
regulation, any rural resident 16 years or older planning to stay in the urban sector for more
than 3 months needed to apply for a Temporary Residence Certificate (zan zhu zheng).
Those staying in the urban sector for a relatively longer time due to work needed to apply
for a Lodge Certificate (ji zhu zheng). With the issuance of this regulation, the restriction
on migration was completely lifted. Just within 10 years, the floating population amounted
to about 80 million (Chan and Zhang 1999, 833).
There are two things worth noting in this “Provisional Regulation on Temporary
Residences in Cities and Towns” issued in 1985. First, the time limit for temporary stay
was extended. With the initial experiment in Wuhan in 1983, the policy only allowed six
to twelve months of temporary stay. Now one could stay an unlimited amount of time only
by receiving a different type of certificate. The term “temporary” in the regulation only
refers to the nature of the stay, not the time length of the stay. Second, the occupations of
those staying in the urban sector for longer time is explicitly discussed in the document.
Those workers are concentrated in the construction, transportation, and other contracted
works.
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1.5.2.2 Implementation of Blue-Stamp Urban Hukou
The 1992 introduction of the Blue Stamp Urban Hukou allowed purchasing of urban
hukou status. As a result, capital now plays a crucial role in determining who enjoys
privileges.
In August 1992, the Ministry of Public Security issued a Circular on
Implementation of Locally-Valid Urban Hukou Registration. This document started to
allow the application of urban hukou. To apply for a Blue-Stamp Hukou, one needs to pay
a large lump-sum fee for urban infrastructural construction (chengshi zengrongfei). The
specific amount of this fee varied by development level of each specific city and town
(Chan and Zhang 1999, 838). After holding Blue-Stamp Hukou for certain years (specified
by cities independently), one can transfer his or her hukou status into becoming a regular
urban resident. These residents could then enjoy the same rights and obligations as urban
residents.
Needless to say, this right to transfer hukou is only enjoyed by those who are
relatively rich or powerful. These people include, for instance, relatives of overseas
Chinese or Hongkong or Macau investors; domestic investors and their close relatives;
persons and their close relatives who, with permission, purchase urban housing at market
prices or building urban housing with their own capital; and persons and their close
relatives who make significant contributions to the urban economy (Chan and Zhang
1999).This association of urban hukou with money value marked the beginning of the
hukou system being associated with inequality.
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1.5.3 Hukou’s Role in the Market Economy
Hukou has played three roles in the market economy. First, it assisted in the creation
of the reserve army in the urban sector. Second, it assisted the adoption of the Lewis
development model under the economic reforms. Third, it reinforced inequality between
the urban and rural sectors.

1.5.3.1 Creation of Industrial Reserve Army
In Capital, Marx described how the creation of industrial reserve army as a result
of a surplus laboring population is a necessary product of accumulation or of the
development of wealth for capitalism. Marx also explained how wages are regulated by the
expansion and contraction of industrial reserve army. The series of policies implemented
first in the rural sector and then in the urban sector resulted in the creation of an industrial
reserve army, paving ways for the capitalist development in the urban sector.
The process of creating an industrial reserve army involves two steps in China.
From the mid to late 1980s, the urban private sector was not well developed. Therefore,
the rural migrants were mainly drawn to the construction and transportation sector, or selfemployed as vendors. During this period, rural migrants and urban workers were still
working in segregated sectors, and the competition did not start yet. Following the massive
lay-offs (i.e. xia gang, literally means stepping down the position) in the urban state-owned
enterprises in 1990s, the urban private economic sector started to grow and was fully
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developed as an integral part of the economy.48 Employment in the private sector as a share
of the total national non-agricultural labor force grew rapidly from only two percent in
1981 to 18 percent in 1997 (Wu 2006; Garnaut et.al 2001). It is not until then the urban
laid-off workers started to face competition in both the full fledging private sector and selfemployment opportunities.
The competition from the rural migrant workers became fierce. Compared with the
urban laid-off workers, on average rural migrants are younger, physically stronger, more
educated on average, and willing to work harder for lower wages (Solinger 2002, 314). The
reasons are intuitive. First of all, it is hard for urban workers who previously worked in the
state-owned enterprise to get accustomed to the work intensity in the informal sector (i.e.
temporary waged worker or self-employed). By contrast, a high proportion of rural
migrants already had more than 10 years of experience. As for the physically
competitiveness of the rural migrants, the interviewed urban laid-off workers admitted that
rural migrants could endure greater hardship: “They can work hard, eat worse food, carry
heavier things.” Third, the percentage (12.7%) of rural migrants who were educated at the
junior high school level or above was twice high as that (6.7%) for the laid-off urban
workers. This may seem counter-intuitive. But in fact, it is often the youngest and the most
educated that are able and willing to leave the rural sector to join the labor force.
All of the above advantages combine to produce a 50% higher rate of average labor
productivity of rural workers relative to urban workers (Solinger 2002, 314). Yet the
average wage for hiring an urban worker (including the legally required benefits) is almost
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five times higher than employing a rural worker.49 The choice facing private employers is
straightforward. Therefore despite some state policies to protect the priority for urban laidoff workers, private employers either would hire rural labor instead or “play on the workers’
eagerness to find new jobs, refusing to give them wages equal to regular workers, though
they do just the same work” (Solinger 2002, 313).50
As urban workers’ bargaining power gradually declined, employers, intellectuals
and skilled labor are paid increasing amounts. Blue-Stamp hukou explicitly attracted
capital and “competent personnel” into urban area to be the preparatory citizens for special
economic zones. The difference between urban and rural sector was no longer on a track
toward convergence.

1.5.3.2 Implementing the Lewis Model of Development
An important element of economic development is industrialization, but
industrialization can take different forms. In most countries, industrialization follows
Arthur Lewis’ dual-sector development model (Fields 2004). In the planned economy,
Lewis development model was largely avoided. Yet the market reform led to an alternative
development path.
With rural decollectivization first and then a series of labor flexibility policies
implemented in the urban sector, a Lewis development path eventually took off in China
in the 1990s. However, the Lewis development with Chinese characteristics suggests a
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much less precarious process than what most other developing countries experienced
(Wang 2005, 118). This is mostly because China successfully prevented the emergence of
large-scale slums in the country’s developed metropolitan cities, as occurred in Brazil and
India. Yet unlike what much the literature has been arguing (Wang 2005, 27), hukou policy
alone did not prevent slums. The condition for any existence of slums in large cities was
already matured since the repeal of Unified Procurement and Marketing of Grain policy in
1985 when rural people could buy food in cities with cash. And the implementation of
Custody and Repatriation policy that forced the slums from occurring in cities since 1982.
After this policy was repealed in 2003, the Department of Public Security became in charge
of keeping slums invisible from the public sight.51
The natural consequence of a Lewis type of development is the squeezing of the
rural sector, as a result of tolerance towards unbalanced distribution of resources between
the urban and rural sector. As Taylor (1988, 760) argues, the major threat to the rural sector
is that the most productive workers (i.e. the young, the educated and the skilled) will
migrate out of the agricultural sector, leaving older and weaker family members to hold the
plots of land as a form of income insurance.
In comparison, in the socialist mode of urban development, the rural sector was not
badly treated. Health care and education services had improved rapidly (Zhang and Kanbur
2005). By the late 1970s, bare-foot doctors and clinics were set up in almost all villages.
By 1980, the school enrollment rate among rural children reached about 90%. Another
important piece of evidence to witness the long-lasting effort the state had made to reduce
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inequality between urban and rural sector is the 1965 Direction on the Adjustment of
Current Prices.52 The direction announced that in the 15 years’ history of People’s Republic
of China, the procurement price of grain has been raised by about 90%, and there is 30%
price increase from 1957 to 1964. For the government, the urgent issue at hand is that the
unified sale price of grain in urban areas is lower than both the sale price in rural areas and
the procurement price from rural area. And this, in the wording of the direction, “causes
the unreasonable fact that urban workers can purchase grain at a cheaper price than peasants
could, which affects the alliance between workers and peasants.” What the state did to
reduce urban-rural inequality is first to “raise the unified urban sales price of grain to the
same level of the unified procurement price from the rural area”; and then to ensure a “oneyuan increase for every 50 kg grain” which resulted in a total surplus from the price
increase of 300 million yuan. Also, for those extremely poor urban areas, government
would provide compensation to ensure the affordability of food grain. With a goal of
balanced growth of both sectors, the planned economy shows a slow but steady
accumulation pattern of both sectors, one that the urban sector was not developed at the
sacrifice of rural sector.
It is interesting to look at the solution to this increased draining of the most
productive rural workers from the rural sector from the perspective of major official
policies and much of the existing studies. The official solution is to encourage seasonal
migration of rural labor, that is: rural laborers are welcomed to find urban employment
during nong xian (slack farming season) but they are encouraged to return farmland to help
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out during nong mang (busy farming season). Mainstream scholars, on the other hand,
criticized this solution as insufficient to solve the fundamental problem. And their
reasoning is that only mechanized farming techniques could compensate for this massive
loss of productive laborers. Yet since agricultural mechanization is more effective for large
land areas, the government should allow the selling of land-use rights between households.
This would permit more effective utilization of rural mechanization on the consolidated
land area (Taylor 1988, 761). It is ironic to see that the advantages of farming on large land
areas instead of small plots was realized in this context. This is after a nation-wide
decollectivization campaign.

1.5.3.3 Reinforcing the Urban-Rural Inequality
Hukou is often associated with protecting urban privileges. This association
originated from the planned economy, when urban workers were guaranteed full
employment and social benefits related with their employment. These benefits included
free compulsory education for children, free or subsidized health care and housing (Zhang
and Kanbur 2005). In the rural sector, healthcare and education services were also provided
but with lower quality than in the urban sector. Healthcare services were provided with a
focus on preventive rather than curative measures. Education services were provided at the
commune level. 53 The results were rather successful, as is discussed in Section 5.3.2.
However, although social benefits are much improved in the rural sector, the physical
hardship innately associated with agricultural work still suggest to many an inferior status
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of the agricultural sector compared to the industrial sector. So although it was actually the
UMPG policy that effectively controlled migration in the planned economy, hukou’s role
of civilian registration, and therefore its assistance in migration control, made it a common
target for critique regarding protecting urban privileges.54
After the market reform, the nature of the urban privileges changed. Since the urban
labor reform in 1984, the “iron rice bowl” system no longer existed. With decollectivization
in the rural sector, rural residents started to leave agricultural work and move to the urban
sector to work. So the key difference between urban residents versus rural residents was
no longer related to the nature of their work. Now the difference is related to the social
resources that rural hukou holders have access to in the urban sector, and the wages they
are paid in the urban sector compared to urban hukou holders. They are lower wages even
for the same jobs. Moreover, barriers between urban and rural hukou holders were more
directly confronted because they are now competing for the same jobs and resources,
including water, electricity, transportation, stably priced food in the urban sector.55
Furthermore, the family separation issues related with the strong mobility control
under the planned economy were intensified after the market reform. This was largely due
to hukou’s role of reinforcing urban- rural inequality. In the planned economy, control of
population mobility served both production and distributional purposes. Of course, the
urgent need to balance the population between the two sectors through strict imposition of
the hukou system created problems. For example, policies had been revised gradually to
guarantee the reunion of workers and cadres family through an annual two-to-three weeks
leave at state expense instead of an automatic migration of family members to the urban
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areas.56 But problems still existed for long-distance separated couples and families when
only one member is recruited by the urban state sector. According to Cheng and Selden
(1994, 661), six million of China’s 24 million state sector workers and employees lived at
a distance from parents, spouses or both in 1957. This arrangement is indeed inhumane.
Yet besides the importance of controlling population mobility, one could also argue that
this arrangement limits the privilege of urban workers and cadres. If, according to the
current discussion, urban workers and cadres already enjoy some privileges over peasants,
it would be more unfair when they can bring family members to urban areas immediately
after they were hired in the industrial sector.
Unsurprisingly,

this

seemingly

“non-humanitarian”

arrangement

induces

resentment from the related people. That is why one of the first things that the state did in
the beginning of the reform era was to revise the nong zhuan fei policy (transfer from
agricultural to non-agricultural hukou status) mainly to ease the process for the reunion of
those long-time separated couples. The state also rehabilitated those purged cadres and
intellectuals with their families (Chan and Zhang 1999, 834). This policy was welcomed
by professionals and cadres that had experienced family separation. However, the extent
of family separation actually worsened during the market economy period. Hundred
millions of peasants were forced to leave their land to earn a living. The left-behind children
in rural China amounted to 23 million in 2000 (Zhou and Duan 2006).
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On 16 November 1957, “Provisional Regulations Governing Home Leaves and Wages of Workers and
Employees”.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the hukou’s functions in both the planned economy and the
market economy. While a range of existing studies attribute China’s urban-rural inequality
to the hukou system in general, I identify the policies, other than hukou, that played crucial
roles in controlling rural to urban migration and for protecting the privileges associated
with the urban sector.
A review of the experimental policies regarding population and labor employment
control since 1951 before the official launch of hukou system suggests that civilian
registration is not new in China. Rather it can be traced back to the 11th century. However,
the distinctive feature of the hukou system comes from the broader economic system it is
operating under. In the planned economy, hukou played important roles in civilian
registration, migration control and employment regulation. I emphasize that the Unified
Procurement and Marketing of Grain policy was the actual policy that effectively
controlled the rural-to-urban migration, with hukou only playing a secondary role. The
employment regulation function of hukou was specifically designed to meet the needs of
balanced growth of both rural and urban sectors. The privileges of the urban sector in the
planned economy was associated with the nature of the work, with the physical hardship
of the agricultural work being considered inferior to jobs in the urban factories. Education
and health care services were improving rapidly with successful results in the rural sector.
Therefore, access to social resources were not the key dividing areas for urban and rural
residents in the planned economy.
The hukou system seemed to be an obstacle to the market reform in the sense that
it binds the rural labor force on their land. But the true obstacle to the reform is not the
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hukou system alone, but the planned economy within which the hukou system is operating.
In that sense, the repeal of the Unified Procurement and Marking of Grain and reducing
urban workers’ bargaining power is more important in promoting market reforms than the
hukou system. My study of the policies from 1982 to 1985 shows how the government,
step by step, generated a massive pool of surplus laborers in the rural sector, and broke the
“iron rice bowl” system in the urban sector, thus creating the supply and demand conditions
for a massive rural to urban migration. This process continues at present. All these policies
preceded hukou’s first adjustment, i.e. Temporary Residence Certificates and the second
adjustment, i.e. the Blue-Stamp Hukou. This evidence refutes the view that it was hukou’s
reform per se that lifted the restriction on rural urban migration. The nature of the urban
privileges has also changed. Not all urban residents are now employed in the public sector
that provided free and subsidized health care services and housing, as in the planned
economy. Now money capital and human capital play major roles in the accessibility to
social resources.
As a result, although urban and rural residents now both have the the freedom to
migrate within the market economy, they have paid high costs for this freedom of
movement. Urban residents now have lost their guaranteed work and associated benefits,
while rural residents lost their access to local education and health care services. They also
lost their freedom to live in the rural sector because they can no longer live by merely doing
agricultural work. Social resources have been minimized, as the rural sector has been
squeezed, in order to further develop the urban sector.
The overall implication of this study is that the interacting effects of the hukou
and the economic system, rather than hukou alone, should be the analytical focus to
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address important development topics such as industrialization, urbanization, spatial and
social inequality. This finding contributes to the understanding of policy discussion of
hukou in the context of the overall development model in China.
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Table 1.1. Growth Rates of Total Industrial and Agricultural Output, Rural
Mechanization, and Net Rural-Urban Migration Rate, 1950-1980 (continued onto
next page)
Year

Growth rate of

Growth rate

Growth rate

Growth rate of rural

Net Rural-

Total Industrial

of Total

of rural

mechanization

Urban

Output

Agricultural

mechanization

(compounded

Migration

Output

(original)

annual growth rate)

Rate

1950

NA

NA

NA

5.1%

1951

NA

NA

NA

4.9%

1952

NA

NA

45.8%

4.6%

1953

36.5%

10.2%

45.8%

2.7%

1954

13.0%

3.7%

45.8%

0.1%

1955

3.5%

7.4%

45.8%

-2.3%

1956

17.5%

5.4%

45.8%

3.4%

1957

20.6%

-3.1%

45.8%

0.1%

1958

53.0%

3.7%

44.2%

22.1%

1959

29.9%

-13.9%

44.2%

1.9%

1960

5.5%

-11.2%

44.2%

4.1%

1961

-36.3%

29.5%

44.2%

-8.8%

1962

-10.1%

2.7%

44.2%

-10.1%

1963

12.4%

9.8%

13.2%

-1.8%

1964

26.1%

12.4%

13.2%

-2.7%

1965

18.5%

16.5%

13.2%

0.7%

1966

18.7%

7.8%

14.5%

-0.3%

1967

-16.0%

1.7%

14.5%

0.6%

1968

-10.0%

1.7%

14.5%

-3.9%

1969

27.7%

1.4%

14.5%

-3.1%

1970

32.3%

7.8%

14.5%

-1.2%

1971

11.9%

4.2%

30.2%

2.1%

1972

6.8%

0.1%

30.2%

2.0%

1973

8.3%

9.7%

30.2%

1.3%

559.8%

523.6%

45.2%

97.1%

120.9%
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1974

1.0%

4.2%

24.0%

24.0%

0.0%

1975

14.9%

2.7%

26.1%

26.1%

0.4%

1976

-3.2%

-0.4%

15.4%

15.4%

0.9%

1977

13.9%

-2.6%

18.9%

18.9%

0.7%

1978

17.1%

8.1%

14.5%

14.5%

3.2%

1979

10.1%

23.6%

13.9%

13.9%

6.1%

1980

12.8%

8.0%

10.2%

10.2%

3.3%

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2012.
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Figure 1.1 Net Rural-Urban Migration Rate 1950—1990
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Figure 1.2. Growth Rate of Rural Mechanization 1952 to 2008

Growth Rate of Rural Mechanization

Note: Rural mechanization is measured by the total power of agricultural machinery
(kilowatt). The growth rate for year 1952-1973 is calculated as the compound annual
growth rates based on the information on the available years.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2012).
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CHAPTER 2
DOES THE FORM OF BORROWING AFFECT INVESTMENT PATTERNS?
EVIDENCE FROM CHINA 1979-1989

2.1 Introduction
The importance of rural finance has been widely acknowledged in the rural
development literature. The availability of rural credit is often assumed to have
substantial positive impacts on agricultural investment as well as agricultural growth.
However, the links among credit, investment and growth are not always straightforward.
This is because rural credit can have different sources and can take various forms. For
example, credit from institutional sources and private sources are associated with
different interest rates which will affect the repayment behavior. Sometimes different
institutions will impose specific conditions for the loans they are making. These
conditions will in turn affect how borrowers spend their loans. At the same time,
investment can also take many forms. While a small amount of loans can only be used to
invest in agricultural inputs or small machinery tools, large loans can be used to invest in
large-scale projects such as infrastructure building. These different types of investments
will have their distinct implications for the loan effectiveness and agricultural growth.
However, most rural finance studies have been focusing on the supply side with
specific attention on availability of credit. This quantity perspective is valuable but
incomplete. There are also other important perspectives that deserve examination. One
example of an understudied perspective is the myriad forms borrowing rural credit takes.
Missing the perspective of borrowing forms risks overlooking the link between
borrowing patterns and agricultural loan effectiveness. In this paper, the term
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“agricultural loan effectiveness” refers to whether loans are being channeled effectively
to contribute to the long-run sustainable development of the agricultural sector. If we can
understand how different borrowing patterns might lead to different investment behavior,
we might better understand why some kind of lending practices are successful while
others are not. We might also understand the way through which production is organized
influences investment behavior from the credit demand side.
This essay compares the different agricultural investment patterns when credit is
borrowed on a collective basis versus on an individual basis. I construct a model of
agricultural investment explained by factors of income, weather and geography as well as
and the form of borrowing. Specifically, I use a two-way fixed-effects model for the
estimation based on a panel data on the ratio of agricultural credit borrowed on individual
basis versus on collective basis (the IC ratio), irrigation, income and weather, covering 11
years and 28 provinces in China. I use irrigation to represent the type of investment that
involves a slow yet long-run reward for sustainability, and fertilizer to represent the
investment that aims for an immediate return, but can be short-sighted in nature as it is
inconsistent with agricultural sustainability.
I find that on the same income and loan level, more loans made to individuals versus
to collectives (i.e. a higher IC ratio) will lead to a lower level of investment in irrigation
building and maintenance work. Correspondingly, more loans made to individuals versus
to collectives (i.e. a lower IC ratio) will lead to a much higher investment in fertilizer use.
Based on these results, I argue that the forms of borrowing (i.e. on a collective or
individual base) matters significantly in decisions regarding agricultural investments.
Collective-based agricultural lending tends to be channeled to investment that contributes
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to more sustainable agricultural development yet with returns only in the intermediate or
long run.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. In section 2, I review
the existing literature on rural finance. I show that despite two streams of literature that
modestly engage with forms of borrowing, the majority of existing studies has not
sufficiently studied how different forms of borrowing affect investment patterns. I also
introduce the history of China’s rural finance development and argue that the particular
decollectivization history provides a real-world case of transformation in the forms of
borrowing. In section 3, I introduce the specifications of the models that I use to test my
hypotheses about the relationship between the forms of borrowing and agricultural
investments. I also discuss the reasons behind choosing irrigation and fertilizer as two
representative types of investments that are different in their implications for sustainable
development. In section 4, I discuss the data sources and provide some descriptive
statistics for the key variables. In section 5, I present the main results from my estimation
exercises. I also discuss about the implications of the results in details. Section 6
concludes the paper.

2.2 Background and Literature Review
2.2.1

Literature Review

A large body of empirical evidence suggests that increasing access to rural credit
leads to higher levels of agriculture-related investment (Binswanger and Rosenzweig
1986; Feder et.al 1992; Binswanger et.al 1993; Rosenzweig& Wolpin 1993; Dinar&
Keck 1997; Foltz 2004; Petrick 2004; Binswanger 2006; Mohan 2006; Kohansal et.al
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2008).57 These case studies have covered a range of countries, including India, China,
Columbia, Tunisia, Poland and Iran. However, not all types of agricultural investment
have positive associations with agricultural growth under all circumstances. For example,
agricultural investment can be publicly or privately funded. Such investment can aim at
infrastructure building such as irrigation facilities or roads, as well as raw materials such
as seeds or fertilizers. At the same time, agricultural work can be organized by small
households or by large collectives. The impact of investment varies with different
conditions. Some empirics suggest that public investment in the form of fertilizer
subsidies shows negative correlations with agricultural growth in the cases of smallholder
farmers.58
Also, credit supply does not necessarily alleviate the credit constraint issue in the
Chinese case. Rural credit constraint, defined as borrowers who indicated a desire for
more credit and the non-borrowers who responded that they could not obtain credit, has
been recorded in the literature since the late 1980s (Feder et.al 1989, 1990, 1991) and
throughout the literature in the 1990s and 2000s (Park et.al 1997; 2001; Du 2002; Brandt
et. al 2004; Tsai 2004; People’s Bank of China and China Statistics Bureau 2009). Into
the 2010s, the problem appears to still exist. Study of He and Li (2011) shows that among
1.2 billion rural households with credit need, about 30% do not have access to credit.
Meanwhile, the supply of credit from financial institutions to the agricultural sector has
been increasing dramatically. Despite some fluctuations, the total amount of agricultural
loan from the the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Rural Credit Cooperatives
57

There are some exceptions. For example, Foltz (2004) suggests that the empirical evidence does not
support the claim that credit constraints have impinged on agricultural investment in Tunisia.
58
See the report of “Models of Agricultural Investment” by Dochas, the Irish Association of NonGovernmental Development Organizations, at http://www.dochas.ie/Shared/Files/4/dochas-agriculturalinvestment.pdf.
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(RCCs), the two major institutional sources, has increased more than eight-fold in real
terms from 1979 to 1994.59 If we take account of the total loans made to the agricultural
sector, data suggests that from 1995 to 2009, the loan supply has increased from 89.9
billion to 739.17 billion yuan (at 1978 price level), a significant nine-fold increase.60
The ambiguous relations among agricultural credit, investment and growth suggest
the importance of studying what we can term “agricultural loan effectiveness.” In this
paper, the term “agricultural loan effectiveness” refers to whether loans are being
channeled effectively to contribute to the long-run sustainable development of the
agricultural sector. This paper approaches the “agricultural loan effectiveness” issue from
the perspective of the form of borrowing. The forms of borrowing refer to borrowing on a
collective basis versus on an individual basis. This perspective has its theoretical and
empirical basis within the existing literature.
There are two streams of studies touching upon the topic of the borrowing forms. The
discounting and time preference literature offer some theoretical elaborations on how
public investment involves a lower social discount rate than private investment. The
conventional wisdom is that given two similar rewards, humans show a preference for
one that arrives sooner rather than later (Solnick e.t al 1980; Thaler 1981; Millar and
Navarick 1984; Benzion et.al 1989; Green et. al 1994; Kirby and Herrnstein 1995; Pender
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The total agricultural loans from Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) increased from 9.9 billion RMB in
1979 to 51.2 billion yuan in 2005, while the agricultural loans from Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs)
increased from 2.9 billion yuan in 1979 to 42.1 billion yuan in 1994. The Chinese government ceased the
publication of China Rural Finance Statistical Yearbook in 1997. The publications were shifted to China
Finance Statistical Yearbook, and Agricultural Bank of China Statistical Yearbook. In either publication,
the information about Rural Credit Cooperatives as independent lending source has become unavailable.
Instead, the transactions in RCCs have been combined into the balance sheets of ABCs.
60
China Statistical Yearbook 1996-2010 Table 19-2, Balance Sheet of Credit Funds of Financial
Institutions (Funds Uses). This data source does not differentiate loans from public and private institutions.
And it does not have data specifically on the loans for agricultural use. This suggests that the loan for the
rural sector also includes loans for development of industry and commerce within the rural sector.
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1996). The implication of this argument is that when the risks associated with the
investments are comparable, investors prefer to make the investment that will give a
quick return. Given that social risks affiliated with government projects can be distributed
over the entire country and thus are inherently smaller than private risks, public
investment will lead to a preference towards rewards in the longer run (Samuelson 1964;
Vickrey 1964; Arrow (1965; 1966)). But there is no consensus upon such explanations
(Hirshleifer 1961; Jensen and Bailey 1972). The counter-argument is that government
projects are still carried out by many private sectors as producers. Thus, the benefits of
the projects are received by private household sector as consumers. Therefore, the costs
and benefits, as well as the risks occurred to the same group of people. This line of
argument leads to the conclusion that there should not be any necessary discrepancy in
the discount rates between public and private investment, or that the social discount rate
should be at least as high a rate as a similar private project.
This stream of literature does shed some light on the reasons behind different
investment patterns. Yet the theoretical discussion is usually too general to be applied to
specific cases such as investment from agricultural credit. Also the empirical evidence in
the discounting literature is usually produced in laboratories by offering cash rewards to
participants. This methodology often suffers from the critique of their external validity
(Schram 2005; Roe and Just 2009). Specifically, the laboratory settings are very different
from the real world, especially the rural sector that is characterized by high poverty rates.
Therefore, one should not expect the behavioral choices made by lab participants to be
applicable to the specific cases in the real world.
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Research on microfinance is the other stream of literature that engages the discussion
about the forms of borrowing.61 It compares the loan repayment rates from group lending
versus individual lending in developing countries. Most studies suggest higher repayment
rates when credit is lent to a group of borrowers (Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990; Remenyi,
1991; Besley and Coate, 1995; Ghatak, 1999; Coleman, 2000; Abbink et.al 2006; Karlan
2007; Li et.al 2013; Sinn 2013). One of the key reasons for launching group lending
practices in microfinance institutions all over the world is that poor villagers usually do
not have access to conventional loans due to their lack of collateral. A group lending
practice allows group members to use joint liability as a substitute for collateral. This is a
technique through which the poor are supposed to have more access to rural credit. Based
on these studies, the higher repayment rates from group lending practices, as compared to
the individual lending practices in the microfinance institutions all over the world, can be
explained by better information and peer pressures. More specifically, the fact that the
borrower groups are usually self-selected by evaluating each other’s creditworthiness
mitigates the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard from the beginning. Also,
the member in the group lending practice tends to repay her loan in order to avoid the
social sanction of her peers. The self-selected borrower groups also tend to avoid
excessively risky projects, and are more willing to contribute to others’ repayment
responsibility when loan-supported projects turn out to be unsuccessful. However, there
is also empirical evidence that suggests that group lending does not always show
advantage over individual lending in terms of loan repayment in all cases over the world

61

In the microfinance case, the forms of accessing rural credit is more imposed from the supply side. So a
more appropriate term should be “forms of lending”. This is different from the Chinese case that this essay
focuses on.
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(Huppi and Feder 1989; Wydick 1999; De Aghion and Morduch 2000; Gine et.al 2006;
Karlan and Gine 2007). For example, Huppi and Feder (1989) suggested that successful
group lending and credit cooperatives have some common attributes such as homogenous
borrowers and bottom-up organization. Other less successful groups or cooperatives do
not show advantage in loan repayment compared with small-farmer borrowers.
In addition to the empirical inconsistency for the advantage of group lending for loan
repayment, the crucial shortcoming of the microfinance literature in terms of evaluating
the forms of borrowing is the targeted indicator: the loan repayment. Since the
sustainability of microfinance institutions is one of the key concerns in the real practice,
the literature reflects this concern by ambiguously equating high loan repayment rates
with success of microfinance operations. However, as Coleman (1999) points out, the
primary goal of microfinance institutions as well as village banks in general, should
instead be the improvement of overall welfare of the borrowers. If this standard is used
for evaluation, one cannot conclude that the microfinance institutions have been
operating successfully (Adams and Pischke 1992; Coleman 1999, Bateman 2010). This
loan repayment measure gives evidence of the sustainability of lenders, not borrowers,
and therefore is unable to provide sufficient information regarding how borrower use the
borrowed credit to make investment that is supposed to help improve their financial
situation.
This question is important as the way investment is made has an influence on how
effectively the loans are being used. And loan effectiveness is reinforced by the level of
sustainability of the rural sector. If investment is made in order to have a quick cash
return, investors look at ways to get the maximum benefits out of an investment within a
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relatively short time. In this case, sustainability will not be a priority. In the case of
agriculture, an investment with no sustainability perspective will contribute to the fast
decline of agricultural productivity that negatively affects the loan effectiveness in the
long run. For example, although fertilizers can significantly improve crop productivity,
heavy use of fertilizers was found to have led to significant loss of soil-water and soil
organic carbon (SOC) that is crucial for maintaining soil productivity (Huang 2003;
Srinivasarao 2014). This means sacrificing sustainable agricultural development in the
long run.
The insufficient attention to this critical question of the form of borrowing could be a
result of the lack of large-scale data for collective borrowing. This is because most
countries under review have not experienced a significant change in the agrarian mode of
production that leads to a dramatic change in the form of borrowing.62 It is therefore
reasonable to expect that these studies do not raise the issue of how the change of mode
of production, through its impact on the organization of rural finance, affects the
decisions on agricultural investment.

2.2.2

Historical background

China’s rural decollectivization in the early 1980s provides a real-world case of
transformation in the form of borrowing, from one that is predominantly based on
collective borrowing to one based on individual borrowing. The analysis in this paper is
based on this unique history in rural China.
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Exceptions exist such as Cater and Olinto (2003).
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Agricultural production in China has shifted from one based on large-scale collectives
to a small-peasant economy. As a result, the basis of the rural finance organizations in
China has changed. Prior to decollectivization, lending mainly took place in the rural
credit collectives (RCCs) that operated on the collective communes and corresponded to
local demands. In 1976, there were about 50,000 RCCs in operation, reaching the level
that there was at least one RCC operating for each rural commune (Lu 2001). After
decollectivization, RCCs lost most of their independence when the government relaunched the state-owned agricultural bank, the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). In
fact, half of the RCCs were combined with the business units of banks. Some still kept
the names of RCCs but functioned no more than the local branches of ABC. The RCCs
also lost their previous local bases, as the production communes were gradually
decollectivized. The ABC does very little business directly with agricultural households.
Its main focus is on the state agricultural agencies and rural industrial enterprises (Feder
et. al 1989). Starting in 1979, ABCs used interest rate and reserve requirement policies to
transfer funds from RCCs to ABCs, thus further hampering the RCCs’ ability to provide
rural credit (Tam 1988).63 As a result, RCCs loosened their ties with the local production
basis, and have to work more in line with ABCs. However, as Wen & Jiang (2007)
argued, the bank-type rural finance institutions are by nature unable to address the smallamount, low interest return, long-term and high-risk credit demand from the
geographically sparse small peasants. By the time RCCs eventually gained their
independence from ABC in 1996, the RCCs had already lost their financial significance
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RCCs are to place 30% of deposits with the ABCs at the annual interest rate of 4 percent. Yet RCCs have
to provide their annual deposit interest rates to members within the range of 7 to 8 percent. Also RCCs
need to keep 15% of deposits as their own reserves, which leaves only about 50% of the total deposits to be
utilized as loans.
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and local connections. The major rural finance institutions and the way they operate
therefore had undergone a dramatic transformation.
One might expect that given China’s agrarian history, studies regarding Chinese rural
finance should have probed into the impacts of forms of agricultural lending on
agricultural investment. However, this is not the case. Ever since the literature on Chinese
rural credit began to appear in the late 1980s, the issue of credit constraint has become
the main focus [Tam 1988; World Bank 1988; Feder et.al (1989, 1990, 1991); Park et.al
(1997, 2001, 2003); He 1999; Du& Sun 2000; Park & Ren 2001; Xie (2001, 2003); Du
2002; Brandt et.al 2004; Tsai 2004; Chen&Sun 2006; Wen & Jiang 2007; People’s Bank
of China and China Statistics Bureau 2009; Yang et.al 2010; He and Li 2011; Newman,
2011]. These studies mostly focus on providing empirical evidence on the extent of the
credit constraint, as well as explanations for the existence of these constraints. These
explanations all took decollectivization for granted and positively evaluated
decollectivization as releasing the incentives for higher credit demand that were inhibited
in the planned economy. The problem, according to these studies, is the failure of the
institutional finance resources to adjust to meet the surging demand. One thing worth
noting is that unlike the earlier literature on rural finance (Nolan 1983), very few recent
studies have discussed the topic in the context of the development of the agricultural
sector. Many discussions were focused too narrowly on comparing the amount of loans
available to the rural sector, without examining the effect of those loans. Most of these
studies miss the important dimension of who gets the loans, how are loans used, and how
these loans assist in promoting sustainable development in the agricultural sector. One
possible reason is that the goal of rural credit at present is limited to raising the income of
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individual rural households. In the previous era, there was much more emphasis on the
welfare of the collective of the whole, for example in building the irrigation systems.
This essay takes advantage of the agrarian change in China that has affected both the
ways that rural finance operates and also the agricultural mode of production in general.
Specifically, I compare the different agricultural investment patterns when agricultural
credit is borrowed on a collective basis versus on an individual basis. Although the case
study is about rural China, its implication for understanding agrarian change and rural
finance has broader implications, in particular for other developing countries.

2.3 Model Specifications and Methodological Concerns
2.3.1

Models

In this section, I present two econometric models that test how the forms of credit
borrowing, collectively versus individually, affect different agricultural investment
decisions.
The first model specifically looks at the investment decisions regarding irrigation
building and maintenance. All the dependent and independent variables are in their
natural logarithm forms. Both provincial (𝜙" ) and year (𝜏$ ) fixed effects are included to
control any possible provincial characteristics or specific year effects.64 The specification
is as follows:
𝑦"$ = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐼𝐶" $,- + 𝑋"$ + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐼𝐶" $,- ∗ Ζ"$ + 𝜙" + 𝜏$ + 𝜀"$ .
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This regression model leaves out the initial level of irrigation investment and fertilizer use for each
province in the beginning of year 1979 because these provincial differences are supposed to be captured by
the provincial dummy variable 𝜙" .
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The dependent variable 𝑦"$ is the effective irrigated area as a share of total sown area
in province 𝑖 and time 𝑡. The independent variable 𝐼𝐶 refers to the ratio of the amount of
loan borrowed by individuals over the amount borrowed by collectives. This IC ratio
directly measures the degree of loan borrowed on an individual basis versus on a
collective basis. It is therefore the key regressor of the model. Adding a subscript, 𝐼𝐶" $,refers to the IC ratio in province 𝑖 and in year 𝑡 − 1, or one year in advance. The reason
to use the one-period lagged IC instead of the contemporaneous IC ratio is the existence
of time lags between borrowing and using loans. This time lag is especially noticeable
between investment decision and implementation regarding irrigation projects. Usually,
irrigation building and maintenance works take place in winter when farming work is
minimal and surplus labor is available. The irrigation works that conclude in year 𝑡
usually started in the last several months of year 𝑡 − 1 in the beginning of the winter,
after investment decisions were made. Therefore, the completed irrigation work recorded
in the official statistics as effective irrigated land should be traced back to the credit
borrowed in the previous year. 𝐼𝐶" $,- here captures this lagged effect between the time
when credit is borrowed, investment decisions are made and the time when the
investment project is completed and recorded in the official statistics.
𝑋"$ is a vector of control variables including the real rural income per capita, real loan
per capita and climate variables; 𝐼𝐶" $,- ∗ Ζ"$ refer to the interaction terms between the
one-period lagged value of IC and all the control variables in 𝑋"$ except the climate
variables. This subset of controls denoted by Ζ"$ includes the contemporaneous real
income level, as well as the contemporaneous and one-period lagged value of real loan.
The main reason to include interaction terms between the 𝐼𝐶 ratio and the specified
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controls is that the 𝐼𝐶 ratio imposes different effects on the outcome variable depending
on the values of these controls. For example, at a higher income level, one would expect
that the households or collectives might be less dependent on borrowing credit to make
investment decisions, and therefore the form of loans should show weaker effects on
investment outcomes. Similarly, one would expect that with different amounts of
available credit, the forms of borrowing might impose different impacts on the eventual
investment decisions. All these possible differences in the impacts could be captured
through the interaction terms of income and 𝐼𝐶, as well as loan and 𝐼𝐶.
Although this model aims to identify the variables that affect irrigation investment, a
reverse causality might also be in play.65 To take account of this endogeneity issue, I use
the one-period lagged value of real income as the instrumental variable for the current
income level. The income level of the previous year is correlated with the current income
level, but does not correlate with the investment in the current year. Therefore it meets
the criteria for an instrumental variable (IV) for the income control variable in the model.
The second model focuses on the investment decisions on fertilizer use. The
specification is as follows:
𝑦"$ = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐼𝐶" $ + 𝑋"$ + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐼𝐶" $ ∗ Ζ"$ + 𝜙" + 𝜏$ + 𝜀"$
This model specification looks slightly different from that for the irrigation
investment, mainly because of the different time horizons to carry out the investment
projects. In particular, the key regressor in this model specification is the
contemporaneous form of borrowing indicated by 𝐼𝐶" $ as compared to the 𝐼𝐶" $,- in the
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Binswanger& Rosenzweig (1986) noted how irrigation projects reduce the demand for credit through
reducing the seasonality of production and increasing the total production as well as diversifying the risk
associated with double cropping.
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model for irrigation investment. This is because fertilizer investment can be made
immediately. It is reasonable to expect a negligible time lag between when credit is
borrowed and when fertilizer is used. Except for this slight difference, this model
resembles the previous model for irrigation investment with respect to the use of the
dependent variable, control variables, interaction terms, and instrumental variable.

2.3.2

Why use irrigation and fertilizer as the key dependent variables?

Irrigation and fertilizer represent two very different types of agricultural investment.
In China, irrigation investments cost about 400 USD per hectare.66 Irrigation projects
usually take about 1 to 20 years depending on the sizes.67 Irrigated plots yield
significantly higher level of crop production compared to non-irrigated plots (Huang et.
Al 2006). As long as irrigation facilities are well maintained, their benefits to agricultural
production stability could last for several decades.68
However, one type of irrigation facilities, tube wells, that started to surge among rural
households in 1990s needs to be singled out from the irrigation works we focused in this
essay. Household tube wells are usually criticized for draining out more water than
necessary and for doing more harm than good to agricultural sustainability (Lv 2010).
The data coverage in this essay ends in 1989 so the potential negative effects of tube
wells do not influence the results.
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These costs are estimated based on the irrigation projects conducted in China in 1999. The money value
is expressed in terms of USD of 2000 level. See Database on Investment Costs in Irrigation from the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, at
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/investment/index.stm, retrieved on April 30th, 2016.
67
For example, Miyun Reservoir of 4.3 billion cubic meters in Beijing takes two years to complete the
construction. Longyangxia Reservoir of 24.7 billion cubic meters in Qinghai Province takes 16 years to
complete the contruction.
68
The Miyun Reservoir was constructed in 1960 and is still well functioning.
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On the other hand, chemical fertilizers cost only about 150 USD per hectare, less than
half of the costs for irrigation facilities (Pray et. al 2002). The return from using fertilizer
is often immediate, within one crop season. The positive impacts of fertilizers can be best
illustrated by the significant improvement in crop yields during the Green Revolution
period (Tilman 1998). However, the heavy use of fertilizer also brings detrimental effects
on the environment. For example, studies show that fertilizers are often accompanied by
significant loss of soil-water and soil organic carbon (SOC) that is crucial for maintaining
soil productivity (Huang 2003; Srinivasarao 2014).
I generalize the features of the two types of investment with the recognition of the
positive impacts of fertilizers as well as the negative effects of certain types of irrigation
facilities. In this essay, I use irrigation to represent the type of investment that involves a
slow yet long-run reward for sustainability, and fertilizer to represent the investment that
aims for an immediate return, but can be short-sighted in nature as it is inconsistent with
agricultural sustainability.

2.3.3

Supply versus demand effect and the relevant endogeneity issue

A shift from collective-based loan to individual-based loan, indicated by a higher
value of the IC ratio, may have twofold implications. Following decollectivization,
communes and production teams were divided and the dominant mode of production in
the rural area became small-household production. As a result, a higher share of credit
was demanded by individual households. If this mechanism plays the dominant role, then
we conclude that the impact on the IC ratio comes mainly from the demand side. On the
other hand, since decollectivization is a policy imposed by the state, one would suspect
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that the rural finance institutions show bias towards lending to individuals rather than
collectives. If this mechanism is in operation, then there is also a supply-side impact on
the IC ratio.
The measure of the IC ratio itself does not distinguish between the supply-side and
the demand-side effects. Yet I argue that the dominant impact on the IC ratio comes from
the demand side. First, the rural finance reform starting from the 1980s ensures selfsufficiency and profit-orientation as the main goals for rural finance institutions.
Collective loans on average have higher repayment rates compared with individual
loans.69 So profit-wise, one should not expect an institutional bias towards making loans
to individuals. Although policy does encourage making loans to individual households to
echo the decollectivization campaign, there is no specific requirements regarding what
the size of loans should be made to individuals rather than collectives.70 Therefore the
actual form that any rural loans take should still be interpreted as driven by the
borrowers’ needs.
Another reason why demand-side effects play a dominant role in the IC ratio is as
follows. In theory, individual households can still coordinate the small loans they
borrowed individually to make large-scale investments, such as irrigation that requires
higher costs. The reality is that these individual households simply did not collaborate
when the coordination platforms no longer existed after decollectivization. No matter the
rural finance institutions favor making loans to individuals or collectives, in the end it is
the level of solidarity among the households. Here the term “solidarity” specifically
69

From 1980 to 1989, the average repayment rate of collectively-borrowed agricultural loans is 91.45%,
compared with 84.96% for the individually-borrowed agricultural loans. The repayment advantage of
collectively loans is more significant from year 1980 to 1986, but was caught up in the last three years of
the statistics. See page 73 to 76 in the China Rural Finance Statistical Yearbook 1979-1989.
70
See page 54 of the Yunnan Province Rural Finance Chorography.
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refers to the possibility of collaborative organization that influences the choice of the
forms of borrowing.
The demand-driven form of borrowing in the Chinese case contrasts with that in the
microfinance practices. In the microfinance setting, banks determine whether loans are
made to groups or individuals based on the associated default risks with the two distinct
practices. In the beginning of the microfinance history, the dominant lending practice was
group-based (Herms and Lensink 2007). Now individual-based lending is also taken by
the most well-known microfinance institutions such as the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh
and is expected to be gaining a higher share of the microfinance loans in the future
(Lehner 2009).
It is tempting to associate the IC ratio with the level of decollectivization, and thus
consider the level of decollectivization as a missing variable in the regression analysis.
However, these two statistics are very different. Xu (2012) uses a variable called “HRS
Adoption” to measure the percentage of production teams which adopted the Household
Responsibility System, or the de-facto small-farm production. This statistic was only 0.01
in 1979, and then jumped to 0.98 in 1983, and 0.99 until 1987 when the data are
available. This suggests that while there was only one percent of the production teams
being decollectivized in 1979, the decollectivization was almost complete by 1984.
However, the IC ratio shows a different picture. Across the provinces, the IC ratio was,
on average, about 0.12 in 1979, and became about 1.55 in 1984, and remained in the
range of 1.4 to 1.6 until 1987. This suggests that even when decollectivization is almost
complete as when HRS adoption percentage became 0.99, the individual loans at that
time consist of only about 60 percentage of the total loans on average. This is because
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HRS measures the land ownership following a state-imposed decollectivization policy,
while the IC ratio measures the solidarity, or the possibility for collaborative work of the
collectives. Collectives with strong solidarity in the collective era still have the
coordination network which enable them to borrow and invest on a collective basis, even
if lands are mostly distributed to individual households already.
This divergence between the two statistics suggests that the IC ratio is a more
accurate measure of the solidarity of the collectiveness compared to HRS which measures
the level of decollectivization. The irrelevance between the two variables also suggest
that the concern for the missing variable is invalid.

2.4 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
2.4.1 Panel data selection
The econometric analysis is based on a panel dataset of 28 provinces and 11 years
(1979-1989). There are altogether 308 observations for each variable. The time range is
chosen to reflect the largest possible variations for the variable IC ratio (i.e. individual
versus collective loan) from the av2.ailable data sources. Prior to 1979, the rural sector in
China was still collectively based, and the statistics do not have a category for individual
loans.71 After 1989, The China Rural Finance Statistical Yearbook eliminated the
category of collective versus individual loans. During 1979 to 1989, rural collectives
were gradually dismantled at various rates depending on the historical conditions of
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The national Rural Finance Statistics only recorded provincial level data from 1979. Yet provincial level
Finance Statistics include agricultural loan data for years prior to 1979 as well and we can use it as a
reference for the statistical categories for rural finance in the pre-1979 period. For example, Tianjin Rural
Statistics show that from 1949-1978, agricultural loans are broken down to three categories as down
payment loans (yugou dingjin daikuan), state-run agricultural loan (guoying nongye daikuan), and
collective agricultural loans (shedui nongye daiguan). No individual loans are recorded.
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individual collectives. The variation in paces of decollectivization allows the largest
possible variation in the IC ratio, although these two indicators are not identical.72
The selection of provinces is mainly based on the data availability. I excluded the
data for Hainan and Chongqing due to the administrative change that has affected the
data availability.73 Xizang (Tibet) was not included because a series of variables was not
available for this province. After excluding these three areas, there are altogether 28
administrative units in the datasets.74

2.4.2 Irrigation variable
The dependent variable for the first regression model is the irrigation variable. It
specifically measures the share of the effectively irrigated area in the total sown area. The
unit of this variable is percentage. The numerator of this measure is the total effectively
irrigated area. It refers to the area of level land (in 1000 hectares) that has water sources
and complete sets of irrigation facilities to lift and move adequate water for irrigation
purposes under normal conditions (Fan and Zhang, 2002). The effective irrigation area is
a reasonable proxy for irrigation investment because it contains information of both the
investment made to build new irrigation facilities and that made to maintain existing
irrigation facilities. This number is then normalized with respect to the sown area (in
1000 hectares) in each province. This is to ensure that neither the irrigation investment
nor the fertilizer use level is over-weighted for those provinces with larger geographical
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I discussed the reason in Section 3.3
Hainan became administratively a province in the People’s Republic of China after 1988, Chongqing
after 1997.
74
The administrative units include both provinces and autonomously-run cities such as Shanghai which are
at the same administrative level as provinces.
73
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areas. The information is extracted from China Compendium of Agricultural Statistics
1949-2008.75
The effectively irrigated area is a cumulative concept. It is a stock variable that
includes not only the flow of irrigation investment in the contemporaneous year, but also
the investment and maintenance work in the previous years. In this sense, it is not an
ideal measure of irrigation investment for any given year. Alternatively, one can use the
growth rates of effectively irrigated area to measure the investment flow. However, using
growth rates has its own problems. This is because irrigation involves not only the newly
irrigated area but also the maintenance of the already irrigated area, both requiring
investment in irrigation. While a zero growth rate of the effectively irrigated area
suggests zero investment in irrigation, it significantly underestimates the the actual
investment because it cannot capture the investment made for irrigation maintenance
work.76 The maintenance work involves both labor inputs which are not acknowledged in
the statistics, and also the investment in purchasing materials that are needed for building
irrigation facilities in money units. If there are reliable statistics for the depreciation rate
of the irrigation facilities, we can use the depreciation data and the level measure of
effectively irrigated area to calculate the actual net investment for year. However, such
statistics are not available. Therefore, even a growth rate measure cannot capture the
actual net investment flow that we are interested in.
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Xin Zhongguo Nongye 60 Nian Tongji Ziliao.Page 97, Sheet 3-2-3.
The average expenditure on irrigation maintenance work is estimated to be about 10-20 RMB per mu
every year. For the total 0.95 billion mu effectively irrigated area in China, the maintenance costs are about
14.3 billion RMB (or 2.5 billion dollars) every year. See Establishing Municipal Maintenance Foundation
for Small-Scale Irrigation (Jianli Caizhen Xiaoxing Nongtian Shuili Sheshi Weixiu Jijin) at
http://zx.pinghu.gov.cn/ucms/html/zx/col1401/2013-06/06/20130606165954872181703_1.html,
retrieved on April 29, 2016. See Aiming for 60% of Effectively Irrigated Area with Efficient Water Use by
2020 (Lizhen 2020 nian jieshui guangai mianji zhan youxiao guangai mianji chao 60%), at
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0929/c1001-25759350.html, retrieved on April 29, 2016.
76
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Some studies use the number of pumps (Binswanger et.al 1993; Rosenzweig&
Wolpin 1993;Dinar& Keck 1997) as a measure of net irrigation investment for each year.
Using physical tools for irrigation certainly is convenient for deducting the net increase in
investment, however physical tools are only part of the costs involved in irrigation
investment. Material and labor inputs for constructing ponds, drainage, ditch and weirs
(gou, tang, qu, yan), which are the major irrigation projects carried out by rural
collectives cannot be captured by simple statistics such as the numbers of pumps.77 Some
micro-level analyses use categorical variables to indicate the irrigation status, such as
plots that are irrigated by surface water, ground water, both or neither (Huang et.al). Such
status variables are also measures of the stock of irrigation facility and are used with
similar reasoning that this essay applies to use a stock variable. However, this micro-level
survey dataset China National Rural Survey does not cover the key period with the
largest variation in individual versus collective loan ratios on which I focus here.
This paper uses the share of effectively irrigated area in the total sown area because it
contains the information of all the possible formats of irrigation work including both
irrigation construction and irrigation tools purchasing to ensure that the land is effectively
irrigated. Also it is a level measure so it does not cancel out the crucial information of
maintenance work as in the growth rate statistics.

I discuss the regression results when

using growth rate statistics for irrigation in Section 5.6 for comparison purpose.
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See featured discussion on rural irrigation construction, at http://news.sohu.com/s2010/dianji395/,
retrieved on April 29, 2016
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2.4.3 Fertilizer variable
The dependent variable for the second model is fertilizer use. It measures fertilizer
consumption normalized by the size of the sown area. The unit of this variable is
kilogram per hector of land. The information is based on China Compendium of
Agricultural Statistics 1949-2008.78 Like the irrigation variable, I also discuss the
regression results when using the growth rate statistics for fertilizer in Section 5.6 for
comparison purpose.

2.4.4 Key regressor: IC ratio
The most critical independent variable I use in this regression is the IC ratio. The IC
ratio is defined as the ratio of individual loans relative to collective loans from formal
rural finance institutions.79 Exclusion of informal rural finance is based on the fact that
until the year 1990, the informal loans are mainly made from family members or
relatives. They neither resembled the private loans undertaken at present in terms of
market interest rate, nor were they for productive use. By 1990, the loans for productive
investment were still predominantly made from state-owned financial institutions. Since
this paper focuses on studying rural finance and its impact on rural productive
investment, the loan information from institutional sources is more relevant.
I constructed this ratio for each province based on the statistics from China Rural
Finance Statistical Yearbook 1979-1989. From page 178 onwards, detailed statistics are
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Xin Zhong Guo Nongye 60 Nian Tongji Ziliao.Page 97, Sheet 3-2-3.
The terms used in China Rural Finance Statistical Yearbook 1979-1989 are Collective Agricultural
Loans (Jiti Nongye Daikuan), and Rural Household Loans (Nonghu Nongye Daikuan)
79
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available for the constitution of loans from Agricultural Bank of China and Rural Credit
Cooperatives for all provinces in China.
Table 1 below presents the IC ratio of each province for the years 1979, 1984 and
1989 (the first, sixth, and the eleventh years respectively). As we can see, IC ratios do not
share a common pattern among all provinces. Most provinces experienced a significant
increase in the IC ratio between 1979 and 1989 (with the exception of Shanghai and
Beijing). This indicates that most provinces in China experienced a significant
transformation in the form of borrowing rural credit, from one on a collective basis to one
predominantly on individual basis. We can also see that a quarter of the provinces
experienced a sharp increase in the IC ratio in the first 6 years and then the IC ratios
dropped. The way of organizing the rural finance units reflected the overall mode of
production in the rural sector. The variations in the patterns of IC changes are consistent
with the variability in the timing and pace of decollectiviation across provinces. Some
implemented it thoroughly and persistently with the result of a sharp increase in the IC
ratio throughout the 11 years of the study period. Some provinces left the rural finance
units as a cushion for the fast decollectivization of agricultural production. This is
indicated by a mild decrease of IC ratio in the second half the year period of study.

2.4.5 Other regressors
Other independent variables include the income variable, the loan variable, and the
dummy variables on climate regions. These are all control variables for the purpose of
this exercise.
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The income variable specifically measures the inflation-adjusted annual net income
per capita of rural households. I collected the data from China Compendium of Statistics
1949-2008 published in 2010. By definition, the net income of rural households is the
total income of rural households minus operational expenditure for rural households,
depreciation of productive assets, tax and contract fee for household responsibility system
and transfer to family relatives.80 Total income includes both income in-cash and in-kind,
adjusted by the market price of the “kind”.81 The operational expenditure, by definition,
includes all operational costs that are attributed to that year’s gain, thus including
fertilizers, seeds, pesticides for use of that year yet excluding those purchased but were
put stock for future use.82 According to Binswanger (2006), household income is
especially important in affecting the rural agricultural investment. Some other relevant
factors can also be reflected in this income control. These factors include the imported
food price (Hayami& Kikuchi 1978; Svendsen& Mark 1994; Dinar& Keck 1997); high
costs of irrigation equipment and technology (Svendsen& Mark 1994); general
profitability from farm work (Binswanger 2006) and other related income factors
(Rosenzweig& Wolpin 1993).
The loan variable measures the inflation-adjusted agricultural loan per capita. The
data source is constructed from China Rural Finance Statistical Yearbook 1979-1989.
The reason for including loan as explanatory variable is that the development literature
(Binswanger et.al 1993; Rosenzweig& Wolpin 1993; Dinar& Keck 1997) recorded the
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Definition and Calculation of net income for rural household. http://www.xydcd.com/onews.asp?id=636
90% percent of market price for grain and meat ,85% market price for other agricultural-related products
were calculated as “in-kind” price, to reflect the difference of in-kind and in-cash income.
http://www.china001.com/show_hdr.php?xname=PPDDMV0&dname=LI6R841&xpos=13
82
Definition and Calculation of net income for rural household.
http://www.china001.com/show_hdr.php?xname=PPDDMV0&dname=LI6R841&xpos=13
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importance of credit constraints in affecting agricultural investments. This is especially
true for investments that take much longer time to see effects, such as irrigation
investments.
In addition to income level and credit availability, the development literature suggests
that climate condition a critical determinant for irrigation investments, including rainfall,
temperature and humidity (Dinar& Keck 1997). Detailed information for these climate
variables at the provincial level is not available prior to 1986. Therefore, half of the
information will be missing if they are to be used. Instead, I construct dummy variables
according to the official geographical division based on information on rainfall, humidity
and temperature. According to this standard, China is divided into four regions: humid,
half-humid, half-drought and drought regions. Since many provinces are located at
overlapping regions, the dummies I constructed are humid regions (11 provinces), halfhumid regions (4 provinces), humid and half humid regions (6 provinces), half humid and
half drought regions (2 provinces), and half drought and drought regions (5 provinces).

2.4.6 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 summarizes the key variables in the estimation. The ratio of the amount of
loan lent to individual households versus lent to collectives, or the IC ratio, averages
about 2.13 over the sample period across the provinces. It has increased dramatically,
from a mere 0.14 in 1979 to 4.22 in 1989. This pattern indicates that following the
decollectivization policy, a rising share of loans were lent to individuals. Those loans are
more than four times the amount of loans lent to collectives in 1989. The share of
effectively irrigated area in the total sown area increased only slightly, from 32.06% in
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1979 to 33.38% in 1989. The fertilizer use per sown area has increased by 77% over the
time span, from 149.31 kilograms per hector in 1979 to 264.74 kilograms per hector in
1989. Table 2 also shows that the total amount of loans measured by individual
household level has increased by a huge amount over the year, while the real income on
the per capita level increases at first, and then declined modestly from 1984 to 1989. The
summary of weather dummies show that among the 28 provinces in the dataset, humid
regions take the highest percentage of 39%, followed by regions covering both humid and
half-humid areas which take about 21% of the total land. Regions covering both halfhumid and half-drought areas take the lowest percentage of total land, of only 7%.
Table 3 presents the detailed breakdown of key variables by different income and
loan quintiles. As we can see, the IC ratio peaked when income is at its 60% quintile
level and when loans are at its 80% quintile level. The share of effectively irrigated area
in the total sown area peaked when income is at its maximum quintile level and when the
amount of loan is at its lowest quintile level. Fertilizer use also peaked when income is at
its maximum quintile level, but when the amount of loan is at its 80% quintile level. This
summary suggests that different levels of income and loans have different impacts on IC,
and the two dependent variables representing irrigation and fertilizer investment. It also
implies that a different combination of the income and loan level would predict different
values of irrigation and fertilizer investment. This is why we need to separate out the
effects of income and loans when considering the relationship between the IC ratio and
irrigation/ fertilizer investment in the model. This also explains why I include interaction
terms in the model to capture the different combination of income and loan levels.
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In Figure 2.1 I present the scatterplots of the IC ratio and the irrigation variable as
a preliminary examination of the possible relationship between the two variables. Figure
2 present the scatterplots for IC ratio and the fertilizer variable. Both scatterplots are
plotted using the logged value and the pooled sample across years and provinces. A fitted
line and also a 95% confidence interval are also presented on the scatterplots to suggest
possible relationship of statistical significance.
As we can see, Figure 2.1 shows a negative correlation between the IC ratio and
the share of the effectively irrigated area as suggested by a slightly tilted fitted line
running from upper left to lower right. Most of the scatterplots are clustered within the
95% confidence interval, implying a strong negative correlation. On the other hand,
Figure 2.2 shows a positive correlation between the IC ratio and the fertilizer use per
hectare of sown area as suggested by a fitted line running from lower left to upper right.
Again, this positive correlation seems quite strong as most of the observations are
clustered within the 95% confidence interval.
This preliminary examination suggests that more rural credits borrowed at an
individual level is associated with less investment devoted to irrigation building and
maintenance. On the other hand, more rural credits borrowed at an individual level is
associated with higher level of fertilizer use. However, this association does not imply
causality as the scatterplots only show the relationship between two variables without
controlling other variables. To strictly examine the impact of IC on the two investment
variables, we need to control for other possible effects such as income, loan and climate
variables in a fully specified formal model.
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2.5 Results and Discussions
2.5.1 Interpretation of coefficients when the dependent variable contains a fraction
value
The fact that the irrigation variable is a fraction value between 0 to 100% invites
some discussion about the interpretation of coefficients in the regression model. A simple
numerical example will show the theoretical foundation of interpreting the change in the
dependent variable as a percentage point change. Suppose both the dependent variable
and control variable are level values rather than log values, then the coefficient 𝛽 =

∆8
∆9

implies that one level increase in x leads to 𝛽 level change in y. If y is a fraction (i.e.
between 0 and 1), then we can rewrite the equation into 100* 𝛽 =

-::∗∆8
∆9

. This rewritten

equation suggests that one level increase in x leads to 100* 𝛽 percentage point increase in
y. When both the dependent variable and control variables are also transformed to its log
form, then the interpretation should be an elasticity change of y as a result of x
(percentage change as a result of percentage change). In this paper, the coefficients are
thus interpreted as percentage point increases as a result of percentage increases.
Alternatively, one can address the fractional dependent variable by estimating the
variables in a fractional response model or a zero one inflated beta models. However,
there is no empirical evidence showing that these alternative model specifications are
theoretically better than the simple OLS regression model. This essay therefore adopts
the simple OLS regression specification.
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2.5.2 The upper bound limit on the share of effectively irrigated area does not create
problems for the estimations
Several concerns could be raised regarding the value range of the dependent variable
in the model, or the share of effectively irrigated area. First, the estimation needs to rule
out the possibility that some agricultural land does not need irrigation either due to
plentiful and reliable water or crops that do not need irrigation. This is because, if such
natural endowments exist widely, one should expect an upper bound for the share of
effectively irrigated areas, well below 100%, on the land that is suitable for irrigation.
Second, the stagnating growth in the share of effectively irrigated area during 1979-1989
might be explained by an upper bound limit as a result of an already sufficient level of
irrigation. In this case, any additional establishment of irrigation facilities only leads to
diminishing returns.
There are four main reasons why these concerns do not present serious problems.
First, agricultural land is defined as effectively irrigated when it is equipped with basic
irrigation facility, and/or with constant water resources, and/or with relatively flat land
level, so that the land could be effectively irrigated within the present year. The key idea
behind this definition is that the agricultural land could only be categorized as effectively
irrigated when it has the capability to endure any unforeseen drought event in the same
year. Even if the agricultural land has plentiful and reliable water resources, the water
still needs to be channeled out when too much is reserved for future use. Being endowed
with plentiful water resources does not suggest that the farmland should be completely
rain-fed, or kaotian chifan, (i.e. completely depend on the natural forces without any
basic facility to prevent or fight for flood or drought events). The 2010 drought in
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Yunnan province proved to be out of expectation because Yunnan is endowed with most
reliable waterfalls. However, without updated irrigation facilities to accumulate and
channel water for future use, it had been struck hard by a historically rare drought.83
Second, the major crops in China, such as rice, wheat, corn, soybeans and tuber crops
are all water-dependent.84 As a matter of fact, two-thirds of the Chinese crops need to be
produced on the irrigated land (Gao 1998). Even for traditionally rain-fed farmland,
supplementary irrigation is essential in generating optimal yield even on the (Bello,
2008). Dry-farming is a technique only developed to cope with the fact some land cannot
be effectively irrigated so is not ideal. Therefore, the mere existence of non-waterdependent crops do not justify the stagnation of irrigation building and maintenance
during the period examined in this paper.
Third, based on the definition of effectively irrigated area, a mere 33.9% of total
sown area in 1989 suggests that only one-third of the sown land has the capacity to
endure drought and flood events. Even at present, the percentage of effectively irrigated
area in rural China is so low that it threatens food security. In 2010, it is estimated that
less than half of the sown area in China is effectively irrigated. The Chinese Academy of
Science interpreted this as a dangerous sign for drought that could potentially threaten
food security and economic stability.85 Given the urgent need for irrigated area, a mere
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The village in Yunnan that is under discussion in this article reported that the only irrigation facility they
have was built in 1958, during the Great Leap Forward. Yet due to lack of maintenance, no one dares to use
it to accumulate full level of water. Irrigation building is too lagged behind in South West China to endure
the historically rare drought weather (Lishi Hanjian de Ganhan Tianqi Tuxian Xinan Shuili Jianshe
Zhihou), published on March 23rd, 2010, on http://news.sohu.com/20100323/n271020821.shtml, retrieved
on November 20, 2015.
84
China in brief----Agriculture. Retrieved on November 21, 2015, at http://www.china.org.cn/echina/agriculture/crop.htm.
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China Academy of Science, Irrigation building as the key national policy and be prepared for fighting
natural disasters (Jiang shuili jianshe zuowei jiben guoce, wei dikang zaihai zuohao zhunbei); published on
March 23rd, 2010, on http://news.sohu.com/20100323/n271039548.shtml, retrieved on November 19, 2015.
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increase in the share of effectively irrigated area from 32.1% to 33.9% from 1979 to 1989
does not represent progress. Therefore, the irrigation level in the time period under
examination is far from adequate for a populous and land-scarce country like China.
Fourth, methodologically there is a weather control in the model, so that natural
differences among provinces (i.e., humid, half-humid, half-drought and drought regions)
are controlled in the model.

2.5.3 Effects of IC ratio on irrigation investment
Table 4 summarizes the regression results. They show the coefficients for each
control variable. For example, the coefficient of -0.14 for lagged IC in column 2 suggests
that after controlling for all other variables listed in column one, a one percentage point
increase in the IC ratio from last year leads to a 14 percentage point decrease in irrigation
investment. However, note that the control variables also include the interaction terms of
lagged IC with income and loans, as shown in column one. The coefficient of lagged IC
in this case only reports the partial impact of lagged IC because the rest of the impact
from IC has been controlled through its interaction terms with other variables. The same
problem applies to the coefficients reported in column 3 and 4 for the analysis on
fertilizer use. To fully account for the effect of IC on either irrigation or fertilizer use, we
need to take into account its total effect both through the interaction terms and its partial
effect reported by the coefficient of non-interaction term of IC. We do that by calculating
the marginal effects of IC. The results are presented in Table 5 and Table 6.
Table 5 and 6 report the marginal effects of the key control variables including
IC, income and loan variables. Weather, provincial and year effects are not reported but
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they are all controlled in the regression analysis. The first row of Table 5 shows the
marginal effects of 𝐼𝐶" $,- on the irrigation investment. To calculate the marginal effect
of 𝐼𝐶" $,- , both the coefficient of 𝐼𝐶" $,- , or 𝛽, and the coefficient of the interaction terms
involving 𝐼𝐶" $,- , or 𝛾$ *Ζ"$ are taken into account. The results of the marginal effects of
𝐼𝐶" $,- are presented with income and loan (Ζ"$ ) setting at their mean values.
As we can see, the lagged IC has a statistically significant negative impact on the
irrigation investment in both the basic specification and in the specification including the
instrumental variable (IV). At this level, a one percent increase in the one-period lagged
IC ratio would lead to 2 percentage point lower share of effectively irrigated area in the
total sown area. That is to say, on the same income and loan level, more loans made to
individuals versus to collectives will lead to a lower level of investment in irrigation
building and maintenance work.
2.5.4 Effects of IC ratio on fertilizer investment
Table 6 presents the regression analysis for fertilizer investment in both its original
specification (Model 2) and an alternative specification for robustness check (Model 3).
In Model 2 where only contemporaneous effects of IC are considered, the estimation
results suggest that the IC ratio has a significant positive impact on the fertilizer use in
both the basic specification and in the IV specification. Specifically, a one percent
increase in the IC ratio would lead to about a 10 percent point increase in fertilizer use,
whether the endogeneity issue is addressed by IV or not.
For a robustness check, I use an alternative specification which includes both
contemporaneous and lagged values of IC in the regression model. This is because it is
possible that in certain rural areas, borrowing entails a significant time lag between when
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the loan was recorded to be lent to the rural households, and when it actually reaches the
rural households for any investment. In this specification where both contemporaneous
effects and lagged effects are considered, results suggest that a one percent increase in the
contemporaneous IC ratio leads to a 6 percent increase in fertilizer use in both the basic
specification and in the IV specification. Compared with the first specification, the
impact of contemporaneous IC on fertilizer use is weaker in this specification because the
partial impact was accounted for through last year’s IC ratio, although not with statistical
significance. The contemporaneous IC ratio still has the strongest and the most
significantly positive impact on fertilizer use compared with other control variables.

2.5.5 Marginal effects of Income and Loan
The marginal effects of income and loan on both the irrigation and fertilizer
investment are also worth some discussion. As we can see, the income level (both
contemporaneous and lagged) shows negative impact on irrigation investment, although
this effect is statistically insignificant. This direction of impact is counterintuitive, as one
would expect higher income level leads to higher investment in irrigation. However, the
data suggest that the causation runs in the opposite direction. Higher income might be
directed to other types of investment, such as purchasing fertilizer rather than to build and
maintain irrigation facilities. This is because the rural decollectivization on the one hand
weakens the solidarity among individuals, and on the other hand, makes it practically
more difficult to cooperate for large-scale irrigation projects. This argument is confirmed
by the positive coefficients of income (both contemporaneous and lagged) in the fertilizer
model.
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The loan effects show similar patterns. The coefficients for the loan variables (both
contemporaneous and lagged) are negligible and statistically insignificant for investment
in both irrigation and fertilizer. This suggests that compared with the form of borrowing,
the amount of borrowing has much weaker impacts on the actual investment.
Overall, the results of this exercise suggest that once the IC ratio, together with
weather, provincial and time effects are controlled, income and loan are irrelevant as
explanatory variables in determining investment in irrigation and fertilizer. This result is
consistent with the main argument of this essay, that the form of borrowing, collective or
individual, has a crucial impact on the types of investment.

2.5.6 Alternative measures
Alternatively, I used the growth rate of the effectively irrigated area as the dependent
variable in the regression analysis for investment in irrigation. In this specification, I use
the level value instead of the log value for the dependent variable because the dependent
variable is already a growth rate measure. A level value is easier for interpretation. Table
7 presents the results. As we can see, the marginal effect of the lagged IC ratio has lost its
significance in this specification. Even some of the coefficients for the income and loan
controls turn negative which is counterintuitive. One reason could be the inaccurate
measure of irrigation investment by this growth rate variable as discussed in Section 4.2.
Moreover, the R-square declined to below 20%, indicating that this specification is
insufficient to capture the relationship between lagged IC ratio and growth rates of
irrigation as the dependent variable.86
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Whether another specification will capture the effects of IC on the growth rates of irrigation will be
studies in further research.
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2.5.7 Discussion
The empirical evidence from these regression exercises suggests that collective
borrowing leads to a higher level of irrigation investment. As was discussed in Section
3.2, investment in irrigation contributes to the sustainable development of agriculture in
the long run as compared to investment in fertilizer use. Therefore, this empirical result
also implies that collectives are capable of making decisions that extend beyond
individual horizons. This result is consistent with the theoretical elaboration that the
social discount rate is lower than private discount rate, and therefore private investors are
more inclined towards obtaining rewards in the short run.
Of course, collectives vary in their patterns of operations. Ostrom (2009) summarized
some common attributes of successful collectives. They include clear and locally
understood boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers, full participation of
individuals who are affected by collective choices, monitoring users and resources, etc.
China’s collectives are also heterogeneous, so not all of them should realize the potential
for success. Here I emphasize that when some basic conditions are met, collectives have
the capability of making investments that contribute to the sustainable development in the
rural sector. These conditions include the the sizes of the collectives as well as the
accessibility to trusted and organized platforms for production. I argue that the collectives
in China during the collective era have met these two basic conditions. This was one of
the key reasons that the empirical result in this essay suggests the advantage of
collectives over individual households in making investment decisions that meet with the
sustainability criteria.
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The first condition is that the size of the collectives must be sufficient to ensure the
benefits through economies of scale. The average size of a production team, which was
the basic accounting unit for collective production, is 20 to 30 households.87 This size of
collective production can easily take advantage of large-scale machinery, irrigation
facilities as well as laborers. For example, Patnaik (1987) documented how tea
production requires manuring in the slack season, tea plucking in the busy season, and tea
picking with coordinated sequence as its essential labor activities. These activities, as
noted by Patnaik (1987), was most efficiently achieved by production teams of several
dozen workers rather than by individual households.
The second condition is a trusted and organized platform for production. Compared
with the Soviet Union, China’s collectivization was achieved with far less social
disruption and without drastic economic losses (Nolan 1976). On the contrary, the
number of farm animals and the grain output in China increased during and after
collectivization (Ibid). This condition suggests a much more voluntary and cooperative
basis for China’s collectives compared with those in the Soviet Union.
These attributes of the rural collectives in China provide the preconditions for their
capabilities of utilizing rural credits in order to raise the overall loan effectiveness. This
finding also provides a possible explanation for the persistent credit constraint after decollectivization despite surging credit supply. The changing forms of borrowing had
imposed a negative impact on the overall loan effectiveness.
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See the Notice Regarding the Basic Accounting Units for People’s Commune (Zhonggong zhongyang
guanyu gaibian nongcun renmingongshe jiben hesuandanwei wenti de zhishi), released on Feb 14th, 1962.
See http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66669/4493583.html, retrieved on June 13th, 2016.
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This finding also sheds light on the explanations towards the disappointing outcomes
with respect to the majority of microfinance projects. Collectives do more than make
investment decisions, they also have the resources to carry out the investment project
collectively. Microfinance borrowers may make group decisions, but they lack the
capability to carry out the large-scale projects such as irrigation because eventually they
do not have a trusted and coordinated platform for collective production.

2.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the different agricultural investment patterns as a result of the
change in the forms of borrowing rural credits. This change refers to fact that the majority
of rural credits are borrowed on an individual basis instead of on a collective basis, as a
result of the decollectivization taking place in China since the late 1970s. I focus on
estimating how this change in the forms of borrowing affect the investments in irrigation
building and fertilizer use respectively. The irrigation investment represents the kind of
investment that contributes to more sustainable agricultural development yet with returns
only in the intermediate or long run. By contrast, the fertilizer investments represent the
kind of investment that is aimed for a quick return yet does potential harms to the
sustainable development in the agricultural sector.
This paper mainly builds on a two-way fixed-effects model for the estimation, taking
account of the endogeneity issue by including the instrument variable for alternative
specifications. I find that on the same income and loan level, a one percent increase in the
IC ratio from the previous year would lead to a two percentage point lower share of
effectively irrigated area in the total sown area this year. On the other hand, a one percent
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increase in the ratio of loans made on an individual basis relative to a collective basis
would lead to about 10 percentage point increase in fertilizer use.
Based on these results, I argue that the forms of borrowing (i.e. on a collective or
individual base) matters significantly in decisions regarding agricultural investments.
Collective-based agricultural lending tends to be channeled to investment that contributes
to more sustainable agricultural development yet with returns only in the intermediate or
long run (such as irrigation). This empirical result also implies that collectives are
capable of making decisions that think beyond individual horizon. This is because the
rural collectives in China met two basic conditions that allow them to utilize rural credits
with relatively better loan effectiveness. They are large enough to achieve economies of
scale, and they have a collective production basis which by nature requires coordination
and mutual-trust that are crucial in carrying out large-scale project such as irrigation
building.
This finding contributes to the understanding of the transition in agricultural mode of
production and its impacts on agricultural investment. It suggests one possible
explanation for the credit constraint issue in China. It also sheds light on the explanations
towards some of the unsuccessful microfinance practices in developing countries.
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Table 2.1. IC Ratio by Province for the 1st, 6th, 11th years (continued onto next page)
1979

1984

1989

Beijing

0.18

0.51

0.08

Tianjing

0.08

1.62

0.48

Hebei

0.10

1.96

5.77

Shanxi

0.07

2.26

2.83

Neimenggu

0.13

1.04

2.77

Liaoning

0.16

1.28

1.00

Jilin

0.10

4.00

3.86

Heilongjiang

0.08

1.65

2.91

Shanghai

0.18

0.43

0.07

Jiangsu

0.13

0.99

0.48

Zhejiang

0.15

1.55

2.84

Anhui

0.08

2.70

4.89

Fujian

0.11

1.32

1.61

Jiangxi

0.14

2.81

6.13

Shandong

0.09

0.93

0.78

Henan

0.10

3.01

6.22

Hubei

0.21

1.51

2.19

Hunan

0.18

3.19

5.00

Guangdong

0.16

2.35

2.04

Guangxi

0.18

1.87

4.00

Sichuan

0.30

8.07

11.20

Guizhou

0.34

2.98

5.79

Yunnan

0.28

6.89

7.22

Shannxi

0.12

2.41

9.01

Gansu

0.09

1.50

5.34
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Qinhai

0.06

2.17

7.83

Ningxia

0.12

2.06

10.40

Xinjiang

0.12

2.16

5.40

Source: China Rural Finance Statistical Yearbook 1979-1989.
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Table 2.2. Summary Statistics of Key Variables (continued onto next page)
Standard
Sample Statistics

Unit

Mean
Deviation
19791979

1984

1989
1989

IC ratio (Individual
N/A

0.14

2.33

4.22

2.13

2.54

Percentage

32.06

33.48

33.87

33.38

15.54

149.31

195.33

264.74

197.3

132.6

175.82

337.97

330.39

291.83

111.35

21.37

47.66

53.49

40.97

46.54

versus collective loan)
Share of Effectively
Irrigated Area in Total
sown area
Fertilizer use

Kilogram
per hector

Real income per
capita

RMB (at
1978 price
level)

Inflation adjusted
RMB (at
agricultural loan to
1978 price
individual households
level)
per capita
Weather dummies
Humid
N/A

0.39

0.49

N/A

0.14

0.35

N/A

0.21

0.41

regions
Halfhumid regions
Regions
covering both humid
and half-humid areas
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Regions
covering both halfN/A

0.07

0.26

N/A

0.18

0.38

humid and halfdrought areas
Regions
covering both halfdrought and drought
areas

Note: Number of observations in this table is 308.
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Table 2.3. Sample Statistics by Income and Loan Quintiles

Share of effectively
Fertilizer use (kilo
IC ratio

irrigated area in
per hector)

Quintiles

the total sown area
Standard
Mean

Standard
Mean

Deviation

Standard
Mean

Deviation

Deviation

Income (Lowest)

0.27

0.33

0.30

0.14

141.42

103.56

Income (Second)

2.51

2.8

0.28

0.11

201.99

140.99

Income (Third)

3.66

3.42

0.32

0.14

213.38

150.87

Income (Fourth)

2.87

2.05

0.37

0.21

179.15

121.77

Income (Highest)

1.25

1.31

0.40

0.14

252.12

119.50

Loan (Lowest)

0.5

0.71

0.37

0.15

184.42

136.31

Loan (Second)

1.49

1.95

0.35

0.14

176.40

131.99

Loan (Third)

3.2

3.19

0.33

0.19

194.30

109.08

Loan (Fourth)

3.3

2.98

0.30

0.12

225.41

125.31

Loan (Highest)

2.17

1.95

0.32

0.16

205.30

155.03

Source: Calculated by the author.
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Table 2.4. Regression Results for Level of Irrigation and Level of Fertilizer Use
(continued onto next page)

Dependent Variables
Specification

Irrigation

Fertilizer

Basic

IV

IC

Income

IC (-1)*Income

IC (-1)*Loan

IC (-1)*Income (-1)

0.59***

(0.20)

(0.19)

0.18**

0.15

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.11)

(0.12)

-0.04

-0.08**

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.00

0.00

-0.01

-0.01

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.02**

-0.02

(0.01)

(0.01)

-0.14*

-0.14*

(0.07)

(0.08)

Income (-1)

Loan (-1)

0.43**

-0.03

IC*Loan

IC (-1)

IV

-0.06

IC*Income

Loan

Basic

-0.04

0.09

-0.05

(0.11)

0.00

0.00

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.02

0.04

(0.01)

(0.03)

0.00

‘-0.00

(0.01)

(0.01)
-0.02
(0.03)
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IC (-1)* Loan (-1)

0.00

0.00

(0.01)

(0.01)

Y

Y

Y

Y

controls

Y

Y

Y

Y

R^2 and Adjusted R^2

0.99

0.99

0.96

0.97

Climate controls
Year and provincial

Source: Calculated by the author.
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Table 2.5. Marginal Effects of lagged IC ratio on the level of irrigation
Model 1

IV

-0.02***

-0.02***

(0.01)

(0.01)

-0.07

-0.04

(0.05)

(0.05)

IC (-1)

Income
-0.04
Income (-1)
(0.05)
0.00

0.00

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.00

0.00

(0.01)

(0.01)

Loan

Loan (-1)

Source: Calculated by the author.
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Table 2.6. Marginal Effects of IC ratios on the Level of Fertilizer Use
Model 2

IV

Model 3

IV

0.1***

0.1***

0.06**

0.06***

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.19*

0.14

0.17

0.19

(0.11)

(0.12)

(0.13)

(0.13)

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.04

0.04

(0.03)

(0.03)

IC

Income

Loan

IC (-1)
0.08
Income (-1)
(0.13)
0.01

0.01

(0.03)

(0.03)

Loan (-1)

Source: Calculated by the author.

112

Table 2.7. Marginal Effects of lagged IC ratio on the growth rate of effective
irrigated area
Model 1

IV

-0.00

-0.00

(0.01)

(0.01)

-0.03

-0.02

(0.04)

(0.05)

-0.01

-0.02

(0.05)

(0.05)

0.00

-0.01

(0.01)

(0.01)

-0.01

-0.01

(0.01)

(0.01)

IC (-1)

Income

Income (-1)

Loan

Loan (-1)

Source: Calculated by the author.
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Figure 2. Scatterplot of the Fertilizer and IC

-4

-2

0
IC ratio (Logged)
logfertp
Fitted values

115

2

95% CI

4

CHAPTER 3
RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN CHINA

3.1 Introduction
In this paper, I estimate the impact on employment creation through investments in
three renewable energy sectors in China, i.e. solar, wind and bioenergy. I also make
comparable estimates for China’s traditional fossil fuel sectors, i.e. coal, oil and natural
gas.
The underlying issue at hand motivating this research question is the massive global
challenge to dramatically reduce greenhouse gas emissions and thereby control climate
change. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the
leading global authority on this question, global emission will need to fall by 39 percent
from 2010 levels by 2030 and 72 percent by 2050, in order for there to be a decent
prospect to achieve climate stabilization (IPCC 2014).
At present, China is one of the two leading countries in terms of both energy
consumption and CO2 emissions. Together, China and the U.S. account for nearly 39%
percent of world energy consumption. Their respective levels of energy consumption
were nearly identical in 2010, with China at 100.9 quadrillion BTUs (Q-BTUs) and the
U.S. at 98 Q-BTUs. In terms of carbon emissions, China is at a higher level, at 7,997
million metric tons (mmt), while the U.S. is at 5,637 mmt. Together, they account for 43
percent of all global carbon emissions. Obviously we must give major attention to
developments in China, along with the United States, in terms of mounting an overall
project for controlling climate change.
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The climate change has huge impacts on China’s domestic environment in terms of
water shortage, air pollution and soil degradation. At present, the average northern
Chinese has access to less than a fifth of the supply of usable water that is above the
international threshold for water stress—the stress level being 1,000 cubic meters of
usable water per person per year.88 Cities in China’s Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River
Delta, and Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region suffer over 100 haze days every year, with
PM2.5 (particles with an aerodynamic diameter less than 2.5 micrometer) concentration
two to four times above the World Health Organization guidelines.89 Moreover, one-fifth
of China’s arable land is contaminated with heavy metals, making the land scarcity issue
even worse.90
Further, at the beginning of 2013, the Health Effects Institute announced that outdoor
air pollution contributed to 1.2 million premature deaths in China in 2010 alone, which is
nearly 40 percent of the global total. Preliminary estimates suggest that about 11 percent
of cases of cancer of the digestive system may be attributable to polluted drinking water
in China.91 Drinking water for roughly 190 million of the rural population contains
harmful substances that exceed health standards. Regarding food security issues, it is
estimated that extreme drought could more than triple crop losses in northeast China to
13.8 million metric tons, or 12 percent of the total production, by 2030.92 Moreover,

The Economist (2013): Desperate Measures. Published on Oct 12th 2013 at
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21587789-desperate-measures, retrieved on October 23, 2014.
89
Greenpeace (2012): Dangerous Breathing—PM2.5: Measuring the human health and economic impacts
on China’s largest cities.
90
Josh China and Brian Spegele, China’s Details Vast Extent of Soil Pollution. The Wall Street Journal,
published on April 17th, 2014 at
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304626304579507040557046288, retrieved on October
23, 2014.
91
See China Water Risk (2010): China’s Water Crisis Part I.
92
McKinsey & Company, From Bread Basket to Dust Bowl, November 2009
88
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today, pollution has replaced land disputes as the main cause of social unrest in China.93
During the 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010) there were over 300,000
environmental complaints and this number has been growing at an average annual rate of
29 percent since 1996.9495
All these environmental issues are translating into unsustainable elements in China’s
current growth model. In response to the growing domestic and global focus on the issue
of climate change, the Chinese government is making efforts to substantially reduce
emissions.96 If China can succeed in reducing CO2 emission from energy-based sources,
this will also significantly alleviate the related crises with respect to air pollution, water
shortage and soil contamination.
In 2011, the Chinese government set as a target the reduction of the country’s level
of carbon intensity—i.e. its carbon dioxide emission per unit of GDP—by 17 percent
from 2010 to 2015.97 In fact, as of 2013, this number has already fallen by about 20
percent compared with five years ago and the government is aiming to cut it further.98 In
2011, the government aimed at increasing the non-fossil-fuel share of total primary
energy by 11.4 percent by 2015—the target was then quickly revised upward to a more

93

Bloomberg News, Chinese Anger Over Pollution Becomes Main Cause of Social Unrest. Published on
March 6th, 2013 at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-06/pollution-passes-land-grievances-asmain-spark-of-china-protests.html, retrieved on October 23, 2014.
94
Figures from the China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP)
95
Announcement made by Yang Zhaofei, vice-chair of the Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences in
2012.
96
Osnos 2009, Green Giant. The New Yorker, December 21st, 2009.
97
See No.41 State Council document on controlling the emission of greenhouse gas in 2011.
98
The East is Grey, The Economist. Published on Aug 10th, 2013, at
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21583245-china-worlds-worst-polluter-largest-investor-greenenergy-its-rise-will-have, retrieved on October 23, 2014.
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ambitious one: 20 percent of its energy from renewable energy sources by 2020, the same
target as in richer Europe.99
In 2012, China has reclaimed its top position from the United States in terms of
renewable energy investments, totaling $65 billion, 20 percent more than in 2011 and
constituting 30 percent of all renewable energy investment from G-20 countries. In 2013,
China invested more in renewable energy than the whole of Europe (Bloomberg New
Energy Finance 2014).
China’s big push on investing in renewable energy since 2007 implies a promising
future of a greener economy in China. However, one of the concerns for building a
renewable-based economy is the likelihood that a significant contraction of production
within China’s traditional energy sectors—i.e. coal, oil and natural gas—will lead to
major employment losses in these traditional fossil fuel sectors. Such employment losses
could potentially trigger further economic instability in a populous country like China.
How to implement this structural change while guaranteeing a smooth transition in
employment is thus highly relevant in discussing the feasibility of the renewable energy
plan in case of China.
The potential trade-off between environmental protection and employment stability
has been a concern in the literature regarding the economic impacts of substituting fossil
fuel energy with renewable energy (Rose and Wei 2006; Lehr et.al 2008; Moreno and
Lopez 2008; Alvarez et. al 2009; Frondel et.al 2009; Pollin et. al 2009; Ragwitz et.al
2009; Mitchell 2011; Pollin et. al 2014).100 However, in the case of China, the
See 2011-2015 Five Year Plan. Also see The East is Grey, The Economist. Published on Aug 10th, 2013,
at http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21583245-china-worlds-worst-polluter-largest-investor-greenenergy-its-rise-will-have, retrieved on October 23, 2014.
100
See also Atkin 2014. How Obama’s Climate Rule Could Change The U.S. Job Market. Posted online on
June 6, 2014 at ThinkProgress. http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/06/06/3444200/clean-energy-epa99
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employment issue has not been adequately addressed. To date, there are no reliable
estimates of the employment impacts of renewable energy investments in China.
This essay addresses the employment issue through estimating the relative
employment impacts of renewable energy investments versus spending within the
traditional fossil fuel sectors. My estimates are based on input-output modeling with
China-specific data of sectorial and sub-sectorial weighting techniques within China’s
input-output (I-O) model. This paper aims to make a contribution to the research
literature in several ways. First, it is focused on the unique labor market structure of
China. Second, working with China-specific data, it estimates the job creation in the
renewable energy sectors as well as the traditional fossil fuel sectors, providing empirical
evidence relevant to the feasibility of a transformation in China to a clean-energy based
economy. Third, this study, examines employment generation in terms of formal and
informal jobs within China. This enables us to also consider the issue of the quality of
jobs being generated by clean energy investments, as opposed to focusing only on the
quantity of jobs.
I find that spending within three segments of the renewable energy sectors—solar,
wind and bioenergy—will, in combination, produce about twice as many jobs per dollar
of expenditure than an equal amount of spending on fossil fuels. This demonstrates that
there need not be any significant tradeoff in China between environmental protection and
expanding job opportunities in a transition to a renewable-based economy.

rule/. See also Dickerson 2014. EPA rules draw wide criticism in W.Va, posted online on June 2nd, 2014 at
The West Virginia Record. http://wvrecord.com/news/267555-epa-rules-draw-wide-criticism-in-w-va.
Retrieved on September 6, 2014.
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With respect to job quality concerns, I also find that more than 70 percent of jobs
generated by renewable energy investments are created in China’s informal economy.
Informal economy jobs in China, as elsewhere, are characterized by lower pay, and a lack
of benefits and basic protections for workers. The high proportion of informal jobs
generated by renewable energy investments in China thus does raise major concerns
about these new job opportunities. At the same time, I also find that the proportion of
informal sector jobs in China’s coal, oil and natural gas sectors are roughly equivalent to
the proportions of informal jobs in renewable energy. Thus, considering both quantity
and quality of job issues, the results of my estimates demonstrate that, for the case of
China, the project of building a clean energy economy does not face the prospect of a
massive obstacle in terms of negative employment effects.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. In section 2, I present a
brief overview of the existing literature regarding estimates of employment generation
through investing in renewable energy sectors in China. My critical review suggests that
to date, there are no reliable estimates of the employment impacts of renewable energy
investments in China, or any relative employment effects of renewable energy
investments versus spending within the traditional fossil fuel sectors. In section 3, I
introduce the input-output model. I also discuss the advantage and limitation of this
methodology through comparing it with alternative approaches. In section 4, I discuss the
data sources and data construction methods used for estimation. Specifically, I discuss the
input-output data, employment data decomposed into formal and informal sector, as well
as the cost breakdown of both renewable energy and fossil fuel sectors in China. In
section 5, I present the main results from my estimation exercises. These results include
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figures for employment generation per $1 million in solar, wind, bioenergy, coal, and oil
and gas sectors—i.e. the “employment-output ratios” for each of China’s energy sectors.
I also specify the composition of the employment in terms of formal and informal jobs, as
well as direct and indirect jobs. The indirect jobs here refer to the jobs created by
purchases from the supplies of the renewable energy sectors. Moreover, I present the
projection for total employment generation from the renewable energy sectors by 2015,
2020, 2030 and 2050. Section 6 concludes the paper.

3.2 Literature Review
One of the strongest obstacles to a successful transition to a green economy is the
consequential job loss that will occur as in economy’s fossil fuel sectors (Mitchell
2011).101 If job loss in the fossil fuel sectors outweighs those generated in the renewable
energy sectors, then the economy will suffer an overall decline in its employment level.
Therefore to some analysts, building a green economy poses a severe trade-off between
environmental protection and employment stability (Rose and Wei 2006; Alvarez et. al
2009; Frondel et.al 2009). This issue has become especially sensitive after the recent
economic crisis as the USA and many European countries are experiencing economic
stagnation with high unemployment level. Yet a growing body of literature has examined
the employment generation of investing in renewable energy, arguing that these
investments in general generate higher employment-output ratios in an economy’s energy

101

See also Atkin 2014. How Obama’s Climate Rule Could Change The U.S. Job Market. Posted online on
June 6, 2014 at ThinkProgress. http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/06/06/3444200/clean-energy-eparule/. See also Dickerson 2014. EPA rules draw wide criticism in W.Va, posted online on June 2nd, 2014 at
The West Virginia Record. http://wvrecord.com/news/267555-epa-rules-draw-wide-criticism-in-w-va.
Retrieved on September 6, 2014.
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sector activities than the fossil fuel sectors (Lehr et.al 2008; Moreno and Lopez 2008;
Pollin et. al 2009; Ragwitz et.al 2009; Wei et. al 2010; Strietska-Ilina et.al 2011; Pollin
et. al 2014).102 As a result, the employment level as a whole will not decline.
The employment impacts of investing in renewable energy are highly relevant to the
discussion on the feasibility of a green economy plan in China. Although using renewable
energy to substitute for traditional energy is critical for China to combat environmental
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions in particular, it is also crucial to examine whether
a significant reduction in production from traditional energy sectors will induce
employment losses, especially since employment issues could potentially trigger severe
economic instability in a populous country like China.
The existing literature has never treated employment impacts of investing in
renewable energy in China as a primary concern. Existing estimates either lack a
transparent methodological discussion or do not provide a clear definition of employment
as a concept. They are therefore incapable of serving as a solid empirical evidence for
policy discussions on building clean energy economies. Most employment estimates
appear in the official documents or think tanks affiliated to the government, mainly as a
justification for the big push on renewable energy development. But even these have
stopped appearing in the literature since 2012, exactly when the renewable energy
investment plan began being implemented. It is therefore not surprising to see a shortage
of serious studies on this topic, especially from the Chinese-language studies.

102

See also Union of Concerned Scientists: Benefits of Renewable Energy Use.
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/renewable-energy/public-benefits-ofrenewable.html#jobs
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Table 3.1 summarizes the employment estimates of renewable energy investments in
China from the recent literature. Specifically, I organize the literature as follows. Column
1 presents the methodology used in these studies. Column 2 examines whether they have
specified the various kinds of renewable energy technologies in their employment
estimates. Column 3 examines whether employment estimates are specified as formal or
informal employment. Here the formal employment refers to those jobs with regular
working hours and benefits and are protected under state labor laws. By contrast,
informal employment refers to jobs outside the formal economy, with low pay, little job
security, few or no benefits, and no legal protection. The specification between formal
and informal employment is crucial because although they can be treated equivalently in
the quantitative sense, one job in the informal economy implies significantly lower job
quality relative to one created in the formal sector.103 Column 4 examines whether
employment estimates are identified as direct or indirect jobs. Direct jobs refer to the core
activities in the energy sectors whereas indirect jobs refer to those jobs generated through
the supply chains associated with renewable energy production. Distinguishing direct and
indirect jobs helps to specify the composition of the employment opportunities in the
renewable energy sectors. Column 5 presents information on the relative spending level
for the employment estimates available in the examined studies. Column 6 categorizes
the employment estimates in terms of stocks or flows and the last column shows the
employment estimates.
A brief overview of the table shows a wide range of estimates over various time
spans with no consistent methodology or definition for any systematic comparison. In
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More detailed discussion on formal and informal employment in China is in Section 4.2 through 4.5.
Data construction for the formal and informal employment is presented in Section 4.3 and 4.5.
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terms of the methodology, almost half the studies do not specify their estimation base
(CREIA 2009; China’s 12th Five Year Plan 2011; CCICED 2011; NDRC 2012).104 Some
studies resort to qualitative methods such as interviews or literature surveys (UNEP et.al
2008; IRENA 2011; REN21 2013). Only two studies discuss the quantitative methods
they use and the relevant assumptions (CASS 2010; Greenpeace 2012). CASS (2010)
uses the Input-Output model (I-O) at a very aggregated level. Multipliers are calculated
for the interactions among only three sectors: agricultural, industrial and service sector (p
86-7). An I-O model could provide detailed information on the interactions among
various sectors, and therefore allow estimation of employment from the relevant sectors.
However, information on only three sectors is too general to even distinguish the
composition of various different renewable sectors. Therefore the estimation results will
not be the most reliable.
The calculations by Greenpeace (2012) are based on the assumptions that “for every
new megawatt of capacity installed in a country in a given year, 14 person/years of
employment is created through manufacturing, component supply, wind farm
development, construction, and transportation” and “0.33 person/years” necessary “for
operations and maintenance work at existing wind farms”, which “seems to work as a
global average” according to Greenpeace (2012). A key disadvantage of these
assumptions is that they treat various renewable energy sectors within and among
countries as having the same employment-output ratios. Although this might be useful as
a first approximation for a global estimate, they are incapable by nature to estimate the
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Keith Bradsher “China is leading the race to make renewable energy”, The New York Times, published
Jan 30, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/business/energyenvironment/31renew.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, Accessed in November 3rd 2013.
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employment-output ratios for individual renewable energy sectors, and for specific
countries.
Most studies in this literature survey have specified the employment generation
among wind, solar, and bioenergy sectors. However, it is still impossible to make
comparisons among these estimates, as some of the studies focus only on one sector of
their interest (Greenpeace 2012; NDRC 2012), yet other produce estimates for a
combination of the three sectors as a whole (UNEP et.al 2008; REN21 2013). Some
studies do not even specify the kind of renewable energy sectors they are estimating
(CREIA 2009; CCICED 2011). For example, CCICED (2011) estimated that China
would generate 10.58 million jobs in the green sector between 2011 and 2015 while
losing 952,100 jobs in high polluting and energy-intensive industries.105 Yet these
employment estimates are for the “green sector” in general, including not only the
renewable energy sectors examined in this paper, but also all the other sectors such as the
waste management sector that contributes to a green economy. This information on the
total employment of the generally defined “green sector” is thus of little value in
understanding employment-output ratio of individual renewable energy sectors.
Regarding the definition of employment, not a single study in this literature survey
discusses its employment estimates for the Chinese case in terms of formal and informal
employment categorizing. Only two studies (CASS 2010; REN21 2013) specify the

105

Li Jing “Green industries to add millions of jobs,” China Daily, Nov 16th 2011.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-11/16/content_14101445.htm, accessed in Nov 3rd 2013. In this
essay, I mainly refer to the 12th Five Year Plan for comparison because no clear-cut renewable energy
target has become available in the 13th Five Year Plan (2016-2020) by the time this paper is written. See
discussion on solar energy development in the 13th FYP at http://www.lsxyedu.com/html/xuexiaoxinwen/429.Html , published on August 24th, 2014 and retrieved on October 2, 2014.
Also see talk by the Director of the National Energy Bureau regarding wind energy development in the 13th
FYP at http://finance.sina.com.cn/energy/news/20140821/150520080922.shtml, published on August 21st,
2014 and retrieved on October 2, 2014.
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employment estimates with regard to direct or indirect jobs, despite a slight difference in
the definition used in this paper.106 CASS (2010) estimated that about 567,000 direct jobs
and 1.52 million indirect jobs could be generated in the energy-saving and environmentrelated sectors. REN21 (2013) estimated that, from 2009 to 2012, 267,000 people were
working in the wind sector, 300,000 in the solar PV industry, 1.1 million in the solar
power industry, and 380,000 in the biomass sector.
Almost half the studies do not specify the spending level with respect to the
employment estimates. CASS (2010) suggested that among the four trillion RMB
stimulus-package issued by the Chinese government during the financial crisis, about 580
billion RMB (or 14.5 percent) was directly related to ecological infrastructure. NDRC
(2012) shares the same investment estimates with China’s 12th Five Year Plan that total
renewable energy investment between 2011-2015 amounts to 1.8 trillion RMB. However,
in most cases, an investment amount was not estimated relative to specific renewable
energy sector. It is therefore difficult to estimate how much employment is generated
relative to certain spending level for each renewable energy sector. Finally, the use of
stocks or flows for employment estimation is also inconsistent among the existing
literature, making it hard to undertake direct comparisons.
In general, the existing literature has not provided any serious estimates for
employment generation through renewable energy investment in China. More
specifically, the literature does not provide either a clear methodology for estimation or
even a clear concept of the term “employment.” It is therefore reasonable to conclude
that, to date, there are no reliable estimates of the employment impacts of renewable
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Note that definition of direct and indirect jobs in REN21 (2013) is slightly different from this paper
whereas the former does not include R&D jobs as direct jobs.
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energy investments in China, or any relative employment effects of renewable energy
investments versus spending within the traditional fossil fuel sectors.

3.3 Methodology
3.3.1

Input-output model

This paper mainly builds on the Input-Output (I-O) model adopted in studying the
United States case in Pollin et.al (2009) to estimate the employment impacts of renewable
energy investment in China. A typical I-O model records detailed information on the
supply and demand relationships between various industrial sectors and distinct
categories of final demand in the economy.107 The I-O model is as follows:
𝑋" = 𝑎"- 𝑋- + 𝑎"< 𝑋< + ⋯ + 𝑎"> 𝑋> + 𝐷" (1)
𝑋 = 𝐴𝑋 + 𝐷

(2)

𝐼 − 𝐴 𝑋 = 𝐷 (3)
𝑋 = (𝐼 − 𝐴),- 𝐷 (4)
In the first equation, 𝑋" indicates the output produced by the 𝑖th sector; 𝑎-" indicates
the required input from the 𝑖th sector to produce output for the 𝑗th sector. Equation (2)
contains the same information as in equation (2), only is written in the vector form, where
notation A indicates an i by j matrix containing all elements of 𝑎"- through 𝑎"> . Equation
(3) is a re-writing of equation (2) where notation I indicates an identity matrix. Equation
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The I-O model is based on aggregate identities where the total output for any sector is assumed to be
fully consumed by two channels: one is directly consumed by final users (i.e. household consumption,
investment, government expenditure and exports; the other is consumed as inputs by other sectors for
output production.
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(4) expresses X in terms of all the other components in the equation with the assumption
that (I-A) is invertible.
The I-O model shows how much materials (input) from each sector in the economy
are used up by economic sector X to produce the goods and services (output) for the
consumption of households, private businesses investment, government expenditures, and
exports. Information on imports is also included, often implicitly, in the I-O model,
through the documentation of “leakages.” It follows that the more detailed breakdown of
economic sectors in an I-O model (e.g., rice farming sector versus agricultural sector in
general), the more precise the inter-sectorial information and hence the employment
estimation based on it. An example illustrates how an I-O model tracks the change in all
the economic sectors caused by an initial increase in final demand. An increase in
purchases of smart phones will cause purchases of intermediate inputs to rise (e.g.,
electronic components). Higher demand for electronic components will, in turn, increases
demand for the inputs used by the electronic components industry (e.g., steel or plastics),
and so forth. Given this information from the I-O model, we can estimate that following
an investment (one element of the final demand) increase in, say, the solar energy
industry, how the relevant sectors such as those manufacturing solar panels, and those
producing steels or plastics for the manufacturing of solar panels, respond to the change.
One challenge in using an I-O model to estimate how the increase in spending in
certain renewable energy sectors affects the whole economy is that these renewable
energy sector activities are not as yet specified into distinct industrial sectors, such as
“solar energy sector” or “wind energy sector.” To solve this issue, I use information on
the cost components of such investment from the existing literature and then use the
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existing sectors within the I-O model to construct a new renewable energy sector based
on the weighting structure that reflects such cost composition. The first step in the
estimation is to calculate the output/investment ratio (O/I ratio), meaning how much
change in output will be induced by a change in the investment level, as is discussed
above.108 The second step is to calculate the employment/ output ratio (E/O ratio), which
indicates how much employment is required to produce a certain output level of
renewable energy goods. Assuming a linear model, the multiplication result of the row
vector E/O and the matrix O/I implies the E/I ratio, suggests the total employment
generation from investment in the renewable energy goods.

3.3.2

Methodological concerns

The assumption of a linear I-O model creates some limitations that need to be
addressed. To put it into the context of this paper, linearity here suggests that the
employment impacts of a $1 billion renewable energy investment project will be exactly
1000 times greater than a $1 million spending on the same project. However, this
assumption might not be able to generate the most accurate estimates in some situations.
First, the basic linear I-O model does not incorporate any supply constraints that
might occur from investing, for example, 1,000 times more in the same project. Yet
within the current context of the Chinese economy, which is operating with substantial
overcapacity especially after the 2008 global economic recession, it is reasonable to
assume that supply constraints are less binding than demand constraints in the short and
intermediate term.
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This O/I ratio corresponds to the Leontief inverse coefficient, generated through matrix manipulation on
the raw I/O data.
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Second, the basic linear I-O model also assumes that relative prices are fixed
regardless of any changes in demand. For example, if demand for solar panels declines
due to the economic recession, then prices of the panel will fall. This could provide
incentives for purchasing more solar panels therefore raise the demand again. This issue
could be addressed in a more fully specified model such as in Computable Generable
Equilibrium (CGE) model yet with its own limitation as discussed later.
Third, when applying basic linear I-O model, productive relationships are assumed to
be stable over the period of analysis. This assumption would seem especially relevant in
employment estimation of the renewable energy investment. However, when put into the
context, it only implies that productive relationships such as those between the
manufacturing sector and construction sector in building solar energy are fairly stable,
which is realistic to a certain extent. In Section 5.4, I compare the output-investment ratio
I-O tables from 1995 to 2011 to show that productive relationship among sectors could be
realistically assumed to be fairly stable in the context of China.
Fourth, the static I-O model does not incorporate the treatment of time dimension
either. It is certainly realistic to think that investment and employment generation occurs
over a reasonable amount of time period rather than happening at one fixed point in time.
A dynamic model would address this concern more accurately yet it is not necessary for
this paper since the estimates cover an intermediate term rather than a specific year.
The advantage of a relatively simple and transparent I-O approach is seen more
clearly by comparing it with the Computable Generable Equilibrium (CGE) model, which
is a relatively more complex modeling framework. In the CGE models, price dynamics,
supply constraints and technological change are incorporated into the basic I-O structure
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through assumptions on a variety of price elasticities and equilibrium conditions.
Critically, most CGE models operate with an assumption of full-employment. Despite the
crucial roles these assumptions play in the model, they are almost impossible to be
identified. In addition, these models are usually proprietary. This proprietary nature
generally presents independent verification of the logic of the model. Also, the
assumption that the economy operates at full employment at all times is unrealistic and
inherently contrary to the purpose of using the model, which is to estimate the number of
job creation through investments. Compared with the CGE model, the I-O model has
critical benefits in terms of its relative simplicity, clarity, minimum number of behavioral
assumptions and ability to handle details more fully as a result.
In general, a basic linear I-O model is still the most effective available tool for
estimating the employment effects of a large-scale renewable energy investment project
in a national economy.

3.4 Data Construction and Discussion
3.4.1

Input-output data

Starting from 1987, the Chinese Statistics Bureau published the Input-Output Table
of China every five years, with the most recent one in 2007.109 This 2007 I-O table is the
most detailed table since 1987, providing information on the 135-industry level basis.110
A more recent I-O table, if available, would be preferable for more accurate prediction of
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Unfortunately the 2012 I-O table that was supposed to be published one year ago has not come out yet
by the time this paper is written.
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The 135 sectors include five agricultural sectors; five mining sectors; 81 manufacturing sectors; three
utilities sectors; one construction sector; nine transportation, storage and postal services sectors; three
communication sectors, one retail sector, two hotel and restaurant sector, two finance sectors, one housing
sector, and 22 other services sectors.
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employment generation. However, this more recent I-O table is not yet available.111 A
2010 I-O table is available at 54-sector, yet I choose the 2007 I-O table for its details that
are most critical for the estimation. Data limitation issue will be addressed and
compensated by discussion of productivity change in section 5.5.

3.4.2

Importance of separating the formal and the informal sector employment

There are three main reasons to separate the formal and informal sectors in the
discussion of employment impacts of investing in renewable energy.
First, employment opportunities within the formal economy differ significantly from
those in the informal economy in terms of job quality, even in the same industrial sector.
If jobs generated in the formal and informal sectors are treated as equivalents, it implies
that large numbers of jobs can be seen as an adequate substitute for low quality jobs.
In 2012, about 75 percent employees within the urban informal economy come from
rural migrant workers (nongmin gong) working in the cities.112 In 2013, 35 percent (or 58
million) of the 166 million rural migrant workers work in the manufacturing and another
23.5 percent (or 39 million) in construction, making for a total of about 97 million
working in the urban “secondary industry.” The remaining 69 million rural migrant
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From regional statistics insitution such as that in Shanghai, I found the national schedule for compiling
and publishing I-O statistics. The regional data are expected to be submitted to the National Statistics
Bureau around August 2013, and the national statistics is expected to be published after 2014. However, it
is still not published by the time this paper is written. See http://tjj.stats-sh.gov.cn/trcc/index.asp
112
Rural migrant workers are defined as those with “agricultural status” according to the household
registration, but live on non-agricultural activities or migrate to other places for work for more than 6
months. In 2014, National Bureau of Statistics published the data on rural migrant workers covering 2008
to 2013 period. 163.3 million indicate the number of rural workers who literarily “migrate” to places other
than their local geographical areas such as towns that belong to the same administration as their rural
origin, and the ratio is based on its share of the total 218.6 million working in the urban informal sector in
2012. See National report on rural migrant workers in 2013, published on May 12th, 2013 and retrieved on
October 5, 2014. See http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201405/t20140512_551585.html. The 2007 data on
rural migrant workers is not available, yet Huang (2009) reported the ratio for 2006 as about 72 percent, or
120 million rural migrant workers over 168.2 million urban informal economy.
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workers are working in the “tertiary industry” (or the service sector).113 This pattern did
not change significantly since 2006 (Huang 2009).114 These are the workers “who have
no security of employment, receive few or no benefits, and are often unprotected by labor
laws” (Huang 2009).
In addition to the rural migrant workers, the remaining quarter of the urban informal
economy consists of urban residents who are laid off (xiagang) from their previous stateowned or collective enterprises and who are now working mainly in the tertiary industry
of services (Huang 2009).
Table 3.2 shows the average annual wage comparison between the urban unit
employees (or the formal sector employees) and the rural migrant workers who constitute
the majority of the urban informal economy. As we can see, the wage for the rural
migrant workers are no more than just 60 percent of the pay received by regular urban
labors, and this pattern has not changed at all since 2004.115 On the other hand, 84 percent
of the rural migrant workers are still working more than 44 hours a week in 2013.116
Despite the low pay yet extra work time, these rural migrant workers enjoy little job
security. In 2013, fewer than half of them are working with some kind of a contract,
among which only 23 percent have contracts that are over one year.117 Moreover, only
17.6 percent of the group had medical insurance and 15.7 percent of them had retirement
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According to Huang (2009), these people work as domestic helps, guards of residential compounds,
barber shop and massage parlor personnel, delivery persons, garbage collectors, street cleaners, or run
small shops, stalls and vendors.
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See Report on China’s rural sector 2007: new development, new issues and new challenges published
on April 2nd 2008. Retrieved on October 5, 2014 at
http://www.china.com.cn/aboutchina/zhuanti/08zgshxs/2008-04/02/content_14114764.htm.
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See discussion on 2004 data in Huang (2009).
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See National report on rural migrant workers in 2013, published on May 12th, 2013 and retrieved on
October 5, 2014. See http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201405/t20140512_551585.html.
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benefits in 2013.118 Although there is another 25 percent of the urban informal economy
not represented by the rural migrant workers, it is reasonable to assume that the work and
living situation of those workers would not be significantly better than the rural migrant
workers due to the strong reserve army effects.
Second, focus on the formal sector employment will leave out the entire employment
population in the rural sector, which constitutes the preponderance of employment
generated by investing in bioenergy. Therefore leaving out the agricultural employment
will give an underestimation of the actual employment.
Third, it is important to note the possibility that a rise in final demand might not
increase employment in the informal economy as much as in the formal economy. This is
especially relevant to those self-employed who would work more to address the rising
demand instead of hiring more employees. It could also apply to others working in the
informal economy that are underemployed to some extent and would be willing to work
more hours to receive higher earnings instead of having their employers hire another
worker. This is to say, using a national I-O model, it is not able to tell how the increase in
total earnings, as a result of a boost in final demand will 1) increasing the number of selfemployed jobs at the prevailing earnings level; 2) increasing earnings while keeping the
level of employment constant, or 3) some combination of the first two possibilities
(Pollin et.al 2014a). Therefore, a separation of formal and informal sector employment
will give a clearer picture for the job creation that are certain to be generated through
investment (i.e. those in the formal sector), as compared to the employment generation
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that might be overestimated (i.e. those in the informal sector). This issue is especially
relevant for the bioenergy sector (see more discussion in Section 5.2).

3.4.3

Employment data: formal sector employment

The 2007 employment data are compiled from Table 3-1 in the 2008 China Labor
Statistical Yearbook on a 90-industry level basis. The only employment data available at
this level of detail are for the urban unit employment (danwei jiuye renyuan, a concept
different from urban employment, chengzhen jiueye renyuan, as will be explained
below).119 Two major groups of population are excluded from the statistical definition of
urban unit employment: first, the entire employment population in the rural sector, which
was about 62 percent of the total national employment in 2007 and 52 percent in 2012;
second, those working in the urban sector but in the private enterprises, or as selfemployed or simply unregistered in the national statistics.120 This population was 22
percent or 28 percent of the entire employment population across for year 2007 or 2012
respectively.121
Compared to urban employment data, urban unit employment data are more strictly
defined in the sense that they only include employment in three types of officially
registered enterprises, or units (danwei). They are the state-owned units (i.e. including the
“state-owned” enterprises and the “state-holding” enterprises), urban collectively-owned
units, and other ownership units (i.e. mixed ownership, or enterprises funded by foreign
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Note that according to the statistical definition available from the China Bureau of Statistics, those who
work in the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs, xiangzhen qiye) are counted as rural employment,
therefore not included in urban employment from Table 3-1. The urban and rural division here is in the
administrative sense, unrelated to the household registration status of the worker.
120
The percentage estimation is calculated based on Table 1-1 from the 2008 and 2013 China Labor
Statistical Yearbook.
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Ibid.
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investment, or by investments from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan).122 This type of
employment is often associated with regular wage, normal working hours, standard
benefits and job security, thus providing the best available estimates for urban formal
sector employment in China.
Table 3.3 presents the relationships among these statistical concepts for years 2007
and 2012. As is shown, the urban unit employment (or formal sector employment), which
aggregates employment from the three types of units, represents about 41 percent of total
urban employment, and this percentage does not change significantly from the 2007 data
used in this paper to the latest available employment data in 2012.

3.4.4

Employment data: informal sector employment

Table 3.3 also shows that the share of urban informal employment as of total urban
employment (about 59 percent) is relatively stable from 2007 to 2012. The informal
employment includes urban private enterprises and self-employment, as well as other
urban employment that is not formally counted in the national statistics.
The concept of private enterprises here does not imply all nongovernment enterprises
as in the US context; they are instead defined as enterprises owned by “natural persons”
(ziranren), therefore do not include “limited liability corporations” or “share-holding
corporations limited” that have corporate “legal person” (fa ren) status (Huang 2009).
They are mostly small businesses. In 2012, there were a total of 10.9 million such
enterprises registered with a total of 113 million workers (including those registered in
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State-holding enterprises refer to those mixed-ownership enterprises where the government has a larger
share of the equity capital than any other shareholder. See “Explanatory Notes on Main Statistical
Indicators” in the China Labor Statistical Yearbook.
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both urban and rural areas thus the number is greater than 75.6 million in the urban
private enterprises presented in Table 3.1), making for an average of only 10 workers per
enterprises, including the employers of such enterprises.123 The average number for 2007
is 13 workers per enterprise, suggesting that the size of the urban private enterprises has a
declining trend.124 Workers in such small-scale enterprises usually enjoy little benefits or
job security or labor law protection (Huang 2009). Although informal employment
usually includes those working in micro-enterprises according to Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an enterprise of average size of 10
people cannot be counted as micro enterprises (which strictly require number of
employees as no more than 10 people, instead of on average) based on the European
Commission standard (Jutting et. al 2008).125 However, in this paper, I still include this
category based on a general consensus in the literature on Chinese informal economy.
The self-employed persons (e.g. small-shop and stall owners, artisans and
apprentices, proprietors of small eateries and food stalls, repair shop owners, etc)
represent about 86.3 million over 41 million entities, making for an average of 2.1
employed persons per entity—usually the person registered together with a relative or
friend.126 This number does not change much from 2007 with about 2 employed persons
per entity.127 Not surprisingly this group of people do not enjoy benefits and job security
(Huang 2009).
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Calculated by author based on Table 4-8 Number of Engaged Persons in Private Enterprises at Year-end
by Region (2012), China Statistical Yearbook (2013).
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Calculated by author based on Table 4-14 Number of Engaged Persons in Private Enterprises at Yearend by Region (2007), China Statistical Yearbook (2008).
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See European Commission, What is an SME at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figuresanalysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm, retrieved on October 19, 2014.
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Calculated by author based on Table 4-9 Number of Self-employed Individuals at Year-end by Region
(2012), China Statistical Yearbook (2013).
127
Calculated by author based on Table 4-15 Number of Self-employed Individuals at Year-end by Region
(2007), China Statistical Yearbook (2008).
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Finally, there are about 90 million unregistered urban informal employees (recorded
as “not formally counted” in Table 3.1), who are working as domestic helps, delivery
workers, street vendors, and the like, with even lower levels of job security (Huang
2009).
The three main groups of the urban informal economy (private enterprises, the selfemployed, and the unregistered) add up to a composite picture of low pay, little job
security, few or no benefits, and no protection under state labor laws. These
characteristics are consistent with the features of informal economy defined by the
International Labor Organization (ILO).128

3.4.5

Constructing employment-output (E/O) ratios for the informal sector

In this paper, employment in the informal sector refers to those working in the urban
sector yet either employed by the small and medium private enterprises, or as selfemployed, or not formally counted by the national statistics. Rural informal employment,
however, is not included due to the potential complication it could cause. These people,
about 83 million people in 2007 and 103 million in 2012, usually work at “township and
village” industries (usually manufacturing and construction sectors), or service sectors
including transportation (e.g. truck drivers), trade (e.g. owners of small shops) and social
services (e.g. barbers, repairmen) (Huang 2009).129 The literature on Chinese labor does
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According to ILO, the characteristic features of informal employment are lack of protection in the event
of non-payment of wages, compulsory overtime or extra shifts, lay-offs without notice or compensation,
unsafe working conditions and the absence of social benefits such as pensions, sick pay and health
insurance. See http://ilo.org/global/topics/employment-promotion/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm.
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The 2012 data are based on National report on rural migrant workers in 2013, published on May 12th,
2013 and retrieved on October 5, 2014. See
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201405/t20140512_551585.html. The exact data for 2007 is not available.
The 83 million data in the paper is a simple extrapolation based on 80 million in year 2006 (Huang 2009)
and 85 million in year 2008 from National report on rural migrant workers in 2013.
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not have a consensus on measuring the rural informal economy. Some would only
consider the rural non-agricultural workers who do not migrate to urban sector and are
locally employed in rural, nonagricultural informal units as included in rural informal
employment; Others argue that all rural employment should be considered informal (even
including all the agricultural-related activities) because of the seasonal features of
agricultural work, which could be as high as 476 million.130 This paper has counted the
agricultural employment into the calculation of bioenergy employment generation.
Constructing the employment data for the informal economy mainly rely on three
sources. First, I refer to the employment data on the three strata of the economy (i.e.
primary, secondary and tertiary).131 Second, I use the employment data on the urban
private enterprises and self-employment for seven industrial sectors.132 Third, I also use
the urban employment composition in Table 3.3 as a reference to disaggregate
employment for industrial sectors that only have very high level of aggregation.
Constructing informal employment data for agricultural-related sectors is
straightforward. The three strata data provides the total employment of agriculturalrelated activities. When this data is subtracted by the formal employment in agriculturalrelated activities we used for calculating the formal employment-output ratio, then we
will have the informal employment data for the five aggregated-related sectors including
cropping, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and service sector related to the these four
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See Huang (2013), Restudy the Chinese laborers—historical evolution of labor law and the
contemporary informal economy, at http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php/4006, published at
Oct 2013, retrieved at October 28, 2014.
131
See Table 4-4 from China Statistical Yearbook (2008). The primary industry includes agriculture,
forestry, animal husbandry and fishery; Secondary industry includes mining, manufacturing, power sector
and construction sector; Tertiary industry includes everything else.
132
See Table 4-13 from China Statistical Yearbook (2008). The seven industrial sectors are manufacturing;
construction; transport, storage &post; wholesale and retail trades; hotel and catering services; leasing and
business services; services to households and other services.
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sectors. To get an average informal employment-output ratio for the five agriculturalrelated sectors, we divide the total informal employment by the aggregated gross output
for these five sectors.
Constructing informal employment for non-agricultural sectors are more
complicated. In order to take advantage of all the available information regarding
Chinese informal economy, I break down the calculation of informal employment into
two categories: the group of people working in private enterprises or as self-employed
(P&S), as well as the group of those not formally counted.
For those working in the P&S, data are available for only seven sectors of high level
of aggregation, amounting to 70 million in total. They are manufacturing; construction;
transport, storage &post; wholesale and retail trades; hotel and catering services; leasing
and business services; services to households and other services. The difference between
the 70 million and the 78.9 million (see Table 3.3) of total employment in the P&S is the
P&S employment for the remaining sectors in addition to the seven sectors, or 98 sectors
by the details of aggregation as in the I-O model by 135 sectors. Then these 8.9 million
workers are allocated to the remaining 22 non-agricultural sectors in the I-O model
according to the formal employment composition in these 22 sectors.133 Thus we have the
informal employment for all the non-agricultural sectors.
The second category of workers who are not formally counted in the national
statistics amounts to 94.4 million in total (Table 3.3). They are allocated to the 130 nonagricultural sectors according to the composition of P&S employment in those 130
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This allocation method assumes relatively similar formal and informal employment ratio in different
sectors. Although the assumption might not hold for certain sectors, this is the best available method given
the data limitation in the Chinese informal economy. 22 is the result of subtracting 135 sectors by the 5
agricultural-related sectors and the 98 sectors with data available on the private enterprises.
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sectors calculated from the previous step.134 The two categories of workers constitute the
whole urban informal economy this paper focuses on estimating. Dividing this
employment estimate by the gross output for each of the 130 sectors will give the
informal employment-output ratio for these sectors.

3.4.6

Weighting the renewable energy sector

3.4.6.1 Selection of three kinds of renewable energy for in this paper
This section will focus on estimating the cost components of three kinds of
renewable energy that are of high relevance in the Chinese context, namely, solar power,
wind energy and bioenergy.135 The reasons for the selection are explained below.
According to China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan on energy development, installed
capacity of solar power is expected to reach 21 GW in 2015, amounting to an annual
growth rate of 89.5 percent from 0.86 GW in 2010.136 For reaching the 21GW target, the
main factor is solar Photovoltaic (PV) technology—solar thermal power only accounts
for 3GW. Thus, our calculation of the employment generation from developing solar
energy will mainly focus on the solar PV sector.137
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This allocation method assumes relatively stable ratio between those not formally counted in the
national statistics and those counted as working for private enterprises or as self-employment in all the nonagricultural sectors. Although this assumption might still not hold for certain sectors, it is a more realistic
assumption than the one I use for allocating the employment group of private enterprises and the selfemployed. And again, this is the best available method given the limited information on the Chinese
informal economy.
135
This paper will focus on studying the employment effects of solar PV, on-shore wind and low-emission
bioenergy. The reasons will be discussed in detail in section 4.3.1 though 4.3.3.
136
Source: State Council January 23, The Twelfth Five-Year Plan on Energy Development.
137
China to install 3000GW solar thermal power by 2015. Nov 2012. Extracted from website on May 15,
2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-11/22/content_15950340.htm
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Wind energy installation capacity is expected to reach 100 GW in 2015, requiring an
annual growth rate of 26.4 percent from 31GW in 2010. Since wind energy is
experiencing rapid development in China, it is included in the calculation.
On the other hand, the expected installation capacity of hydropower is 290GW in
2015 from the already existing 220GW in 2010. This essay excludes hydropower in the
calculation for two reasons. First, hydropower has been well developed in China and
there is limited potential for another round of major increases in hydropower installation.
Thus, it is not of high relevance to the employment generation we are discussing here
(Martinot and Li 2007; REN21 2012).138 Second, counting hydropower as renewable
energy has become controversial due to the impact of dams on fisheries and water
flows.139
Last but not least, China's bioenergy production is estimated to exceed 50 million
tons of standard coal by the end of 2015, and biomass electricity is expected to achieve
13 million kilowatts capacity.140 Since the biomass energy sector contains significantly
higher employment-output ratio than other renewable energy sectors based on the world
experiences, I include the calculation of employment generation of biomass energy
despite its relative underdevelopment in China for policy recommendation purpose.
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According to REN21 (2012), China’s capacity exceeds that of Brazil, the USA and Canada combined.
Is hydropower a renewable energy or not? September 2013. Extracted from the internet on May 15th
2014. http://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/gov-hydropower-renewableenergy.html
140
Based on China’s 12th Five Year Plan (2011-15). The plan has outlined the following targets: Biomass
Electricity: 13 million kilowatts capacity;, Biogas Annual Utilization: 22 billion cubic meters; Solid
Biomass Fuel Annual Utilization: 10 million tons liquid; Biofuels Annual Utilization: 5 million tons.
Hereby, bioenergy investment is expected to increase to 140 billion RMB (or 22.6 billion USD at 2012
price level) with 100 billion annual sales turnover. Source: http://www.bbs-summit.com/en/, retrieved on
September 27, 2014.
139
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3.4.6.2 Necessity of country-specific weights
It is necessary that our estimates be based on cost components that are specific to
China. Figure 3.1 presents the cost components for renewable power generation
technologies by regions covering OECD countries, Africa, Eastern Europe and Central
Asia, China, India and Latin America. As we can see, cost per kWh for the same kind of
renewable technology can vary widely among different regions. For example, biomass
energy costs about 0.06 to 0.29 USD/kWh in OCED European countries yet its cost in
China ranges from 0.02 to 0.08 USD/kWh. Even within the same country, the cost
structure of the solar industry in 2007 looked very different than it does now, due to the
rapid technological development of the industry and the resulting significant decline in
the costs of raw materials.
Table 3.4 presents the estimation for the cost components of the solar industry
conducted by China Solar PV Report 2007. We can see that the largest cost share comes
from purchasing silicon materials (i.e. 45.2 percent of the total costs), while installation
only accounts for 3.6 percent. This pattern is surely very different from the US case, yet it
is hardly surprising for two reasons. First, the data in Li et.al (2007) are collected when
the price for polycrystalline silicon was 470 USD/kg, a price that experienced about a 97
percent decline over the next five years.141 Second, the installation costs measured by Li
et.al (2007) listed only the in-grid type, which contains the lowest costs among all types
of installation (IRNEA 2012a). Therefore in the following sections, I will mainly use the
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In 2012, the silicon price fell to only 20 USD/kg for leading Chinese polycrystalline silicon
manufacturers, and 12 USD/kg for international leading manufacturers. From News on the 2013 China
Solar PV Report. See: http://www.pv-tech.cn/guest_blog/semi_deliver_report_of_2013_pv_industry/P1. In
the first quarter of 2014, the price has risen to 20.3 USD/kg. See Mike Munsell, Fastest Quarterly Growth
in Polysilicon Prices since 2010, at http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Fastest-QuarterlyGrowth-in-Polysilicon-Prices-Since-2010, published on April 4th, 2014 and retrieved on September 27,
2014.
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latest available literature on the cost components of renewable energy technology,
combined with China-specific information, to indicate the changes in recent years.

3.4.6.3 Solar PV
Table 3.5 presents the capital cost structure of a PV system, composed of the PV
module cost and the balance of system (BOS) cost (IRENA 2012a). According to the
IRENA (2012a) definition, the PV module cost is determined by raw material costs,
notably silicon prices, cell processing/manufacturing and module assembly costs. The
BOS cost includes the cost of the structural system (e.g. structural installation, racks, site
preparation and other attachments), the electrical system costs (e.g. the inverter,
transformer, wiring and other electrical installation costs) and the battery or other storage
system cost in the case of off- grid applications (p 15).142 Note that the module cost data
in the upper part of the table are the average world price level, while the BOS costs in the
lower part are estimated based on US data (IRNEA, 2012a). Since the average selling
price of solar PV modules has already converged among nations including China, the cost
structure among countries should not vary significant.143 The real gap between countries,
as will be shown later, lies in the installation costs. Therefore in this paper I will apply
the cost structure information for all the other costs except the installation based on the
Table 3.4 information.
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Note that the use of BOS is slightly different in IRENA (2013, p51), where BOS are used to refer all
costs excluding both the module costs and the installation costs. Here we still use BOS as including the
installation costs for convenience.
143
Solarbuzz November 30, 2012: Installed PV system continue to exhibit strong global variations.
http://www.solarbuzz.com/resources/analyst-insights/installed-pv-system-costs-continue-to-exhibit-strongglobal-variations
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From Table 3.5, we can see that the installation costs for solar PV vary with the
nature of the installation. For utility-scale PV plants, it can be as low as 20 percent (for a
simple grid- connected system) or as high as 70 percent (for an off-grid system). For
residential and small-scale systems, the BOS and installation costs make up 55 percent to
60 percent of total PV system costs. This variation also applies across countries (IRENA
2013).
Table 3.6 gives the cost structure for the Chinese Solar PV industry in 2012. From
the available information, we can calculate the installation costs for a utility-scale
ground-mounted system as 0.5 USD/Watt, which is about 23 percent of the total costs,
very different from the information presented in Table 3 which is based on 2007 data.144
Applying the information from Table 3.5 (all but the installation costs) and Table
3.6, Table 3.7 presents the cost structure in detail for the Chinese Solar PV industry.
Notice that this number is only for the utility-scale ground-mounted version. I also
included the Table 3.4 information on the 2007 cost structure for comparison. Table 3.8
presents the industries and weights for solar energy matched to the I-O model used in
estimation.

3.4.6.4 Wind
Wind energy in China consists of two main categories: onshore and offshore wind
power. According to IRENA (2013), offshore wind power installation usually has a much
higher construction cost share than the onshore wind power installation (25 percent
versus 10 percent). However, since offshore wind power constitutes less than 1 percent of

144

Total installed costs minus PV module costs minus BOS costs (except installation costs). The percentage
is calculated by 0.5 divided by 2.2
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the total installed wind power in China, the analysis in this paper will focus on the
onshore wind power case.145
Table 3.9 presents the world average cost structure of on-shore wind energy
investment and the estimated cost structure for the Chinese case. Column by column, I
show how I use the world average statistics on wind energy structure from IRENA
(2012b) and IRENA (2013) to work out the China’s specific cost structure through
combining the information on China’s total installed costs of on-shore wind energy. For
example, column 1 and 2 show the world average statistics on the detailed cost
components of wind energy sector. Column 3 transforms the weights of the components
in the turbine building costs to the total costs. Column 4 applies these specific weights to
the context of China with consideration of the feature of low-cost turbines and low total
installed costs as well. As a result, total installed costs of wind energy in China amount to
only about 1300 USD/kW in 2011, compared with the world average of 1700 to 2150
USD/kW (IRENA 2012b). The last column aggregates the information in the previous
columns. Table 3.10 presents the industries and weights for wind energy matched to the
I-O model used in estimation.

3.4.6.5 Bioenergy
Bioenergy can be used either directly through combustion to produce heat, or
indirectly after being converted to various forms of biofuel. Currently China’s biomass
energy sources mainly come from agricultural stalks, animal manure, forestry sources
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By the end of 2012, China had only installed 389.6 Megawatt (MW) offshore wind capacity, while the
total installed capacity for on-grid wind power has reached 60830 MW. Source: China unable to achieve
5GW offshore wind goal by 2015 (http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1187293/analysis---chinaunable-achieve-5gw-offshore-wind-goal-2015) & China National Renewable Energy Center.
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and bioenergy crops, and are used to produce heat, electricity, solid fuel, liquid fuel
(biofuel ethanol, biodiesel, biofuel), and gasified fuel (methane gas, biogas and
hydrogen). These are used by households (e.g. cooking and heating) and in transportation
and electricity provision (Tian et. al 2011).
For the purpose of estimating meaningful employment opportunities, this paper
focuses the estimation for biofuel. More specifically, this paper estimates the
employment impacts from using biofuel that relies on the “beneficial” biomass resources
defined by the Union of Concerned Scientists.146

3.4.6.6 Combustion
Although using biomass sources to produce heat contributes to the reduction in
consuming non-renewable energy sources, its employment impacts are not very
significant. This is because the production and consumption of such energy takes place in
individual households—collection of biomass sources (e.g. agricultural stalks and animal
manure) involves negligible costs. The same applies to transportation costs of the energy
(from outside the house where sources are picked up to inside house where heat is
generated for cooking and heating purpose). All in all, even though labor and time are
involved, they are largely undercompensated and are not considered to be a job as long as
an industrial scale of production is not achieved. Employment generation occurs in the
industrial sector that produces firewood stoves, which represent the only considerable
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The Union of Concerned Scientists terms “beneficial” biomass resources that meet the following
standards. First, energy crops that do not compete with food crops for land; Second, portions of crop
residues such as wheat straw or corn stover; Third, sustainably harvested wood and forest residues; Fourth,
clean municipal and industrial wastes.
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costs (200 RMB per firewood stoves, or 32 USD) involved with household’s use of
biomass energy (Tian et.al 2011).
Given the limited employment impacts of direct use of biomass, this paper does not
include combustion as an important source for employment generation.

3.4.6.7 Biogas
The Chinese government has been supporting the development of the biogas industry
in rural China since 1958.147 The use of methane gas technology (specifically rural
household methane gas and breeding farm methane gas) has been developed to a
considerable scale mainly because the main sources that methane gas relied on—rotting
garbage, agricultural and human waste—are easily accessible and do not threaten food
security (Tian et.al 2011).148 However, biogas industry is developed for local use mostly
and therefore it does not involve significant transportation costs such as in the biofuel
industry. Also the main sources that biogas relies on does not involve agricultural
activities that create significant amount of jobs. Therefore despite the fact that biogas is
used at a much larger scale than biofuel in China at the moment, this paper does not
include employment estimates for biogas due to its limited potential for employment
generation (USDA FAS 2013).
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China’s renewable energy development history: 1958-1008. Retrieved from Gansu Website of China,
http://www.gscn.com.cn/pub/special/2009zt/gsxny/xny/2009/07/13/1247456273000.html, September 26,
2014.
148
According to Tian et. al (2011), other types of biomass energy (such as for solid fuel or methane gas
from stalks) are still in the preliminary stage for commercialization.
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3.4.6.8 Biofuel
When a biomass energy source is converted into liquid form, it becomes biofuel.
However, it is important to note that whether biofuel (i.e. ethanol and biodiesel)
contributes to environmental sustainability will depend on its production processes. A 30year lifecycle analysis suggests that the overall level of greenhouse gas emissions of corn
ethanol refined through coal-fired processing is actually 34 percent higher relative to that
of burning gasoline.149 Instead, the way to achieve major emission reductions is by
burning waste-grease biodiesel, corn stover ethanol, or switchgrass ethanol (Pollin et. al.
2014b).
Biofuel development is extremely labor-intensive from the world experience
(Raswant et.al 2008), but it also raises the issues of food security especially in the
developing countries (FAO 2008; Raswant et.al 2008; FAO 2013; Pollin et.al. 2014b). In
China, corn-based ethanol production has been constrained since 2007 due to its potential
threat to domestic food security.150 Alternative crops, like sweet sorghum or cassava, that
grow on marginal land have relatively low yields and small-scale production, therefore
have limited potential to support large-scale industrial ethanol production unless China
seriously expands its production bases to mid-west regions or coastal saline areas (USDA
FAS 2013).151 Moreover, development of sorghum or cassava-based biofuel would not
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2009, May. “EPA Lifecycle Analysis of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Renewable Fuels,” Office of Transportation and Air Quality. EPA-420-F-09-024.
Retrieved from: http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=P100B3F8.txt
150
Since then the trend of biofuel production has been reversed. The realized fuel ethanol production in
2010 was only 1.86 million tonnes with 0.37 million tonnes using non-grain feedstocks”, far short of the
target of 2 million tonnes of non-grain fuel ethanol consumption (Chang et.al 2012).
151
To ensure a domestic feedstock supply for biofuel production, China will need to expand its production
bases in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, two regions with substantial sunshine and heat resources suitable for
the planting of sweet sorghum, as well as in the Bohai Rim Region, where a five million-ton fuel ethanol
production base can be built in the region’s large saline areas, as proposed by the government think tank
Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology at Tsinghua University. See Liu Yuanyuan, China seeks
to develop biofuel industry despite production difficulties. April 24, 2012, at
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have a massive impact on employment generation unless China changes its current
importer role and seriously starts to grow the feedstock domestically, since feedstock
accounts for about 50 percent of the total cost of electricity produced by biomass
technologies in China (Chang et.al 2012; IRENA 2013, p66).152
Despite government’s tight control on all kinds of grain-based ethanol production,
majority feedstocks for biofuel in production are still grain-based mainly because the
technological development for alternatives was lagged behind.153 This also explains why
biofuel development is stagnating in China.154
In addition, China’s biodiesel industry still lacks a large scale of industrial
production mainly due to the high cost and therefore inconsistent supplies of feedstocks
(i.e. grease waste, or waste cooking oil).155 Even today, no national or provincial mandate
exists for biodiesel usage (USDA FAS 2013). This paper excludes biodiesel in the biofuel
employment calculation.
The choice of feedstocks for biofuel production in China should be based on the
following standards. First, they must be “beneficial” sources in the sense that they neither
threaten food security nor incurring more GHG emission than burning gasoline; second,

http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/04/china-seeks-to-promote-development-ofbiofuels-industry-despite-production-difficulties, retrieved September 27, 2014.
152
Remarks retrieved from the introduction of Division of Biofuels and Bio-chemicals, Institute of Nuclear
and New Energy Technology, Tsinghua University, on December 25, 2013, at
http://www.inet.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/ineten/5761/index.html
153
According to USDA FAS (2013), 64 percent of fuel ethanol production in China was sourced from corn,
30 percent from wheat and 6 percent from cassava in 2012.
154
Although the National Energy Bureau of China announced ambitious goal for developing biofuel, it still
only accounts for less than one percent of China’s liquid fuel production in 2013. See USDA FAS 2013; A
spokesperson for the National Energy Bureau said that the Chinese government has set a goal of utilizing
five million tons of ethanol fuel during the "12th Five-Year Plan" period spanning 2011 to 2015, nearly
doubling the goal set for the prior period (2006-2010). See Liu Yuanyuan, China seeks to develop biofuel
industry despite production difficulties. April 24, 2012, at
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/04/china-seeks-to-promote-development-ofbiofuels-industry-despite-production-difficulties, retrieved September 27, 2014.
155
China new energy network. Why is the Chinese biodiesel industry developing so slow? See:
http://www.newenergy.org.cn/html/01211/11211250543.html. Retrieved Oct 9, 2013. Also see USDA FAS
(2013) for relevant discussion.
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they should have minimal demand for soil quality (e.g. saline soil, desert, grassland, etc)
given China’s already serious land intensiveness; third, they need to be labor-intensive
(i.e. involve massive agricultural activities) to ensure significant amount of employment
opportunities.
Perhaps there is no single feedstock that meets all the standards. Switchgrass, for
example, demands lowest soil quality and contains largest amount of emission reduction,
yet its flexibility of growing conditions implies that it does not involve much agricultural
activities that are the main sources of job creation.156157 Therefore a combination of
different feedstocks is necessary for reaching the best outcome of biofuel development
before any technological breakthrough.158

3.4.6.9 Cost breakdown
The costs for generating bioenergy power include three critical components (IRENA
2013). The first part occurs in the process of growing biomass feedstocks. Feedstock cost
usually represents 40 percent to 50 percent of the total cost of electricity produced by
biomass technologies, varying by the transportation costs, labor costs involved and the
quality of the biomass sources (IRENA 2013, p66). Prices for the biomass sources range
between USD 10/tonne to USD 160/tonne (IRENA 2013, p67).
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According to Pollin et.al (2014b), switchgrass-based biofuels have emission level 124 percent lower
than the gasoline. See Table 3.5 Greenhouse gas emissions reductions for alternative biofuels and biomass
energy sources.
157
National Energy R&D Center for Non-food Biomass (NECE), Switchgrass, published on March 13th,
2013 at http://necb.cau.edu.cn/ylzy/nyzw/lzj/2013-03-13/520.html, retrieved on September 27, 2014.
158
Research and development for non-grain based biofuel production is still ongoing. See China Science
Newspaper Biomass: Grain and energy can coexist at http://news.bioon.com/article/6655908.html,
published on July 25th, 2013, retrieved on September 27, 2014.

152

The second cost component arises when biomass feedstocks are transformed into the
energy form that will be used to generate heat and/or electricity, or in most cases, when
biomass is transformed into biofuel. This includes the cost for the equipment (prime
mover and fuel conversion system), fuel handling and preparation machinery.
The last cost component is generated during the use of power generation
technologies, including engineering, construction and planning costs. It also includes grid
connection, roads and new infrastructure required for the project (IRENA 2013, p68). For
non-OECD countries, such costs are estimated to be in the range of USD 600 to USD
1400/kW (IRENA 2013,p68).
Based on the statistics for some non-OECD countries, I use an average of the costs to
represent the cost breakdown for China. The weighting for relevant sectors of biomass
energy is shown in Table 3.11 below. Table 3.12 presents the industries and weights for
bioenergy matched to the I-O model used in estimation.

3.4.7

Traditional fossil fuel sectors

3.4.7.1 Coal
UNEP et. al (2008) found that modern coal-fired power plants are becoming much
less labor-intensive than a decade ago. Specifically, nowadays a coal plant employs about
270 workers for a 1200-megawatt facility, compared with older plants employing up to
1000 workers for a 50 to 100-megawatt facility (p91). However, developing countries are
still lagging behind advanced nations in applying the technology to reduce the laborintensiveness in the coal sector.
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The coal sector in China distinguishes itself in its heavily weighted component of
transportation costs. Since most coal mining activities are conducted in the western and
northern part of China while major coal demand occurs in the eastern and southern part
of China, coal transportation cost usually makes up about 55 percent to 60 percent of the
consumer-end electricity costs (Mao et. al 2008). In addition to the transportation costs,
coal-fired energy production costs include production costs on the coal-mining sites as
well as the actual electricity generation costs occurred in the coal-fired power plant. Xie
et.al (2011) show that 88 percent of the coal-fired power generation costs come from the
coal products (including the mining, processing and transportation) and the rest (i.e.
electricity distribution and other related services) only constitute 12 percent. Depending
on these pieces of information from the existing literature, I construct the industries and
weights for coal energy as in Table 3.13 matched to the I-O data.

3.4.7.2 Oil/Natural Gas
The reason to combine oil and natural gas in the same industry, although they
have a slight difference in their cost structure to produce energy, is that they are also
combined in the input-output table. The process of using oil/natural gas to produce
energy mainly depends on activities in mining, transportation, refining and chemical
product manufacturing, as well as management-level activities (Cui et.al 2008). Table
3.14 presents two case studies of oil production cost structure. The weighting adopted in
this paper is based on their average. Table 3.15 presents the industries and weights for
oil/ natural gas sector matched to the I-O model used in estimation.
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3.5 Results and discussion
3.5.1 Employment generation per million of USD
Table 3.16 through 3.19 present the full set of results in terms of job created per $1
million USD spent in both renewable energy and fossil fuel sectors.
As we can see (Table 3.16), the bioenergy sector generates highest number of jobs
with the same amount of spending level, with 224 direct jobs per $1 million. This
contrasts with a range of about 27-29 for solar and wind energy due to the significant
amount of agricultural-related activities involved in bioenergy production. It is also
significantly higher than the direct jobs generation in the fossil fuel sectors, with range
between 30 to 70 jobs per $1 million. In terms of indirect jobs—those jobs generated
through the supply chains associated with renewable energy production—the three kinds
of renewable energy sectors show relatively consistent estimates, about 60-70 jobs per $1
million, and is much higher than the fossil fuel sectors with range between 40 to 50 jobs
per $1 million.
If equal weights are assigned across the three renewable energy sectors, then results
suggest that spending $1 million on renewable energy generates about 162.3 jobs,
including 93.1 direct and 69.2 indirect jobs on average. This contrasts with only 96.7
jobs, including 49.5 direct and 47.1 indirect jobs, generated from $1 million overall
spending on both coal and oil/gas.159
The results suggest that, for China, spending on the clean energy economy (with a
combination of the three kinds of renewable energy focused in this paper) will produce
about twice as many jobs per dollar of expenditure than an equal amount of spending on
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This average number is also calculated by assigning equal weights to the two fossil fuel sectors.
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fossil fuels. Thus a clean energy investment strategy will not destabilize the overall
employment level in China relative to the investment strategy biased towards the fossil
fuel energy sectors.

3.5.2

Composition of Employment

The informal workers mainly concentrate in the mining, construction, manufacturing,
transportation sectors, which are also the significant components for the renewable
energy and fossil fuel sectors. Table 3.17 presents the composition of employment in
terms of formal and informal employment. As we can see, the bioenergy sector is
constituted mostly (261 jobs or 90 percent of jobs) by employment in the informal
economy. Those are the people growing or logging for bioenergy feedstock, as well as
workers engaged in manufacturing equipment and machinery to transform feedstocks into
the energy form that will be used to generate heat and/or electricity.
On the other hand, three quarters of employment (or about 75 jobs per $1 million)
created by solar and wind energy sectors are within the informal economy. Workers in
the construction sector constitute a significant portion. Specific manufacturing sectors
also contribute to the informal component of jobs in these two sectors. They include
manufacturing of power transmission equipment and mining machinery for the solar
energy sector (i.e. for the mining of polycrystalline silicon materials crucial for building
solar panels), as well as manufacturing of metal products and other sectors related with
building wind turbines.
The fossil fuel energy sectors also have a high level of informal employment
composition. In the oil and natural gas sector, 20.9 jobs (or 81 percent of the jobs)
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generated from $1 million spending are within the informal economy. These are mostly
workers on the field extracting oil and natural gas, corresponding to the informalization
of the state-owned oil and natural gas enterprises in the recent decade. With respect to the
coal energy sector, 78.6 jobs (or 70 percent of the jobs) generated from $1 million
spending are within the informal economy. These are mostly workers in the railway
transportation, mining and coking sectors.
It is important to note that the amount of informal employment generation might be
overestimated either due to the inclusion of small and medium scale private enterprises,
or the fact that the final demand is only raising earnings instead of generating new
employment especially for the self-employed population (as discussed in section 4.5).

3.5.3

Cumulative employment generation

In addition to the estimates of employment generation in terms of jobs per
1$ million, this section presents the projection of the cumulative employment generation
(jobs generated over certain time period). The difference here lies in the nature of the
employment estimates as flows or stocks. Table 3.20 presents the cumulative
employment generation for solar, wind and bioenergy according to the investment target
in the 12th Five Year Plan period (2010-2015). Based on my estimation, the cumulative
formal employment generation in the three renewable energy sectors adds up to 3.7
million, among which direct jobs accounts for 1.7 million. When informal employment is
included, the cumulative employment generation in the three sectors adds up to 19.1
million, among which direct jobs accounts for 8.5 million.
Table 3.21 presents the cumulative employment generation in the wind sector
supposing the investment targets announced in the National Development and Reform
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Commission are met. As we can see, the wind sector could generate about 12.5 million
new jobs from 2010 to 2020 through investing a total of 264.4 billion USD, 57.2 million
new jobs from 2010 to 2030 through 571.8 billion USD investment and 180.6 million
new jobs from 2010 to 2050 through 1804.1 billion USD.
Among these jobs generated, 6.5 million, 14.1 million and 44.6 million respectively
are in the formal sector. If we take the annual average employment generation from the
three ranges of years to approximate employment generation for the end-year for each
period respectively, then we can roughly estimate that the wind sector generates 1.3
million jobs in year 2020, 2.9 million jobs in year 2030, and 4.5 million jobs in year
2050. This total employment in both formal and informal sectors would compare to 0.1,
0.3 and 0.6 percent of the labor force for year 2020, 2030 and 2050 respectively.160
Employment estimates for bioenergy and solar sectors are based on the assumption
that investment in these two sectors follows the same growth rate as in the wind sector.
The solar sector will generate relatively fewer employment opportunities than the wind
sector, yet the numbers are still significant. Specifically, the solar sector will generate
about 12.5 million new jobs by 2020, 27 million by 2030 and 85.1 million by 2050,
among which 3.1 million, 6.7 million and 21.3 million are in the formal sector
respectively, all relative to the 2010 level. The bioenergy will generate the largest number
of jobs especially when informal employment is included. Specifically, it will generate
employment for about 35.7 million new jobs by 2020, 43.3 million by 2030 and 136.6
million by 2050, among which 1.7 million, 3.8 million and 11.9 million are in the formal
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According to United Nations World Population Prospects (r. 2012), China’s working-age population
(age 15 to age 60) will be 929, 875 and 700 million respectively for year 2020, 2030 and 2050, assuming
constant fertility. See Table Population by Age Groups- Both Sexes at http://esa.un.org/wpp/ExcelData/population.htm
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sector respectively, compared with the 2010 level. However, it should be noted that the
formal and informal employment proportions in China should shift in favor of formal
employment by year 2050. Therefore the estimates for the informal employment could be
overestimated by then.

3.5.4

Output-Investment Ratio (output multipliers)

In this section, I compare the output multipliers over time to show their relative
stability for all energy sectors in the past decade.161 The output multipliers tell the amount
of output increase as a result of increase in final demand therefore providing information
on the production relationships between sectors in the I-O table. The data was taken from
the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), a project of the European Commission, which
produces annual national I-O tables for a selected number of countries. For China, the
WIOD tables are more aggregated (i.e. 35 sectors) than the one I used to produce the
employment estimates in this paper (i.e. 135 sectors). I use the same weighting schemes
that were applied to produce employment estimates to estimate output multipliers for
synthetic sectors of both renewable and fossil fuels—the energy sectors that are not
readily available in the original I-O tables. Table 3.22 presents the results.
As we can see, for all the energy sectors, the annual average percentage changes in
the output multipliers from 1995 to 2007 are negligible (all within the range of 1 percent
in absolute values).162 This concludes that the production relationships between the
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Output multipliers are calculated from the Leontief inverse for each of the four countries. The Leontief
inverse matrix is given by L=(I-A)-1 in which L is the Leontief inverse matrix, I is the identify matrix, and
A is the matrix of I-O coefficients derived from the WIOD tables.
162
I intentionally choose year 2007 as end point to avoid cyclical complication by the 2008 economic
crisis.
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domestic sectors in China did not change significant over the 12-year period between
1995 and 2007. This conclusion addresses the concerns for not incorporating dynamic
elements in the model. It is now reasonable to assume that output multipliers would
change only at a modest pace over the next two decades for which employment
projection will be made.
On the other hand, changes in output multipliers from 2007 to 2011 vary among
different sectors. Solar, wind and coal energy sectors still show relative consistent
production relationships (with the range of changes in output multipliers within 1 percent
in absolute values). Yet bioenergy and oil/gas sectors show moderately fast annual
average changes in output multipliers (1.1 percent and -1.3 percent respectively).163
However, since the changes are still not very dramatic, it is reasonable to think that the
employment estimates will not be improved much by using the 2011 I-O table with only
information on 35 aggregated sectors than to use the 2007 I-O table (with a detailed
breakdown of 135 sectors) as this paper does.

3.5.5

Productivity and declining Employment-Output (E/O) ratio

Although more updated I-O tables are available for year 2010 (with 54 sectors) and
year 2011 (with 35 sectors), the 2007 I-O table still provides the most sufficient details of
the production relationship among sectors relevant for energy production. This is why
this paper sticks to the 2007 I-O table to provide employment estimates for both
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The decline of output multiplier in oil/natural gas sector in China can be explained by China’s growing
imports of oil. In 2013, China has become the largest net imports of petroleum and other liquid fuels. See
EIA, China is now the world’s largest net importer of petroleum and other liquid fuels at
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15531, published on Mar 24th 2014, retrieved on October
13, 2014.
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renewable and fossil fuel energy sectors. Since I-O table also provides information on
gross output by sectors, lack of more updated I-O table with comparable level of details
as in the 2007 I-O table means that even though more recent data are available for
employment by sector, they are not compatible with the 2007 industry data and therefore
cannot be utilized to calculate a more updated E/O ratio at a desired level of detail.
To compensate for the lost information, I calculate the E/O ratio for period 2007 to
2011 to show its general pattern in the post-2007 years, although it is defined more
loosely and at a more aggregated level with a different unit compared with the E/O ratio I
use for the major estimation.164 Note that the E/O ratio is simply the inverse of labor
productivity therefore an increase in labor productivity will reduce the E/O ratio. I use the
same weighting scheme to aggregate relevant sectors to synthetic energy sectors of
interest to this paper.165 The results are presented in Table 3.23.
As we can see, the coal sector has the most significant productivity gain among all
energy sectors, almost twice the productivity gain for all renewable energy sectors. This
increasing productivity suggests that for the same spending level, the employment
generation in the coal sector will be much smaller now than five years ago. Although we
observe that coal sector show comparable employment generation per $1 million relative
to the renewable energy sectors in terms of both formal and informal employment, this
result suggests that the coal sector will very quickly lose its “advantage” in terms of labor
intensiveness. The oil and gas sector does not show productivity gain as dramatic as the
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Note that the latest China Statistical Yearbook 2013 did not publish estimates gross output value or the
annual average persons by industrial sector consistent with those published in previous yearbooks. Thus I
exclude the 2012 data for comparison.
165
Note that gross output data are not available for all the sectors relevant for the energy sectors (such as
R&D and Transportation). Under such circumstances, it is assumed that these sectors with missing
information will experience the same productivity changes as the weighted average of productivity changes
in other relevant sectors for producing the same kind of energy.
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other energy sectors, yet it is already the least labor-intensive energy sector among all.
Thus it is reasonable to conclude that renewable energy sectors, compared with fossil fuel
energy sectors, have the advantage over fossil fuel energy in terms of job creation in the
long run.

3.6 Conclusion
This paper addresses the impacts of transformative renewable energy investment
program for China. It focuses on estimating the relative employment impacts of
investments in three renewable energy sectors in China, i.e. solar, wind and bioenergy,
versus spending within China’s traditional fossil fuel sectors i.e. coal, oil and natural gas.
The existing literature has never treated employment impacts of investing in
renewable energy in China as a primary concern. Existing estimates either lack a
transparent methodological discussion or do not provide a clear definition of employment
as a concept. They are therefore incapable of serving as a solid empirical evidence for
policy discussions on building a clean energy economy.
This paper mainly builds on the Input-Output model to estimate the employment
impacts of renewable energy investment in China. One challenge in using an I-O model
to estimate how the increase in spending in certain renewable energy sectors affects the
whole economy is that these renewable energy sector activities are not as yet specified
into distinct industrial sectors, such as “solar energy sector” or “wind energy sector.” To
solve this problem, I use information on the cost components of such investment from the
existing literature and then use the existing sectors within the I-O model to construct
synthetic renewable energy sectors within China’s I-O model. These synthetic sectors—
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for solar, wind and bioenergy respectively—are based on the weighting structure that
reflects the composition of costs within each specific sector.
Based on this estimation methodology, I find that the bioenergy sector generates
highest number of jobs with a given level of spending. That is, I estimate that China’s
bioenergy sector generates 224 direct jobs per $1 million of spending. This contrasts with
a range of about 27-29 for solar and wind energy. The large difference here is the result
of the significant amount of agricultural-related activities involved in bioenergy
production. It is also significantly higher than the direct jobs generated through spending
within China’s fossil fuel sectors, which generate about 30 to 70 jobs per $1 million of
spending. In terms of indirect jobs—those jobs generated through the supply chains
associated with renewable energy production—the three kinds of renewable energy
sectors show relatively consistent estimates, about 60-70 jobs per $1 million, and is much
higher than the fossil fuel sectors with range between 40 to 50 jobs per $1 million. If
equal weights are assigned across the three renewable energy sectors, then results suggest
that spending $1 million on renewable energy generates about 162.3 jobs, including 93.1
direct and 69.2 indirect jobs on average. This contrasts with only 96.7 jobs, including
49.5 direct and 47.1 indirect jobs, generated from $1 million overall spending on both
coal and oil/gas.
In terms of formal and informal employment, with China’s bioenergy sector, to
begin with, job creation is heavily weighted toward informal jobs—specifically, about 90
percent, or 261 jobs per $1 million will be informal jobs. The proportions of informal
jobs are somewhat lower—at about 75 percent—with the solar and wind energy sectors.
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Within China’s fossil fuel energy sectors, informal job creation is about 81 percent in the
oil and gas sector and 70 percent in the coal sector.
If the investment target of the 12th Five Year Plan is met, then the total formal
employment generation in the three renewable energy sectors adds up to 3.7 million from
2010-2015, among which direct jobs accounts for 1.7 million. When informal
employment is included, the total employment generation in the three sectors adds up to
19.1 million, among which direct jobs accounts for 8.5 million.
Supposing the investment targets announced by the National Development and
Reform Commission are met, cumulative employment generation in the wind sector will
amount to 12.5 million new jobs from 2010 to 2020, 57.2 million from 2010 to 2030 and
180.6 million from 2010 to 2050. Among these jobs generated, 6.5 million, 14.1 million
and 44.6 million respectively are in the formal sector. If we take the annual average
employment generation from the three ranges of years to approximate employment
generation for the end-year for each period respectively, then we can roughly estimate
that the wind sector generates 1.3 million jobs in year 2020, 2.9 million jobs in year 2030,
and 4.5 million jobs in year 2050. This total employment in both formal and informal
sectors would compare to 0.1, 0.3 and 0.6 percent of the labor force for year 2020, 2030
and 2050 respectively.
Based on the same assumption, the solar sector will generate about 12.5 million new
jobs by 2020, 27 million by 2030 and 85.1 million by 2050, among which 3.1 million, 6.7
million and 21.3 million are in the formal sector respectively, all relative to the 2010
level. The bioenergy will generate the largest number of jobs especially when informal
employment is included. Specifically, it will generate about 35.7 million new jobs by
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2020, 43.3 million by 2030 and 136.6 million by 2050, among which 1.7 million, 3.8
million and 11.9 million are in the formal sector respectively, relative to the 2010 level.
However, it should be noted that the formal and informal employment proportions in
China should shift in favor of formal employment by year 2050. Therefore the estimates
for the informal employment could be overestimated by then.
The overall implication of this study is that a clean energy investment strategy will
not destabilize the overall employment level in China relative to the investment strategy
biased towards the fossil fuel energy sectors. The challenges of raising job quality
standards in China’s energy economy will nevertheless remain substantial.
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Table 3.1. Employment estimates of investing renewable energy in the existing
literature (continued onto next page)
Total
employmen
Specify job
t generation
Specify formal
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creation
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direct or

relative to

employment

indirect jobs

spending
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Studies

Methodology
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flow

renewable
energy

level
investment
(million)
Interview

Wind, solar

officials and

and

UNEP et.al

Stock; “by
No

No

No

(2008)

0.9
2007”

experts

biomass

NA

NA

CREIA
No

No

No
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No

Flow; 2008

580 billion

Stock;

RMB

2008-2011

1.8 trillion

Stock;

RMB

2011-2015

1.1

(2009)
2005 I-O
CASS
(2010)

table of three
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Wind and
solar

30

levels
China’s 12th
Five Year

NA

Bioenergy

No

No

3.6

Plan (2011)
CCICED

Stock;
NA

NA

No

No

$909 billion

(2011)

10.6
2011-2015

Wind, solar
IRENA

Literature

Stock; “by
thermal and

(2011)

survey

No

No

No

0.3
2010”

solar PV166
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Solar thermal technology first translates the sun’s light to heat and then to electricity, while solar PV
directly converts the sun’s light to electricity. Therefore solar PV technology is only effective during
daylight hours as storing electricity is not a particularly efficient process as compared to heat storage.
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Assuming 14
person/years
of
employment

Annual

Greenpeace

Stock; by
for every new

Wind

No

No

average of

(2012)

0.3
2020

megawatt and

€23 billion

€23 billion of
annual
investment
NDRC
NA

Wind

No

1.8 trillion

Stock; by

RMB

2050

No

(2012)

0.7

Wind, solar
REN21

Literature
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and

(2013)

No
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survey

No

1.7
2009-2012

biomass

Source: Author’s compilation.
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Table 3.2. Annual average wage (RMB) comparison between urban unit employees
and rural migrant workers
Urban unit

Rural migrant

Rural wages as a share

employees

workers

of the Urban Wages

2008

28,898

16,080

56%

2009

32,244

17,004

53%

2010

36,539

20,280

56%

2011

41,799

24,588

59%

2012

46,769

27,480

59%

Source: Table 4-11 China Statistical Yearbook 2013 and National report on rural migrant workers
in 2013.
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Table 3.3. Urban employment and urban units employment in 2007 and 2012 (in
millions)
Category

2007

%

2012

%

Urban employment (million)

293.5

100

371.0

100

Urban units employment

120.2

41.0

152.4

41.1

State-owned Units

64.2

21.9

68.4

18.4

Collective-owned Units

7.2

2.5

5.9

1.6

Other Ownership Units

48.8

16.6

78.1

21.1

173.3

59.0

218.6

58.9

Urban private enterprises

45.8

15.6

75.6

20.4

Self-employment

33.1

11.3

56.4

15.2

Not formally counted

94.4

32.2

86.6

23.3

Urban informal employment

Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2008 and 2012, Table 1-1. Details of urban
private enterprises and self-employed are retrieved from Table 4-14 and Table 4-15 in
China Statistical Yearbook (2008); Table 4-8 and Table 4-9 in China Statistical Yearbook
(2013).
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Table 3.4. In-grid solar PV electricity investment costs in 2006
Item
Research
Industrial design
Solar PV battery (including the
panels)
Silicon
Battery
Electronic components
GCI (grid connector inverter)
Electricity distribution measuring
and cables
Transportation
Installation and testing
Grid connection testing
Tax and other expenses

Source: Li et.al (2007)
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Percentage (%)
2
2
66
45.2
10.0
10.8
10
10
1.6
3.6
1.6
3.2

Table 3.5. Cost components of Solar PV of roof-top and ground-mounted types

Utlity Scale
Module cost
Silicon materials
Cell processing/
manufacturing
Module assembling
BOS cost

Inverter
Mounting and racking
components
Combiner box and
miscellaneous electrical
components

Residential Scale

In-grid
80%
40

Off-grid
30%
15

50%
25

20

7.5

12.5

20
20%
GroundRoof- top
mounted
2
3

7.5
70%
GroundRoof- top
mounted
8
9

12.5
50%
GroundRoof- top
mounted
5
6

6

6

21

22

15

16

1

2

5

5

3

4

13

9

3

3

11

13

Site preparation and
5
3
18
12
installation, labor costs
Battery storage
1
1
4
4
System design,
4
5
15
18
management, etc
Source: Calculated by author based on IRENA (2012) Figure 4.2 and 4.5.
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Table 3.6. Cost Structure for the Chinese Solar PV industry in 2012
Category
PV module costs
BOS costs except
installation costs for
utility-scale system
(ground-mounted)
Total installed costs for
ground-mounted system

USD/Watt
0.75
0.95

2.2

Source: Compiled by author based on IRENA (2013), p52-5
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Table 3.7. Detailed cost structure for the Chinese Solar PV industry in 2012
USD per Watt
PV module costs
Silicon materials
Cell processing/
manufacturing
Module assembling
BOS costs except
installation costs
Inverter
Mounting and racking
components

0.75

Percentage in
2007
45.2

8.5
8.5
0.95

Combiner box and
miscellaneous electrical
components
Battery storage
System design,
management, etc
Installation costs

Percentage in
2012
34.1
17

0.5

Site preparation and
installation, labor costs

43.2

49.6

7.6

10

15.2

11.6

5.1

10.8

2.5

10

12.7

7.2

22.7

5.2

22.7

Source: Calculated by author based on Table 3 to Table 5
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Table 3.8. Industries and Weights for Solar Energy in the I-O Models
I-O Industry
Mining of Non-Ferrous Metal Ores
Smelting of Non-Ferrous Metals and
Manufacture of Alloys
Manufacture of Equipments for Power
Transmission and Distribution and Control
Manufacture of Other Electronic Equipment
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery for
Mining, Metallurgy and Construction
Research and Experimental Development
Construction

Source: calculation by author based on Table 6
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Weight (%)
17.1
8.5
11.1
12.7
15.2
12.7
22.7

Table 3.9. On-shore wind energy cost structure: the world average versus China
(continued onto next page)
World

Cost in

average cost

China

structure

(USK/kw)

Weights
(%)
Rotor blades (glass
fibre, eposxy resin or

50%~60% of the

polyster)

turbine costs, or

Tower

32% to 50% of

28
the total costs

Gearbox
13% of the
turbine costs,
Turbine cost

Generator, transformer,

(64% to 84%)

power converter

therefore 8.3% to

610

7

11% of the total
costs
Other costs
(miscellaneous costs
associated with tower,

3% to 43.7% of

such as rotor hub,

the turbine costs

12
cabling and rotor
shafts)
Construction of access
Civil works

roads and other related

(4% to 16%)

infrastructure required

260
for the wind farm
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22

Transportation and
installation of wind
turbine and towers
Grid
Connection to the local
connection
distribution or

260

18

169

13

costs (9% to
transmission network
14%)
Planning and
project costs
(4% to 10%)
Total

1300

Source: Author's own calculation based on IRENA 2012b, p19&p24; IRENA (2013).
Note: Italicized numbers are calculated by author assuming world average cost share.
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Table 3.10. Industries and Weights for Wind Energy in the I-O Models
I-O Industry

Weight (%)

Research and Experimental Development

13

Construction

22

Manufacture of Synthetic Materials

10

Manufacture of Boiler and Prime Mover

7

Manufacture of Metal Products

30

Manufacture of Equipments for Power

10

Transmission and Distribution and Control
Production and Supply of Electric Power and
Heat Power

Source: calculation by author based on Table 8
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8

Table 3.11. Bioenergy cost structure
Weight (%)
Grow and transport biomass feedstock

45

Prime mover and fuel and conversion system

31.5

Fuel handling and preparation machinery

4.5

Infrastructure& logistics

7.7

Civil works

7.3

Grid connection

3

Planning

1

Source: Author's own calculation based on IRENA 2013
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Table 3.12. Industries and Weights for Bioenergy in the I-O Models
I-O Industry

Weight (%)

Agriculture

25

Forestry

20

Manufacture of Lifters

36

Construction

15

Manufacture of Equipment for Power

3

Transmission and Distribution and Control
Research and Experimental Development

Source: calculation by author based on Table 10
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1

Table 3.13. Industries and Weights for Coal in the I-O Models
I-O Industry

Weight (%)

Mining and Washing of Coal

18

Coking

18

Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery for

1

Mining, Metallurgy and Construction
Production and Supply of Electric Power and

10

Heat Power
Transport Via Railway

51

Other Services

2

Source: calculation by author based on Mao et.al (2008) and Xie et.al (2011)
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Table 3.14. Cost structure of Oil/Natural Gas energy

Case study 1

Case study 2

Average

Material Cost

26.5

12.5

19.5

Wage and Compensation

4.2

4.7

4.45

Mining Cost (well-injecting fee,
Mining
labor under-well fee, well testing
25.8

54.8

40.3

Transportation fee

7.9

4.8

6.35

Transportation

Management

35.6

23.2

29.4

R&D

fee, maintenance and repair costs,
etc)

Source: Bing et.al (2008)
Note: Case study 1 is based on data from China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC);
Case study 2 is based on data from China Petroleum and Chemical Cooperation (or SINOPEC)
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Table 3.15. Industries and weights for oil/gas energy in the I-O Models
I-O Industry

Weight (%)

Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas

50

Processing of Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel

20

Transport Via Pipeline

5

Other Services

25

Source: calculation by author based on Table 14
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Table 3.16. Total employment generation in renewable energy and fossil fuel energy
sectors (unit: jobs per $1 Million)
Direct

Indirect

Direct+ Indirect

93.1

69.2

162.3

Solar PV

28.1

72.0

100.1

Wind

27.1

73.0

100.1

Bioenergy

224.0

62.5

286.4

49.5

47.1

96.7

Coal

68.0

43.6

111.6

Oil/Natural Gas

31.0

50.7

81.7

Renewables
(average)

Fossil Fuels
(average)

Source: Author's own calculation

186

Table 3.17. Formal and informal employment share in total employment in
renewable energy and fossil fuel energy sectors
Total
Formal

Informal

employment

employment

share

share

employment
(jobs per $1
Million)
Renewables
Solar PV

100.1

26%

74%

Wind

100.1

25%

75%

Bioenergy

286.4

9%

91%

111.6

30%

70%

81.7

19%

81%

Fossil Fuels
Coal
Oil/Natural
Gas

Source: Author’s calculation
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Table 3.18. Formal employment generation in renewable energy and fossil fuel
energy sectors (unit: jobs per $1 Million)
Direct

Indirect

Direct+ Indirect

Solar PV

11.0

14.7

25.7

Wind

9.8

14.9

24.7

Bioenergy

13.2

11.7

24.9

23.5

9.5

33.0

10.1

5.8

15.9

Renewables

Fossil Fuels
Coal
Oil/Natural
Gas

Source: Author’s calculation
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Table 3.19. Informal employment generation in renewable energy and fossil fuel
energy sectors (unit: jobs per $1 Million of USD)
Direct

Indirect

Direct+ Indirect

Solar PV

17.1

57.3

74.4

Wind

17.3

58.1

75.4

Bioenergy

210.8

50.8

261.4

Coal

44.5

34.1

78.6

Oil/Natural Gas

20.9

44.9

65.8

Renewables

Fossil Fuels

Source: Author’s calculation
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Table 3.20. Total Employment generation between 2010 to 2015
Total Formal

Formal + Informal

Employment

Employment

generation in 2010-

generation in 2010-

2015 (million jobs)

2015 (million jobs)

Target investment in
2010-2015 (billion
USD)
Direct

40.3

0.5

1.1

Total

25

1.0

4.0

Direct

85.5

0.8

2.3

Total

24.7

2.1

8.6

Direct

22.6

0.3

5.1

Total

25

0.6

6.5

Solar

Wind

Bioenergy

Source: Author's own calculation based on the investment information from National
Development and Reform Commission (2012), 12th Five Year Plan on the renewable
energy development p37.
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Table 3.21. Cumulative employment generation by 2020, 2030 and 2050 relative to
2010 level
Formal Sector:
Formal and Informal
cumulative
Cumulative investment

Sector: cumulative
employment

target (billion USD)

employment
generation
generation (millions)
(millions)

2020

2030

2050

Direct
Solar

124.6

269.5

Direct
264.4

571.8

Direct
69.9

151.1

2020

2030

2050

1.6

3.6

11.2

3.5

7.6

23.9

3.1

6.7

21.3

12.5

27.0

85.1

2.6

5.6

17.7

3.4

15.5

48.9

6.5

14.1

44.6

12.5

57.2

180.6

0.9

2.0

6.3

27.9

33.9

106.8

1.7

3.8

11.9

35.7

43.3

136.6

1804.1

Total
Bioenergy

2030 2050

850.4

Total
Wind

2020

476.9

Total

Source: Author's calculation based on the investment target in National Development and
Reform Commission (2012), China's wind energy development roadmap, Table 3-2.
Note: Investment target for wind is direct in National Development and Reform
Commission (2012). Investment target for bioenergy and solar is derived based on the
assumption that they share the same growth rate with that for the wind energy sector.
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Table 3.22. Output multipliers and percentage changes in energy sectors in China,
1995-2011
1995

2007

2011

Renewables

1995 to 2007

2007 to 2011

Annual average % increase

Solar

2.41

2.56

2.64

0.5%

0.7%

Wind

2.40

2.56

2.58

0.6%

0.2%

Bioenergy

2.17

2.31

2.41

0.5%

1.1%

Coal

2.05

2.15

2.14

0.4%

-0.1%

Oil and Natural Gas

2.18

2.17

2.06

-0.1%

-1.3%

Fossil fuels

Source: Author's calculation based on World Input-Output Database
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Table 3.23. Productivity changes in energy sectors in China
Measured as the inverse of productivity: Number of persons 1 million of RMB

2007

2011

Renewables

2007 to 2011
Annual Average
Percentage change

Solar

3.19

2.03

-9.1%

Wind

3.19

2.02

-9.2%

Bioenergy

3.23

2.14

-8.4%

Coal

2.67

1.22

-13.6%

Oil and Natural Gas

0.91

0.78

-3.6%

Fossil fuels

Source: Author's calculation based on Table 13-2 or 14-2 Main Indicators of Industrial
Enterprises above Designated Size by Industrial Sector from China Statistical Yearbook
2008-2012. Price index based on Table 9-1, China Statistical Yearbook 2012. Data for
productivity for construction sector is calculated based on Table 15-34 CSY 2012 and
Table 14-36 in CSY 2008.
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Figure 3.1. Typical cost components for renewable power generation technologies by
region167

Source: Extracted from IRENA (2013) Figure 2.3
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Solar photovoltaic (PV) directly converts solar energy into electricity using a PV cell made of a
semiconductor material. Concentrating solar power (CSP) devices concentrate energy from the sun’s rays
to heat a receiver to high temperatures. This heat is transformed first into mechanical energy (by turbines or
other engines) and then into electricity – solar thermal electricity (STE). See definition from IEA, at
http://www.iea.org/topics/solarpvandcsp/. Other renewable energy sources in the figure are selfexplanatory.
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